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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This White Paper examines present and future plans for a SPS in a political-legal
context. Since a SPS will have international ramifications, the analysis focuses on
international political and legal matters.
A number of existing international organizations, having both scientific and techni-
cal competence and a political-legal orientation, are involved in the governance of space
objects orbiting at geostationary heights. The public international institutions include
the United Nations, and in particular, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
and the International Telecommunication Union. A private international institution with
a scientific focus is the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).
The United Nations has been instrumental in the preparation of two international
agreements that bear directly on the uses of outer space, the Moon and celestial bodies
(the space environment) by a SPS. These are the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
other Celestial Bodies and the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects. The United States is a party to both agreements, and they have
entered into force. As a chief proponent of these two major international legal instru-
ments, the United States has sought to assure the full and free use of the space environ-
ment for all peaceful purposes. These agreements have been premised on the res communis
international legal principle. Thus, the space environment is open for the use of all
who are able to use it. It cannot become an area subject to the sovereignty of a nation-
state. The Liability Convention is intended to prevent against misuse of the space
environment. It provides that monetary damages will compensate for misuse.
Since the 1967 Treaty preserves the right to the free use of the space environment,
States and others having the capacity to do so are entitled to make use of geostationary
orbital positions. However, a formal definition/delimitation of sovereign airspace and
non-sovereign space environment does not exist. Consequently, in 1976 eight equatorial
States issued the Bogot6 Declaration. In this they asserted that the spatial area
superjacent to their territorial areas was airspace and subject to their sovereignty.
The space-resource States and others have rejected this claim.
The ITU, pursuant to the 1973 Telecommunication Convention and Final Protocol,
continues to make allocations of radio frequencies. There has been a trend at the ITU
to link the radio spectrum with the geostationary orbital position. There is no question
that the ITU is charged with making microwave frequency allocations. However, such
allocations depend upon the national assignments of such frequencies which are recorded
with the ITU. The ITU continues to be responsible for preventing harmful interferences
by competing broadcasts. It remains to be seen whether the UN, the ITU, or a new inter-
national entity will be given the principal responsibility for protecting national and
international wants and needs for the efficient, economic, and equitable use of a SPS.
International law has not established international microwave exposure standards.
Nonetheless, the Liability Convention has established international tort law rules. If
microwave transmissions of energy from geostationary levels were to cause harm to plants,
animals, and tangible items, the Convention would cover the subject.
Suggestions have been made for a new International Conference on Space Law. If and
when such a conference is held, it is probable that scientific, technological, political,
and legal aspects of a SPS will be considered.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
I.I International Agreements and a SPS
The needs of an energy-hungry world have suggested the use of a
Satellite Power System (SPS) to bring supplies of energy from outer
space to Earth-based consumers. 1 Since solar energy at the distance
from the Earth at which geostationary space objects can conveniently
orbit is regarded as a world natural resource, it is to be expected
that the gathering, transmission, and utilization of the resource will
require international agreement.
The present inquiry will focus on the possibility of obtaining
international agreements having legal significance relating to:
(I) the availability to a nation-state of geostationary
orbital positions (slots) for its space objects;
(2) allocations and effective use of microwave frequencies;
(3) microwave exposure standards.
1.2 Role of Law and International Organizations
My assessment will take into account the current state of interna-
tional law on the foregoing matters. Of necessity it will have to
examine the political context in which this law has developed. This will
require an analysis of the role of the international organizations that
1
It has been estimated that by 2000 the demand for electricity in
the United States will be almost three times higher than it is now.
have been engaged in the development of legal principles, rules, and
standards for these subjects. It will also require an assessment of
the possible future roles of such institutions.
Such institutions will continue to be international in scope.
Further, they will continue to be influenced by the lively forces of
science and technology and by the human values that constantly give
direction to political-legal judgments.
Pragmatic considerations will play a substantial role in what
appears below. International organizations will be treated as having
the principal responsibility for obtaining viable legal principles, rules,
and standards. It will be their function, taking into account the needs
and wants of sovereign nation-states, to obtain common denominators.
Different techniques are available to obtain such common agreement. For
example, with the United Nations General Assembly Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) operating on the basis of consensus,
its final agreements will have to command themselves to the strong support
of the States composing the world community. Having arrived at their
agreements these States will then be critically charged with securing
the day-to-day implementation of the agreements. Such national implemen-
tation will not be possible unless all affected States, presumably a
very large number of the community, are persuaded that the international
agreement will serve and satisfy their respective mutual interests. The
keystone to the implementation and enforcement of international legal
and political promises is simply the realization that an orderly and
harmonious implementation of agreed commitments will serve the general
needs of all.
This time-tested prescription works best when it is acknowledged
that over time States perceive that their needs and wants do _hange.
As science and technology open new vistas the appetites of beneficiaries
or potential beneficiaries take on new dimensions. Thus, the product
of international law and of international organizations, in order to
meet existing and future world-community expectations, must rely upon
the firm facts of science and technology.
1.3 National Perspectives in International Organizations
As noted, the present world-community expectation is that the outer
space environment (outer space, the Moon, and celestial bodies) is a
world resource. Following World War II a very large number of new States
entered the world community. Many of them are identified as less-
developed-countries (LDCs), and their assertiveness has been noticed in
many of the world's international organizations. Like all States they
possess the condition of sovereignty, i.e., legal equality.
The newer States have been identified with efforts to improve their
economic well-being. They have urged the need to establish a New
International Economic Order. They have sought preferential benefits in
ocean areas and have helped to evolve the concepts of the Common Heritage
of Mankind and the Province of Mankind. The newer States have mobilized
voting and consultative blocs in international organizations in order to
overcome their separate political weaknesses. Although their preponderant
voting power in the United Nations has resulted in the expression "paper
majorities," nonetheless, it cannot be denied that in their consolidated
positions they are influencing the substance of international agreements.
In the context of the present analysis a small bloc of States situated
at the Equator has put forward claims to special rights in the area of
the space environment in which geostationary space objects can conven-
iently orbit.
.1.4 Composition of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
In the past the major space States, particularly the United States
and the Soviet Union, have very substantially influenced--either by their
action or their inaction--the development of international space law at
the United Nations. In 1958 the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space consisting of 18 members
of which three were within the Soviet bloc, namely, the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The other members of the committee were
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, India, Iran, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the United Arab Republic, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The Soviets considered the committee to
be "one-sided and heavily weighted in favor of the Western powers. ''2
Consequently, the three socialist States refused to participate in the
meetings of the committee. Joining the boycott were India and the UAR
who considered that the committee could not usefully serve its purposes
in the absence of the Soviet Union.
Through General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV) of December 12, 1959
COPUOS was established. To the Ad Hoc committee members were added
Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania of the socialist bloc and also
Austria and Lebanon. In this manner the 18-member Ad Hoc committee was
2"Unanimity on Outer Space," 6 United Nations Review 18 (February
1960).
enlarged in COPUOSto 24 members. The socialist bloc obtained 7 out of
the 24 members.
The committee was again enlarged in 1961 by adding Chad, Mongolia,
Morocco, and Sierra Leone.3 The 28 became37 on December18, 1973 with
the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 3182 (XXVIII). Added as new
membersby appointment of the President of the General Assembly were
Chile, the GermanDemocratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, and Venezuela. Then, on
December20, 1977 the 37 became47 with the adoption of General Assembly
Resolution 32/196B. Newmemberswere Benin, Colombia, Ecuador, Iraq,
Netherlands, Niger, Philippines, Turkey, United Republic of Cameroon,
and Yugoslavia. Two facts stand out in the augmentations of membership.
First, the space resource States were joined by representatives of the
LDCs. Second, the equatorial States received strong representation.
With the admission of Nauru to the United Nations in 1976 there were 9
equatorial States as members. Of these five, namely Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Indonesia, and Kenyaare committee members. Congo, Nauru,
Uganda, and Zaire have not been appointed to the committee. Since
geostationary space objects find an orbital position above the Equator
to be congenial the namedStates have a particular interest in this subject.
1.5 Additional International Forums
While it may not be possible to forecast with finality the respective
roles of States having the capacity to embark on major space programs
(space-resource States) and all the others, yet it is feasible to predict
3General Assembly Resolution 1721E (XVI), 20 December 1961.
that they will interact on behalf of their interests in all available
international institutions. If the SPS is to emerge as a reality at
the end of the present century or in the next, States will have an
extended period in which to work out their legal and institutional
needs. This is not to say, however, that the legal and institutional
issues that are under investigation in this study will be put off to
future dates. In fact, positions by States have already been identified
on subjects within the scope of this present analysis. Thus, at both the
United Nations with its original concern for the definition and/or the
delimitation of outer space, with the emphasis on the fixing of a
boundary between airspace and outer space, 4 and at the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) with its initial function of allocating
radio frequencies so that broadcasters might avoid harmful interferences
and its more recent involvement in the allocation of geostationary orbital
positions for space objects, there have been contributions to the
development of legal regimes. It is even possible that there will be
conflicting claims on the part of these two institutions as to the extent
of their respective interests and jurisdictions.
4The question of determining where outer space begins was considered
by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1959. It
was not until 1967 that this subject was placed on the agenda of the legal
subcommittee of COPUOS. Owing to lack of time and more pressing matters
it was not considered in any detail until 1977. At the April 1977 session
of the subcommittee its chairman redesigned the Committee's focus by
entitling the agenda item "Matters relating to the definition and/or
delimitation of outer space and outer space activities," U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/196, pp. l and 9 (ll April 1977). At the April 1978 meeting of
the legal subcommittee the agenda item was again modified. This time it
was "Questions relating to the definition and/or delimitation of outer
space and outer space activities, also bearing in mind questions relating
to the geostationary orbit," U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/218, pp. 3, 9-I0 (13 April
1978). The changes in the agenda item designations suggest an enlarged
interest within the UN in new space activities, including presumably those
associated with the Space Shuttle, and on geostationary orbits, including
presumably their use in space telecommunications.
1.6 The Possibility of Unilateral SPS Activity
As States contemplate, both at the present, near future, and more
distant future, their respective needs and wants in the solar energy
field, they may have to identify the forum or forums in which decisions
are to be taken. A continuing assessment might take into account not
only the references of SPS issues to international institutions. It
is also possible to contemplate that one or more of the space resource
States would wish to embark on an essentially unilateral SPS undertaking.
While such a position would be unpopular internationally, it might--at
least at the outset--produce a position that would be advantageous
later in political bargaining. Or, rather than arriving at SPS policies
through a universal international body, such as the UN or the ITU, it
would be possible for like-minded and essentially equal space resource
States to form agreements serving their own narrowly defined international
interests. Within this last mentioned classification, it would be
possible to consider regional bodies insofar as radio frequencies and
orbital positions for geostationary space objects do possess important
geographical characteristics.
Against these short-term considerations are provisions contained in
the "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies. ''5 Thus, Article l, paragraph l, provides "The exploration and
use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall
518 UST 2410, TIAS 6347. It will be referred to hereafter as
"Principles Treaty." The agreement entered into force for the United
States on October lO, 1967. See Appendix A.
be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and
shall be the province of all mankind." When this paragraph was analyzed
by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as it engaged in its
constitutional function of giving its advice and consent to the President,
the Committee formally stated that "nothing in Article l, paragraph l, of
the Treaty diminishes or alters the right of the United States to determine
how it shares the benefits and results of its space activities. ''6
1.7 Policy as the Product of Legal and Scientific Forces
Admittedly, the science and technology of the radio spectrum and of
the effectively operating geostationary orbit are complex. Undoubtedly,
many of the aspects of an operating SPS will present challenges of
enormous magnitude. The processes of international law and its institu-
tions have a complexity of their own, admittedly different from the
complexity of the scientific and technological world, but nonetheless in
their way such legal and political processes are complex. The purpose
here is to effect a meaningful joinder of these two processes so that the
SPS and its solar energy will serve the needs of mankind.
As stated, solar energy is a natural resource. The radio spectrum
is a natural resource. The slot occupied by a geostationary satellite in
orbit is a natural resource. As natural resources of the space environ-
ment pursuant to the Principles Treaty they are to be treated as the
province of all mankind. And, as provided in Article 33 of the 1973 ITU
Convention the parties are obliged to bear in mind in the employment of
6"Treaty on Outer Space, Report," 90th Cong. Ist Sess., Executive
Rept. No. 8, p. 4 (April 18, 1967).
frequency bands for space radio services that "radio frequencies and the
geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources, that they
must be used efficiently and economically so that countries or groups of
countries may have equitable access to both in conformity with the
provisions of the Radio Regulations according to their needs and the
technical facilities at their disposal. ''7 Thus, to the province of
mankind concept has been added the further requirement that this resource
must be used equitably, efficiently, and economically.
From the perspective of international law and organization the
question must be asked and answered: Who may use such resources? Under
what conditions may such resources be used? The answers will be found
in existing legal and political constraints. And, as the law is a living
institution in a living society, the answers will also be found in future
developments.
The following constitutes an early effort to provide some of the
answers. Throughout the methodology will be to examine relevant facts,
often in a most detailed and precise fashion. Conclusions drawn from
such facts will then be put forward.
7TIAS 8572. This agreement entered into force for the United States
on April 7, 1976.
Chapter Two
THEITU ANDTHEALLOCATIONOF
THERADIOFREQUENCYSPECTRUM
2.1 Essential Powers of the ITU
The several International Telecommunication Conventions have given
to the ITU powers relating to the allocation of radio frequencies.
Thus, the International Telecommunication Convention signed at Montreux
on November 12, 1965 provided in Article 4.2. that a purpose of the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) would be to:
(a) effect allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and
registration of radio frequency assignments in order
to avoid harmful interference between radio stations
of different countries; and,
(b) coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference
between radio stations of different countries and to
improve the use made of the radio frequency spectrum . .
The ITU is now governed by the new Telecommunication Cbnvention and
Final Protocol signed at Malaga-Torremolinos on October 25, 1973.
Pursuant to the 1973 convention the ITU became critically involved in
the use of the geostationary orbit by space objects.l Article 4
identified in language identical to that appearing above a major purpose
of the Union.
ITIAS 8572. It entered into force for the United States on April 7,
1976. Both conventions must be taken into account in an analysis of
telecommunications law and practice. Although the United States is bound
by the 1973 Convention to the extent that other States have not accepted
it, but are parties to the 1965 Convention, they remain bound under its
terms in their relations with the United States.
II
The 1965 and the 1973 Conventions in identical language made
provision for the use of Administrative Conferences by the ITU. The
World Administrative Radio Conference is one of such bodies. The agenda
of such a conference may allow for the partial revision of preexisting
Administrative Regulations, the complete revision of one or more of
those Regulations, and "any other question of a worldwide character
within the competenceof the conference. ''2 Following agreement on the
managementof radio activities the terms in the form of "Radio
Regulations" are submitted to participating States for ratification.
Upon ratification the agreement has the force of law.
The International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) of the ITU
performs important functions. Pursuant to Article 13 of the 1965 Conven-
tion and Article I0 of the 1973 Convention the five independent members
of the IFRB are to be elected in such a way as to ensure equitable
distribution amongthe regions of the world. Moreover, they are expected
to exercise their functions "not as representing their respective
countries, or of a region, but as custodians of an international public
trust. ''3
Since the precise duties of the membersof the IFRBare not always
accurately presented, it will be helpful to quote the language of the
Conventions. Both conventions recite that the "essential duties" of the
IFRBshall be:
(a) to effect an orderly recording of frequency assignments
made by the different countries so as to establish, in
accordance with the procedure provided for in the Radio
2Article 7 of the respective Conventions.
3Article 13, 1965 Convention; Article I0, 1973 Convention.
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Regulations and in accordance with any decision which
maybe taken by competent conferences of the Union,
the date, purpose and technical characteristics of
each of these assignments, with a view to ensuring
formal international recognition thereof; 4
2.2 Association by ITU of Radio Frequencies and Orbital Positions
The duties of the IFRB were enormously enlarged in 1973. Thus, in
Article 10.3. it is provided that the Board is:
(b) to effect, in the same conditions and for the same
purpose, an orderly recording of the positions
assigned by countries to geostationary satellites.
In establishing this new function for the ITU a direct association was
made between frequency assignments and the orbital position or "slot"
occupied by a space object having the capacity to make use of radio
frequencies or channels. Since 1973, pursuant to Article 33 of the 1973
Convention, the ITU has moved from the essentially ministerial function
of registering national assignments of space orbits to the furnishing
of advice to members and to the formulation of policy relating "to the
equitable, effective and economical use of the geostationary satellite
orbit. ''5
Despite the making of the above association in the quoted language,
the question of whether from an analytical point of view there is a
need to join the "recording of frequency assignments" to "positions
assigned by countries to geostationary satellites" deserves critical
assessment. In referring to the radio spectrum and orbits it has been
suggested that the preferred designation is "the nominal orbit/spectrum
4Article 13.1. of the 1965 Convention; Article 10.3. of the 1973
Convention.
5Infra, p. 15.
13
because it is impossible to consider separately these two concepts ....
7
This analysis appears below.
In both Conventions the IFRB is obliged
(c) to furnish advice to Members with a view to the operation
of the maximum practicable number of radio channels in
those portions of the spectrum where harmful interference
may occur.
In paragraph 3.d) of the 1973 Convention the IFRB, as in the 1965
Convention, paragraph 3.c), is obliged, in addition to performing
essential duties, also to "perform any additional duties, concerned with
the assignment and utilization of frequencies." To authorize the IFRB
a new involvement in geostationary satellite orbits, the following
language has been added to the quoted phrase from Article lO, namely,
"and with the utilization of the geostationary satellite orbit, in
accordance with the procedures provided for in the Radio Regulations."
However, such additional duties of the IFRB, both under the 1965 and the
1973 Convention, are to be undertaken only "as prescribed by a competent
conference of the Union, or by the Administrative Council with the
consent of a majority of the Members of the Union, in preparation for
or in pursuance of the decisions of such a conference."
Finally, both Conventions in Articles 13 and lO prescribe that the
IFRB is to "maintain such essential records as may be related to the
performance of its duties." Numerous provisions of an administrative
nature set out in the 1965 Convention are not repeated in Article lO of
6Richard E. Butler, "World Administrative Radio Conference for
Planning Broadcasting Satellite Service," 5 Journal of Space Law 93
(1977). Mr. Butler is the Deputy Secretary-General of the International
Telecommunication Union.
71nfra, pp. 29, 49, 55-59.
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the 1973 Convention.
2.3 Harmful Interference with Natural Resources: Spectrum and Orbit
Both as a practical and as a legal matter the radio frequency is
treated as a natural resource. So that this natural resource may be
employed beneficially and in an orderly manner the members of the ITU
have accepted the concept of "Harmful Interference." This concept is
set forth in identical language in the 1965 Convention Article 48 and
in the 1973 Convention Article 35. Thus, it is provided that:
I. All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established
and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful
interference to the radio services or communications of
other Members or of recognized private operating agencies,
or of other duly authorized operating agencies which
carry on radio service, and which operate in accordance
with the provisions of the Radio Regulations.
2. Each Member undertakes to require the private operating
agencies which it recognizes and the other operating
agencies duly authorized for this purpose, to observe the
provisions of [paragraph l].
3. Further, the Members recognize the desirability of taking
all practicable steps to prevent the operation of
electrical apparatus and installations of all kinds from
causing harmful interference to the radio services or
communications mentioned in [paragraph l].
The two Conventions carry with them a definition of the expression
"Harmful Interference." Thus, in the respective Annexes 2, entitled
"Definition of Certain Terms used in the Convention and in the Regulations
of the International Telecommunication Union," the expression is defined
as "Any emission, radiation or induction which endangers the functioning
of a radionavigation service or of other safety services (e.g., 'Any
radiocommunication service used permanently or temporarily for the
safeguarding of human life and property') or seriously degrades, obstructs
15
or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in
accordance with the Radio Regulations."
The ITU has consistently sought to encourage a rational use of the
radio frequency spectrum. Thus, Article 46 of the 1965 Convention states
that:
Members and Associate Members recognize that it is
desirable to limit the number of frequencies and the
spectrum space used to the minimum essential to
provide in a satisfactory manner the necessary
services. To that end it is desirable that the
latest technical advances be applied as soon as
possible•
The 1973 Convention made special provisions for radio. It particu-
larly focused on the rational use of the radio frequency spectrum and
connected this subject with the geostationary satellite orbit. Following
the lead contained in Article 46 of the 1965 Convention and Article lO.3.b)
of the 1973 Convention the parties agreed in Article 33 to the following:
l • Members shall endeavor to limit the number of frequencies
and the spectrum space used to the minimum essential to
provide in a satisfactory manner the necessary services.
To that end they shall endeavor to apply the latest
technical advances as soon as possible.
. In using frequency bands for space radio services Members
shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the
geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources,
that they must be used efficiently and economically so
that countries or groups of countries may have equitable
access to both in conformity with the provisions of the
Radio Regulations according to their needs and the technical
facilities at their disposal.
Aside from the fact that the 1973 Convention places a somewhat greater
duty on ITU members to limit frequencies and spectrum space than in the
1965 Convention, the 1973 addition of paragraph 2 is of substantial
importance. This paragraph reflects a direct and greater concern for
"limited natural resources" consisting of radio frequencies and the
16
geostationary satellite orbit.
Although the 1973 Convention focused on the need for radio fre-
quencies for satellites, this subject was also considered in 1965.
Resolution 24 of the 1965 Montreux Conference is entitled "Telecommunica-
tion and the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space." Resolution 24 called
attention to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1721 (XVI) and
1962 (XVII) which had stated that satellite telecommunication should be
available to all nations on a global and non-discriminatory basis and
had identified important legal principles relating to the conduct of
States in the exploration and use of the space environment. The concept
that the space environment constituted a global natural resource available
on a widely distributed basis was reflected in a call upon the members
of the ITU to promote the principle that "all countries should have equal
,18
opportunity to use space telecommunication facilities.
2.4 The Governmental Process of the ITU
To facilitate the implementation of the purposes of the Conventions
9
each made reference to the use of and the binding force of ITU Regulations,
and Administrative Regulations. I0 Both Conventions provided that ratifi-
cation or accession "involves acceptance of the Administrative Regulations
in force at the time of ratification or accession." Article 42 of the
1973 Convention identifies the force of such regulations, namely, "The
81nternational Telecommunication Conference (Montreux, 1965) Resolution
No. 24, at p. 204.
9Article 15 of the 1965 Convention.
lOArticles 42 and 43 of the 1973 Convention.
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provisions of the Convention are completely by the Administrative
Regulations which regulate the use of telecommunication and shall be
binding on all Members." In the event of inconsistent provisions in
the Convention and Administrative Regulations the Convention prevails.
The ITU has complementedeach of the Conventions with sets of
Administrative Regulations dealing with Telegraph, Telephone, Radio,
and Additional Radio. II The United States in accepting both conventions
has attached a protocol on behalf of the territories of the United States
whereby the United States does not accept "any obligations in respect
to the Telephone Regulations or the Additional Radio Regulations referred
to in Article 15 of the International Telecommunication Convention
(Montreux, 1965)." This is set forth in Article 59 of the Final Protocol
of the 1965 Convention. 12 The samestatement relating to Article 42 and
Article 82 of the 1973 Convention is to be found in Article XXXVIII of
the Final Protocol of that Convention. Thus, the United States, while
bound by the 1973 Convention, has consistently accepted as applicable to
it only the historic telegraph and radio regulations and has rejected the
telephone and special radio regulations.
Before proceeding to an assessment of the critically important
substantive provisions of the 1959 ITU Radio Regulations, the 1963 Partial
Revision of the 1959 Radio Regulations, the 1971 Final Acts of the World
Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications (WARCST),
and the 1977World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of
the Broadcasting-Satellite Service in Frequency Bands 11.7 - 12.2 GHz
llArticle 15 of the 1965 Convention and Articles 42 and 82 of the
1973 Convention.
1218 UST575, TIAS 6267.
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(in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7 - 12.5 GHz(in Region I) (WARCBS), it is
necessary to identify with particularity someadditional basic features
of the ITU governmental process.
As noted above, the regulatory regime of the ITU focuses in large
part on the performance of the International Frequency Registration
Board and on the Administrative Regulations of identified functional
units. For radio communications the critical points in the governmental
process relate to harmful interference and to the need for the rational
use of the radio frequency spectrum and of the geostationary satellite
orbit.
International organizations typically endeavor to establish inter-
national standards. Since sovereign nation-states composesuch organiza-
tions the international standards are those acceptable to such members.
Oncesuch international standards have been agreed to it then becomes
the duty of such membersto secure their implementation by all available
national processes. The ITU operates on the premise that national
self-interest will be served through the harmonious acceptance of
international standards and by an orderly and consistent implementation
of such standards by its membership. With respect to radio frequencies
the ITU agreements consistently refer to their equitable, effective, and
economical use. The agreements also provide that such frequencies should
be used efficiently and economically. Over time these standards have
been transposed by the ITU to the presence of space objects in geostationary
orbit, particularly for the broadcasting satellite service in frequency
bands 11.7 - 12.2 GHz(in Regions 2 and 3), and 11.7 - 12.5 GHz(in
Region I). However, it must be recognized that both in the formulation
19
and in the implementation of such international standards that national
interest is a dominant consideration. Thus, in somecircumstances it ay
be anticipated that.world community interests best served through an
orderly and consistent implementation of agreed to standards may be
disregarded. Further, until nation-states are entirely clear as to the
benefits to them of a community as opposed to a strictly national
approach, there is a normal reluctance to accept international standards.
In the interaction between the ITU as an international organization
and its membersit is of critical importance to understand the meanings
given to two words, namely, "allocate" and "assign." These terms relate
to access to and the use of radio frequencies, including the use of such
frequencies by space objects. The position of the ITU on this was
reflected by a statement of Secretary-General Mili of the ITU in 1968
when he stated "it is certain that all telecommunications problems are
the sole competenceof the ITU, including problems relating to tele-
communication by satellite. ''13
Radio broadcasters and listeners benefit whenemissions and receptions
are not marred by harmful interference. Thus, national governments
either monopolize broadcasting or issue licenses to broadcasters to use
specific and limited frequencies at given times. National authority is
required prior to the use of the natural resource of radio wavelengths.
National governmentswould not serve useful purposes if they were to allow
use of a given spectrum in such a manner that their nationals would not
be able to have the effective use of the granted privilege. Obviously,
1335Telecommunication Journal 240 (1968), cited by D. D. Smith,
International Telecommunication Control 160 (1969).
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there is a need to plan at a world level for the most equitable,
effective and economical access to and use of radio frequencies.
The ITU's international radio conferences allocate usable portions
of the spectrum to different communications services, including such
competitive needs as fixed, mobile, broadcast, aeronautical, maritime,
and space. Thus, ITU allocations to services insures against frequency
interference among such competing services, as well as among the services
of competing nations. Allocations also are made to three geographical
regions of the world. Very roughly, Region 1 refers to Europe (including
Asiatic Russia), Africa and the Middle East, Region 2 to the Western
Hemisphere, and Region 3 to the Pacific Area and the Far East. When the
allocations have been formally adopted by the radio conference they are
published in Article 5 of the Radio Regulations in the form of a "Table
of Frequency Allocations." This process has been identified as the
legislative process of the ITU's radio conferences. 14 This legislative
process forms the basis for the international standards mentioned above.
Neither the ITU nor the radio conferences possess the means to force
compliance even though the parties have entered into international
agreements having the force of law. At this stage "the frequency spectrum
is distributed among different services but not directly among different
countries. ''i5 Country distributions are effected by regional conferences.
14David M. Leive, International Telecommunications and International
Law: The Regulation of the Radio Spectrum 19 (1970).
151bid., p. 20.
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States, as opposed to the ITU, designate or assign particular
16frequencies to their own national applicants. Suchassignments are a
function of the sovereignty of such States. Theoretically, such assig,,-
ments could be madeby States as they might see fit. However, membership
in the ITU obliges them to participate in the above mentioned legislative
process. Assuminga willingness on the part of the signatories to the
ITU conventions a State will notify the IFRBof the frequency assignment
that has beenmade. The Board possesses authority to examine the national
notice, correspond with the State, issue findings with respect to
conformity to existing laws, identify the possibility that the noticed
frequency would constitute harmful interference with previously recorded
assignments, and record the national assignment in the Master International
Frequency Register. This phase of the ITU's activities has been described
as regulatory with the functions of the Board being "quasi-judicial. ''17
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the legal status of a
national assignment depends in part on the findings of the Board.
Thus, it will be seen that the ITU acts in two stages. In the
legislative stage it is engaged in the allocation of radio frequencies
to communications services at the world level. In the regulatory stage
the ITU makes assessments of the assignment of frequencies by member
States to specific stations to determine if such assignments are consistent
with the ITU Convention, with the Radio Regulations, and with other
16Assignments of frequencies by the United States are "effected by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Office of Telecommuni-
cations Policy (OTP), acting in concert." Office of Telecommunications
Policy, Executive Office of the President, "The Radio Frequency Spectrum,
United States Use and Management," p. B-5 (1975). When the frequencies
are published they constitute the National Table of Frequency Allocations.
17Leive, op. cit., p. 20.
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relevant ITU determinations. Leive has identified these stages:
The first stage is similar to a domestic legislature's
passage of a law dividing a natural resource into
different categories and providing that potential
users file their claims within the proper categories;
the second stage is comparable to the filing of claims
(frequency assignments) by individual users (countries)
with a domestic administrative agency (the Board).
Unlike such agencies, however, the Board possesses only
limited powers to review claims or to ensure compliance
with the law. 18
For the ITU to be useful in dealing with radio frequencies two things
are required. First, it is necessary to be clear as to the aggregate of
its powers and functions. Second, it must serve as a catalyst to bring
out the clearest possible recognition on the part of its membersthat
their well-being in the world of communications depends on community-
oriented perspectives. This is because the Board does not have the
authority to distribute or to withhold frequencies. Eachmemberis
allowed to make its own frequency assignments. The membercan also insist
that its unilaterally identified assignment be recorded in the Master
Register. Thus, the ITU serves as an agent-like broker or negotiator on
behalf of its client members. It is able to record the assignments made
by States. On behalf of its membersit can makeallocations and seek to
secure conformity therein. But, in the absence of good will and a
sense of communityon the part of its members,the effective mandate of
the ITU is quite limited.
2.5 The Issue of Priority of Rights to Radio Frequencies
All of the foregoing has direct relevance to space telecommunications.
Among the functions given to the ITU in the 1973 Convention is the
181bid., p. 20.
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following:
Coordinate efforts with a view to harmonizing the
development of telecommunications facilities, notably
those using space techniques, with a view to full
advantage being taken of their possibilities. 19
This brief review of the relevant, and on the whole, consistent
provisions of the 1965 and 1973 conventions has indicated that a fairly
limited international regime exists concerning radio communications. The
governing power of the ITU and its components requires further identifi-
cation. This is needed particularly insofar as nation-states assert
priority of rights to use radio frequencies with the corollary that
rightful uses of the radio spectrum not be subjected to harmful inter-
ference.
Such an assessment requires a more detailed examination of the role
and function of the IFRB, and this in turn necessitates a further examina-
tion of the legal principles and rules developed by the ITU's Administra-
tive Radio Conferences and their formal regulations. These include the
1959 World Administrative Radio Conference which produced "Radio
Regulations, with Appendices, and Additional Protocol, ''20 the 1963 World
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference to Allocate Frequency Bands
for Space RadiocommunicationPurposes which produced the "Partial Revision
of Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1959, and Additional Protocol, ''21 the 1971
World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications which
191973 Convention, Article 4.2.c).
2012 UST2377, TIAS 4893.
States on October 23, 1961.
2115 UST887, TIAS 5603.
States on January I, 1965.
This entered into force for the United
This entered into force for the United
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produced the "Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference
for Space Telecommunications,''22 and the 1977 World Administrative Radio
Conference for the Planning of the Broadcasting-Satellite Service which
produced the "Final,Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference
for the Broadcasting-Satellite Service in Frequency Bands 11..7 - 12.2 GHz
(in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7 - 12.5 GHz (in Region I). ''23 All dealt
with varying aspects of radio by space object or satellite services.
While the 1971 agreementmadethe most substantial changes relating to
satellites, it will be helpful to examineall of the agreements in order
to be aware of the general pattern as well as the important changes.
This examination will focus on two concerns. First, there is the
issue of the legal right of a nation-state to use a radio frequency or
geostationary orbital position that it has assigned to a national user
following national registration with the ITU pursuant to its allocation
procedures. Second, there is the issue of the permanencyof the national
right. The first issue will test the validity of the claim of "first-come
is first-served." The second will test the durability of such a claim,
if in fact the nation-state has acquired something of value as a result
of its involvement in the assignment-allocation process. Impacting on
2223 UST1527, TIAS 7435. This entered into force for the United
States on January I, 1973.
231nternational Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 1977. This agree-
ment had not entered into force on October I, 1978. There is also the
1974 World _laritime Administrative Radio Conference which produced a
"Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1959) with Final
Protocol," U.S. Senate, Executive G, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 1975. This
was signed by the United States on June 8, 1974 with a reservation. It
was intended to come into force on January I, 1976 for governments which,
by that date, had notified the ITU of their approval. This agreement is
not considered here, since it relates more to maritime communications
than to space communications, although the two services must accommodate
to each other.
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each of these considerations is the fact that the radio spectrum is a
natural resource, and, pursuant to the ITU is a "limited natural resource."
In this connection it should also be kept in mind that the ITU has linked
this characterization of the radio frequency with the "limited natural
resource" of the geostationary orbit. These positions are specifically
asserted in Article 33 of the 1973 ITU Convention.
After examining the not entirely unanimousviews of respected United
States commentatorson these matters, who, on the whole have focused
more on the radio spectrum than on orbital positions, the relevant language
of the several agreementswill be examined. Thereafter suitable conclu-
sions will be drawn.
The absence of agreement on the part of commentatorsmay be explained
in part by the fact that the "legal significance of the elaborate notifica-
tion and registration procedure is nowhere clearly defined. ''24 This is
admitted by the ITU. In referring to the findings of the IFRB the ITU
has stated that the Board's findings do:
confer certain rights on Administrations [nation-states],
the right to international protection, or at least the
right to official international recognition, and place
certain obligations on them, the obligation to respect
the rights conferred on others. These rights and obli-
gations are invoked by Administrations when they discuss
cases of harmful international interference that have
actually occurred in practice.
The nature of this task can be compared to traffic
control on the radio roads in which the Board, before
giving an indication with a green, yellow, or red light,
has to take careful stock of the existing traffic
situation. 25
24Leive, 9_P_. cit., p. 22.
25From Semaphore to Satellite, International Telecommunication Union,
p. 253.
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To this last statement Leive has observed "If the Board can be compared
to a traffic officer, it is an officer unable to adequately measure the
traffic, whose 'tickets' for violations are often ignored, and who lacks
not only a jail but also a court for the offenders. ''26 Nonetheless, he
has written that two principles govern the rights and obligations of
States that have registered national assignments with the IFRB. These
are applicable international law consisting of the relevant conventions
and ITU Radio Regulations and a State's earlier use of a frequency and
due notification of this fact to the Board. He has observed:
While the significance of the first principle has
not been adequately recognized, the importance of
the second principle has been generally overemphasized.
It has been widely assumedthat harmful interference
disputes between two countries generally are resolved
strictly on the basis of a "first-come first-served"
principle. This is not true. In manydisputes first
use of a frequency is a controlling factor, and often
is not even relevant to a determination of the
respective rights of the parties concerned.27
26Leive, op. cit., p. 22, fn. 8.
271bid., p. 23. Italics added. For Leive's further assessment of
this issue see Chapter 4 "Rights and Obligations," pp. 144 ff. In his
final assessment of the importance of priority of notification to the
IFRB and use on the right of space telecommunications to immunity from
harmful interference by other services he stated that the Radio Regula-
tions in force in 1970 "do not explicitly establish the respective
rights and obligations of the parties to a harmful interference dispute
(e.g., an earth station and a terrestrial station) both of which are in
conformity with the Convention and Regulations. In view of the enormous
investment in space and earth stations and the likelihood that the
probability may increase as space communications services expand, it
would appear prudent to attempt to clarify the state of the law applicable
in such cases." Ibid_______.,p. 240. Despite this fact as of 1970 the IFRB's
powers to examine national notices of frequency assignments to space
objects was "substantially narrower than its examination of terrestrial
and earth station notices." Ibid., p. 235. Further, the Board's
coordination procedures for space stations was considered "weaker" than
those available for "terrestrial and earth stations." Ibid., p. 234.
27
Writing prior to the convening in 1971 of WARCST, Smith has also
called attention to the role of prior claims for radio frequencies. In
the context of the practice of somecountries of not following the
findings of the IFRBhe states: "One reason for this non-adherence is
that frequencies are [allocated] on a time priority basis rather
than on equitable principles. In the early days of regulation this
caused nations to hoard frequency assignments that they would never use,
and today it creates difficulties in the determination of which frequency
use should predominate. ''28
Writing in 1970 at a time when the 1963 revised Radio Regulations
were in force, another commentator has observed that these Regulations
did not introduce a new approach to the traditional system of unilateral
national assignment of radio frequencies to national entities. He
stated: "The conference proceeded on the assumption that space communi-
cations were merely an extension of terrestrial communications which fell
within the sovereign prerogative of individual states. Accordingly, the
traditional principle of 'first use, first served' has been extended to
the new field of space communications and applies both to the use of
frequencies and to the occupation of orbital 'parking slots' by communi-
cation satellites. ''29 This outcome served the interests of the
28D. D. Smith, International Telecommunication Control 30 (1969).
29Eric N. Valters, "Perspectives in the Emerging Law of Satellite
Communications," 5 Stanford Journal of International Studies 76-77
(June 1970). He also observed that "This principle reflects an approach
that values the freedom of national action more highly than international
decisionmaking concerning the utilization of a scarce international
resource. It favors the economically and technologically advanced states
and, in principle, protects their communications satellites against
interference from subsequently launched communications satellites of other
states, regardless of the comparative merits of such satellites." Ib___id.
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technologically advanced States.
Writing in 1973, following the 1971 World Administrative Radio
Conference, Chayeshas summarizedpre-1971 practices and has offered
conclusions relating to radio frequency priorities for the post-1971
era. His commenttakes into account the fact that the ITU even prior
to 1971 had associated the recordation by the IFRB of radio frequency
national assignments with the orbital positions of the satellites that
3O
employed such radio frequencies.
Chayeswrites:
Until the WARCof 1971, registration, in the case of
satellite-communications systems, required notice of
the frequencies to be used, the proposed orbital
position and certain other characteristics, notably
the effective power at which the satellites would
operate, antenna directionality, and other matters
relevant to compliance with the criteria established
for use of frequencies already in use by terrestrial
services in the area of coverage. If these character-
istics were in conformity with ITU Regulations, and
if there were no likelihood of interference with
stations already registered, the applicant would be
entitled to have the frequencies registered in the
Master Register with a favorable finding. That meant,
in effect, that the system was entitled to priority
over any later systems that caused interference with
it, even though the registered system was not designed
so as to economize spectrum use and did not take
account of prospective needs of other users in
planning. 31
The 1971WARCSTmodified this framework by requiring users of radio
frequencies in satellite systems to coordinate their respective uses of
the radio spectrum. While the change allows prospective users of the
spectrum to object to existing uses, and while it obliges existing users
30Seep. 6 infra for the treaty basis for the linking of radio
frequencies with the orbital slots of space objects.
31A. Chayesand others, Satellite Broadcastin 9 18 (1973).
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to consult with those who have objections, the 1971 rules do not oblige
existing users to makesubstantive adjustments. Thus, Chayesconcludes
that "Overall, the coordinating process remains one for a series of
bilateral adjustments of national policies rather than an integrated
spectrum-managementfunction. The regime of first-come-first-served is
hardly altered. ''32
Two options were available to the 1971 WARCST respecting use of
the geostationary orbit. First, the ITU could have been authorized to
allocate an orbit upon application, even though the State might not have
the capacity to use it. Secondly, and in the view of States that
considered the first option to be wasteful, there was the possibility
that a State might makeuse of the orbital position, subject to the duty
to relocate the space object as required. The second option was accepted
as a voluntary procedure, pursuant to paragraph 639 AF of Spa 2. Thus,
pursuant to paragraph (b) if difficulties were to arise because of over
use of the orbit consultation could be used to "explore all possible
meansof meeting the requirements of the requesting administration, for
example, by relocating one or more of its own geostationary space stations
involved, or by changing the emissions, frequency usage (including
32Ibid. The requirement of coordination is set out in Annex 8 of
the Final Acts of the 1971WARCST. This is a revision of Article 9A
of the 1963 Radio Regulations. The revised paragraph 639AJ provides in
part: "Before an administration notifies the Board or brings into use
any frequency assignment to a space station on a geostationary satellite
or to an earth station that is to communicatewith a space station on a
geostationary satellite, it shall effect co-ordination of the assignment
with any other administration whoseassignment in the sameband for a
space station on a geostationary satellite or for an earth station that
communicateswith a space station on a geostationary satellite is recorded
in the Master Register, or has been co-ordinated o_ is being co-ordinated
under the provisions of this paragraph. For this purpose, the administra-
tion requesting co-ordination shall send to any other such administration
the information listed in Appendix IA." 23 UST1527, 1687, TIAS 7435.
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changes in frequency bands) or other technical or operational character-
istics. "33 Pursuant to paragraph (c), if the foregoing procedures failed
to resolve difficulties among potential users, the concerned States were
to "together make every possible effort to resolve these difficulties by
means of mutually acceptable adjustments, for example, to geostationary
space station locations and to other characteristics of the systems
involved in order to provide for the normal operation of both the planned
and existing systems. "34
The 1971WARC ST in Resolution No. Spa2-1, 35 however, did accept the
view that the registration with the IFRB of a national assignment of a
radio frequency would not establish any permanent priority for the
registrant over a particular frequency. The resolution, entitled "Relating
to the Use by all Countries, with Equal Rights, of Frequency Bands for
Space Radiocommunication Services," linked the subjects of radio frequencies
with satellite orbital slots.
In the preambulatory provisions of the Resolution it was noted that
"all countries have equal rights in the use of both the radio frequencies
allocated to various space radiocommunication services and the geostationary
satellite orbit for these services." The preamble also referred to the
view that "the use of the allocated frequency bands and fixed positions
in the geostationary satellite orbit by individual countries or groups of
countries can start at various dates depending on requirements and readiness
of technical facilities of countries."
3323 UST 1527, 1686, TIAS 7435.
341bid"
3523 UST 1527, 1820, TIAS 7435.
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The States then resolved:
I . that the registration with the ITU of frequency assignments
for space radiocommunication services and their use should
not provide any permanent priority for any individual
country or groups of countries and should not create an
obstacle to the establishment of space systems by other
countries;
. that, accordingly, a country or group of countries having
registered with the ITU frequencies for their space
radiocommunication services should take all practicable
measures to realize the possibility of the use of new space
systems by other countries or groups of countries so
desiring .... 36
This Resolution was designed to promote the "coordinated use of the
special frequencies available for satellite systems. ''37 The foregoing
Resolution has been construed to mean that registration of national
assignments with the IFRB does not accord to the registrant a permanent
priority concerning the registered frequencies. Thus, Rankin has concluded
that "registration of a space services frequency assignment with the ITU
does not provide the individual registrant with any permanent priority
claim over that particular frequency, and that it is not to be viewed as
a barrier to the establishment of space systems by other countries. ''38
Support for this viewpoint is also found in recommendations of the
1971 Conference. Thus, Recommendation No. Spa2-1 entitled "Relating to
the Examination by World Administrative Radio Conferences of the
Situation with Regard to Occupation of the Frequency Spectrum in Space
3623 UST 1527, 1820-I, TIAS 7435.
37Clyde E. Rankin, III, "Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit--A
Need for Orbital Allocation?" 13 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
I07 (1974).
381bid., pp. 106-107.
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Radiocommunications''39 accepts the proposition that nation-states should
be enabled to establish the telecommunication links which they deem
necessary. This view is based on the conclusion that "technology is
steadily and rapidly evolving and that the best possible use should be
madeof resources in space radiocommunications. "40 The rule of priority
rights to frequencies is conditioned by the judgment that such frequencies
must be used in the "most efficient manner possible consistent with
developing technology and that such assignments are relinquished when
no longer in use. ''41 The focus of this Recommendationwas clearly on the
efficient and economic use of radio frequencies. Thus, the ITU Administra-
tive Council was invited to seek consideration by the next World
Administrative Radio Conference of "all aspects of the use of the
frequency band(s) concerned including, interalia, the relevant frequency
assignments recorded in the Master International Frequency Register and
,,42
to find a solution to the problem.
However, the past practices of the IFRB have been such that the first
national claim for the registration in the Board's Master Register of
its assignment has established preferences if not rights within the
context of the ITU governing process. When the Board receives a frequency
assignment for registration that conforms to the frequency allotment
plans of the ITU, such assignments are accorded "the highest level status
3923 UST 1527, 1839, TIAS 7435.
401bid.
41 Ibid.
42
Ibid., p. 1840. Italics added.
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of any category of user.
of registration in Column2a of the Master Register.
Radio Regulations such assignments are entitled to ".
international protection from harmful interference. ''44
,,43 Suchassignments are listed with the date
Pursuant to the
the right to
But, if a
registrant does not conform to the ITU registration plan, it is nonethe-
less listed in Column2b of the Master Register. This does not accord
to the registrant the international protection assured to situations in
"full conformity with the allotment plan of the Union. ''45 Such a registra-
tion is effected so that other parties will know that the frequency is in
use as a result of the nation's assignment. Even so, such a registrant
does have identifiable rights. Thus, the Regulations "require that the
IFRBgive an unfavorable ruling to a new user which would interfere with
a station already listed in Column2b so long as that station is operating
in conformity with the Convention and Regulations and has not caused
interference to a station in full conformity with the ITU frequency
plan. ,,46
Column2d of the Master Register is used for assignments presented
to the Board but not ruled on by it. Listed there are the broadcasting
services operating in crowded high-frequency ranges. Also listed are
43Allan H. Ickowitz, "The Role of the International Telecommunication
Union in the Settlement of Harmful Interference Disputes," 13 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 86 (1974).
441TU Regulations of December 21, 1959, Paragraph 607, 12 UST 2377,
2507 TIAS 4893. This international agreement entered into force for the
United States on October 23, 1961.
451ckowitz, op. cit., p. 86, citing Paragraph 608.
461bid., citing Paragraph 608.
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radio operators that have been identified as engaging in harmful inter-
ferences by the Board. Even so, such a Column2d listing is of some
value. Such a registration will offer "security against future stations
listed in Column2d interfering with their operations--provided that
they are operating in accordance with the ITU Convention and Radio
,,47Regulations.
The foregoing assessment does offer support for the proposition that
the first to list an assignment with the Board will derive an advantage
therefrom. This conclusion was captured by Ickowitz in his summary:
Only those stations which function in the planned
portion of the spectrum in accordance with ITU .
[allocations] are entitled to an absolute right to
international protection from interfering users.
Assignments operating in accordance with the Conven-
tion and Radio Regulations receive limited protection
against future newcomers. The Board can refuse to
protect a station which has interfered with these
users when subsequently registered stations interfere
with it in the future. Finally, the doctrine of
prior notification is applied by the Board when both
parties are in conformity with the Convention and
Radio Regulations, or whentwo [registrants]
listed in Column2d of the Register'interfere with
each other. 48
He concluded that the concept of "priority" needs clarification in an
operational context. Since the Regulations do not provide for exceptions
to its applicability, muchhas been left to the undirected judgment of
the IFRB. Consequently, a "principle like that of the 'first-come,
first-served' rule must be limited in someway before it can becomea
workable doctrine in a variety of situations. As it is applied now, the
47Ibid., citing Paragraph 501.
48Ibid., p. 87.
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rule is too rigid to be very useful in different cases. ''49
The ITU remains steadfast to its principle, as set out in Paragraph
607 of the 1959 Regulations, that assignments set out in Column2a of
the Master Registe[ are entitled to "the right to international
protection from harmful interference." This has not been touched in
either the 1963or the 1971 Regulations. Thus, in the 1971 revised
Article 9A, entitled "Co-ordination, Notification and Recording in the
Master International Frequency Register of Frequency Assignments to
Radio Astronomy and Space Radiocommunication States except Stations in
the Broadcasting-Satellite Service, ''50 the IFRB is to be notified by an
ITU memberof any frequency assignment to an earth or space station if
"the use of the frequency concerned is capable of causing harmful
interference to any service of another administration; or if the frequency
is to be used for international radiocommunications; or if it is desired
,,51to obtain international recognition of the use of the frequency.
Section IV. of revised Article 9A is entitled "Procedure for the Examina-
tion of Notices and the Recording of Frequency Assignments in the
Master Register." Pursuant to Paragraph 639BPof this section the Board
is empowered,when it receives a notice from a memberState concerning
a frequency assignment, to examine the "probability of harmful interference
to the service rendered by a space radiocommunication station for which a
frequency assignment already has been recorded in the Master Register.
491bid., p. 95.
5023 UST1684, TIAS 7435.
51
52
This is Annex 8 to the 1971 Convention.
Ibid., Paragraph 639BA, p. 1695.
Ibid., p. 1698.
,,52
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The Board's role in the combinedareas of frequency allocation,
harmful intereference, and priority of use by the State that has given
notice to the Board of a frequency assignment is illustrated in
Paragraph 639BSof, revised Article 9A. It reads:
When, following an examination of a notice with
respect to No. 639BP, the Board reaches an unfavorable
finding based upon the probability of harmful inter-
ference to a recorded assignment for a space station
which the Board has reason to believe maynot be in
regular use, the Board shall forthwith consult the
administration responsible for the registered
assignment. 53
If it is determined by the Board that the assignment has not been used
for two years the Board is authorized to engage in coordination with
IRUmemberslikely to be adversely affected by harmful interference and
to engage in further examination of the situation as appropriate. Such
coordination and examination are to take place before the assignment "is
brought back into use [and] the date on which the assignment is
brought back into use shall then be entered in the Master Register. ''54
While this language allows for the protection of a priority, even though
the frequency has not been in use, it also suggests that the Board can
exercise an ongoing influence over the equitable, effective, and
economical utilization of the spectrum.
Section VIII. of revised Article 9A is entitled "Modification,
Cancellation and Review of Entries in the Master Register." This section
deals with situations where the use of a recorded assignment to a space
station is suspendedfor a period of 18 months. The registering State is
obliged to notify the Board of the date when use was suspendedand when
53Ibid., p. 1699.
541bid.
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the assignment is to be brought back to regular use. If the registering
State does not notify the Board, it is authorized to inquire of the
affected State whenthe assignment is to be brought back into regular use.
If the State does not respond within six months, the Board is to treat
the assignment "as one which has been established as having been out of
,,55
regular use for two years.
This section allows a State to relinquish the use of a recorded
frequency assignment. Thus, in the case of a permanent discontinuance
of the use of any recorded frequency assignment, the notifying administra-
tion shall inform the Board within ninety days of such discontinuance,
whereuponthe entry shall be removedfrom the Master Register. ''56
Further, the Board has the authority to either cancel or suitably modify
the registration of a memberState. Thus:
Wheneverit appears to the Board from the information
available that a recorded assignment has not been
brought into regular operation in accordance with the
notified basic characteristics, or is not being used
in accordance with those basic characteristics, the
Board shall consult the notifying administration and,
subject to its agreement, shall either cancel or
suitably modify the entry. 57
The 1971 Radio Regulations also require that memberStates submit
to the Board well in advance of the putting into use of a given frequency
a notice concerning such prospective use. For a frequency assignment made
by a memberto either an earth or a space station, such notice must reach
the IFRM"not earlier than three years before the date on which the
assignment is to be brought into use
551bid., Paragraph 639DM,p. 1709.
561bid., Paragraph 639DN,p. 1709.
571bid., Paragraph 639D0, p. 1709.
" and not later than 90 days
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58before the date of use. Further, the 1971 revised Article 9A established
in Section 1 a "Procedure for the AdvancePublication of Information on
Planned Satellite Systems." Thus, a memberState "which intends to
establish a satellite system shall, prior to the coordination procedure
in accordance with No. 639AJwhere applicable, send to the International
Frequency Registration Board not earlier than five years before the date
of bringing into service each satellite network of the planned system,
the information listed in Appendix IB. ''59 According to Mr. Richard E.
Butler, Deputy Secretary-General of the ITU, this rule requires that member
States intending to introduce direct satellite broadcasting systems must
"provide advance notification at least five years before the establishment
of such systems. ''60
The foregoing Appendix IB is set out in Annex 15 to the 1971 Regula-
tions. It is entitled "Advance Publication Information to be furnished
for a Satellite Network. ''61 Member States, pursuant to the 1971
Regulations, are obliged to supply the IFRB with orbital information
relating to space stations. Where the space station is situated aboard
a geostationary satellite, such information is to include the "planned
nominal geographical longitude on the geostationary satellite orbit and
the planned longitudinal and inclination tolerances. ''62 Also to be
indicated is the arc of the geostationary satellite orbit "over which
581bid., Paragraph 639BF, p. 1696.
591bid., Paragraph 639AA, p. 1684. Paragraph 639AJ appears in
footnote 32, supra.
60U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.2/SR.258, p. 6, May 20, 1976.
61
23 UST 1527, 1739, TIAS 7435.
62Ibid., 1740.
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the space station is visible, at a minimum angle of elevation of I0 ° at
the Earth's surface, from its associated earth stations or service
areas [and] within which the space station could provide the
required service to its associated earth stations or service areas .... ,,63
Further, the arcs are to be "indicated by the geographical longitude of
the extremes of these arcs on the geostationary satellite orbit. ''64
Revised Article 9A of the 1971 Regulations also identified the
need for member States to engage in coordination respecting proposed
frequency assignments. The Article made specific reference to the use
of the frequency spectrum above l GHz. Pursuant to Section II.,
"Co-ordinating Procedures to be applied in appropriate Cases" before a
member State gives notice to the Board or brings into use any frequency
assignment to an earth station, whether for transmitting or receiving,
in a particular band "allocated with equal rights to space and terrestrial
radiocommunication services in the frequency spectrum above l GHz, it
shall effect co-ordination of the assignment with any other administration
whose territory lies wholly or partly within the co-ordination area of
,,65
the planned earth station.
Aside from the issue of priority and notice, there is also the
companion problem of registered assignments that are not in active use.
This has been referred to as "deadwood." If first registration with the
IFRB establishes a preferred right, if not a permanent priority, to the
use of a frequency, then the non-use could be considered to be a matter
63Ibid.
641bid.
651bid., Paragraph 639AN, p. 1689.
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wholly at the discretion of the registrant. The registrant would be
able to assert that a future use was contemplated. But, if first
registration, or use, provides no basis for a claim of preference, priority,
or exclusivity, then the "deadwood" situation could allow the Board to
register the frequency for use by a different State. To encourage the
equitable and efficient use of radio frequencies the 1971WARC ST fixed
66
means to penalize "deadwood" stations no longer in use.
However, the holder of the "deadwood" registration would have to be
amenable to the imposition of the restraints. It has been noted that
"such 'deadwood' cannot be removed from the Master Register without the
consent of the government concerned. ''67 To reduce the possibility of
harmful interference the IFRB would need to possess the power to remove
"deadwood" frequencies from the Master Register when such frequencies were
not used. Pending such a development when an interference dispute arises
involving such registrations "the new users are often preempted by
priority given to the earlier user. ''68
Following the 1971WARC ST and Resolution No. Spa2-1 representatives
of the ITU have called attention to paragraph one which provides that
"the registration with the. ITU of frequency assignments for space radio-
communication services and their use should not provide any permanent
66David M. Leive, The Future of the International Telecommunication
Union, A Report for the 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference 45 (1972). This
conclusion is based on Recommendation No. Spa2-1, "Relating to the
Examination by World Administrative Radio Conferences of the Situation
with Regard to Occupation of the Frequency Spectrum in Space Radiocommun-
ications." 23 UST 1527, 1839, TIAS 7435.
671ckowitz, op. cit., 85, citing E. Pepin, "General Legal Problems
in Space Telecommunications," 38 Telecommunication Journal 387 (1971).
681ckowitz, op. cit., 93.
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priority for any individual country or groups of countries and should not
create an obstacle to the establishment of space systems by other
,,69
countries. Thus, Mr. Richard E. Butler of the ITU advised the Legal
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of the
UN on May 20, 1976 that "The Convention also provided for equal rights
in the frequency bands for space radio communication services and ensured
that international registration of frequency assignments did not give
permanent priority to any country or group of countries. ''70 In addressing
the same group in March 1977, Mr. Butler in referring to the 1971WARC ST
Conference indicated that it had "laid down the principle of equal rights
in the frequency bands for space radio communication services and stated
that the international registration of frequency assignments did not
provide any permanent priority for any individual country or groups of
countries. ''71
The radio spectrum resource is both a natural and an international
resource. The function of the ITU, as reflected in the observations of
Mr. Butler, are to insure the most equitable, efficient, and economical
use of the resource. Yet, it is important to bear in mind the following
assessment:
While the use of this resource by one country will
often affect the extent to which other countries
can use the resource, there are parts of the
spectrum in which one country's use will not affect
others. In addition, it should be stressed that in
general the communications needs of any particular
country are not guaranteed under the ITU regulatory
6923 UST 1527, 1820, TIAS 7435. Italics added.
70U.rJ. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.2/SR.258, p. 6, Hay 20, 1976.
71U.H. Doc. A/AC.lO5/C.2/SR.273, March 28, 1977.
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regime. While the spectrum is "owned" by no one
nation, a variety of factors--political, economic,
entrenched rights--suggests that in practice the
spectrum maynot be equally available to all countries. 72
2.6 The 1959 ITU Radio Regulations and Space Activities
In analyzing the present and future regulatory role of the ITU in
the area of radio communications between Earth and space it is necessary
to consider the relevant international agreements from 1959 to the present.
While the most current carry with them more of the substance of existing
legal requirements, nonetheless the evidence of the transition from the
past to the present offers an understanding of trends. Further, this
review will allow for conclusions to be drawn concerning the validity of
the positions taken by the commentators that have been referred to above.
Although the 1959 International Telecommunication Convention 73 made
no specific mention of radio for space communications, the subject was
barely treated in the Radio Regulations, with Appendices, and Additional
Protocol which were signed on the same day as the Convention. 74 Partial
75 76
revisions were effected in 1963, and in 1971. Major changes were
proposed in 1977. Since the agreements subsequent to the 1959 Radio
Regulations were revisions, those portions of the respective agreements
72Leive, International Telecommunications and International Law:
The Regulation of the Radio Spectrum 17 (1970).
7312 UST 1761, TIAS 4892, December 21, 1959. This was the predecessor
to the 1965 Convention, 18 UST 575, TIAS 6267, and the current 1973
Convention, TIAS 8572.
7412 UST 2377; TIAS 4893.
7515 UST 887; TIAS 5603.
7623 UST 1527; TIAS 7435.
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that did not undergo modifications remained in full force for the affected
States.
The 1959 Radio Regulations gave very little attention to the space
radio frequencies that might be registered with the IFRB. It did begin
the process of identifying systems in which space objects could participate,
and it did begin to define a variety of space-connected subjects. Thus,
in 1959 a definition was established for a "Space Service," for an
"Earth-Space Service," and for a "Space Station." In 1959 the first
allocation of frequencies for space use was madeto Region 2. The alloca-
tion was madefor "research purposes''77 under the classifications of
,,78
"space" and "earth-space.
By 1971 the definition of a "space service" had been deleted 79 and
a new definition had been given to "space station," namely, "A station
located on an object which is beyond, is intended to go beyond, or has
been beyond, the major portion of the Earth's atmosphere.''80 In 1971 a
"Space System" was defined as "Any group of co-operating earth and/or
,,81
space stations employing space radiocommunication for specific purposes.
The identification of services has been expandedwith the "Meteorological-
Satellite Service" emerging from the 1963 conference. 82 In 1971, the
7712 UST2377, 2450, TIAS 4893.
781bid., p. 2449. Allocations were made in the ranges of 108-144
Mc/s, 235-401Mc/s, 1,350-1,535 Mc/s, 1,700-1,710 Mc/s, 2,290-2,300
Mc/s, 5,250-5,255 Mc/s, 15.15-15.25 Gc/s, and 24.25-40 Gc/s. Ibid.,
pp. 2449-2478. The foregoing frequencies were variously allocated in
all three regions. Nonewere allocated at the GHzlevel.
7923 UST1527, 1571, TIAS 7435.
8023 UST1527, 1569, TIAS 7435.
81Ibid., p. 1571.
8215 UST918, TIAS 5603.
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following new services were defined: Amateur-Satellite, Standard
Frequency-Satellite, Time-Signal Satellite, Space Research, Space
Operation, and Inter-Satellite. 83 Additionally, the ITU has defined or
redefined services dealing with Fixed-Satellite, Mobile-Satellite,
Aeronautical Mobile-Satellite, Maritime Mobile-Satellite, Land Mobile-
Satellite, Broadcasting-Satellite, Radiodetermination-Satellite,
Radionavigation, Aeronautical Radionavigation-Satellite, Maritime
Radionavigation-Satellite, Earth Exploration-Satellite, and Meteorological-
Satellite. 84
2.7 The 1963 ITU Radio Regulations and Space Activities
The 1963 Regulations made a connection between the radio spectrum
and "Space, Orbits and Types of Objects in Space." Thus, definitions of
eight related objects or events were made, including a definition of
85
deep space, orbit, stationary satellite, and spacecraft. This same
approach was pursued in the 1971 Regulations to include definitions of
deep space, spacecraft, satellite, active satellite, passive satellite,
orbit, inclination of an orbit, period of a satellite, altitude of the
apogee (perigee), geosynchronous satellite, and geostationary satellite.
In all instances the 1959 definitions were altered. Important additions
were also made. Among the definitions made were: spacecraft "a man-made
vehicle which is intended to go beyond the major portion of the Earth's
atmosphere," satellite "a body which revolves around another body of
8323 UST 1576-1577, TIAS 7435.
84Ibid., pp. 1570-1576.
8515 UST 887, 919-920, TIAS 5603.
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preponderant massand which has a motion primarily and permanently
determined by the force of attraction of that other body." The term
"body" wasalso defined as to mean "a body so defined which revolves
around the Sun is a planet or planetoid." "Active satellite" meansan
"earth satellite carrying a station intended to transmit or retransmit
radiocommunication signals." "Passive satellite" meansan "earth
satellite intended to transmit radiocommunication signals by reflection."
Orbit by 1971was defined as:
I. the path, relative to a specified frame of reference,
described by the center of massof a satellite or other
object in space, subjected solely to natural forces,
mainly the force of gravity.
2. by extension, the path described by the center of mass
of an object in space subjected to natural forces and
occasional low-energy corrective forces exerted by a
propulsive device in order to achieve and maintain a
desired path.
A geosynchronoussatellite is an "earth satellite whose period of revolu-
tion is equal to the period of rotation of the Earth about its axis."
A geostationary satellite is a "satellite, the circular orbit of which
lies in the plane of the Earth's equator and which turns about the polar
axis of the Earth in the same direction and with the same period as those
of the Earth's rotation. The orbit on which a satellite should be placed
to be a geostationary satellite is called the 'geostationary satellite
orbit. ,,,86
8623 UST 1578-1579, TIAS 7435. The foregoing definitions are set
out in Annex I of the agreement and constitute revisions of Article 1 of
the 1963 Radio Regulations. For a critical appraisal of the validity
of these definitions, see James J. Gehrig, "Geostationary Orbit--
Technology and Law," Proceedings of the 19th Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space 267 (1977).
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2.8 The 1971 ITU Radio Regulations and Space Activities, WARC ST
The 1971 Regulations contain detailed provisions relating to the
use by satellites of the radio spectrum. Allocations were made ranging
from 7,000-7,100 KHz to 275 GHz, with the highest MHz being 8,500 and
the lowest GHz being in the 10.95-11.2 range. 87 The 1971 Regulations
88
identify a total of 104 allocations for different space services.
These allocations to space services unquestionably contributed to the
expansion of radio services and radio spectrum allocations between 1959
and 1971. The table 89 illustrates this fact:
Year International
Radio Conference
1959 Geneva
1963 Geneva (Space)
1967 Geneva (Maritime)
1971 Geneva (Space)
Number of Radio
Services
Spectrum Allocated
(KHz)
23 I0 to 40,000,000
26 I0 to 40,000,000
26 I0 to 40,000,000
41 I0 to 275,000,000
The 1971 Regulations did not make allocations in the GHz range below
10.55 and at the 71-84, 152-170, 200-220, 240-250, and above the 275
frequencies.90 By 1977 the ITU was able to report the rapidly expanding
91
use of frequencies above I0 GHz.
8723 UST 1527, 1587-1645, TIAS 7435.
881bid., pp. 1587-1645.
89Office of Telecommunications Policy, Executive Office of The
President, "The Radio Frequency Spectrum: United States Use and
Management," p. A-5 (1975). The 1971 figure, as indicated, reflects a
large number of new satellite services.
9023 UST 1527, pp. 1633-1645, TIAS 7435.
91
U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/213, p. 26, Dec. 22, 1977.
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2.9 The 1977 ITU Radio Regulations and Space Activities, WARC BS
In 1971, the WARC ST invited the Administrative Council of the ITU
to include on the agenda of the next conference an examination of relevant
frequency assignments recorded in the Master International Frequency
Register. Concern existed that member States would experience difficulty
in frequency bands in meeting requirements for space radiocommunication
as the use of frequencies and orbital positions increased.92 The
Administrative Council initiated activity which led to the convening in
Geneva on January I0, 1977 of "The World Administrative Radio Conference
for the Planning of the Broadcasting-Satellite Service in Frequency Bands
11.7 - 12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7 - 12.5 GHz (in Region I),"
WARC BS. On February 13, 1977 the Final Acts of the WARC BS were signed
by representatives of III countries. The extreme complexity of the subject
matter had posed substantial problems for the ITU. These had only been
resolved through the use of computers.
It should be emphasized that although the Final Acts have the
appearance of an international agreements ready for approval as an
operating commitment the Acts at this stage are merely a "Plan." Their
present status has been described: "The Final Acts are destined to be
incorporated as an integral part of the Radio Regulations by the general
92Recommendation No. Spa2-1, 23 UST 1527, 1839-1840, TIAS 7435.
Resolution No. Spa2-2, entitled "Relating to the Establishment of
Agreement and Associated Plans for the Broadcasting-Satellite Service,"
also called for the convening of appropriate conferences. 23 UST 1527,
1821, TIAS 7435. Further authorization was contained in Article 54 of
the 1973 ITU Convention and in Resolution No. 27 of the 1973 ITU
Conference.
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World Administrative Radio Conference in 1979.... ,,93 The negotiators
identified their work as "planification. ''94
The 1977 WARCBS in formulating its "Plan" for the use of the
identified frequencies in the several regions took into account "All the
technical parameters necessary for the purpose of ensuring the optimum
use of available resources. Amongthese parameters we can quote the
frequency, the position, the power, the direction of the antenna beam
and the beamwidth, etc. The position is always indicated in the Plan,
whether it is on the earth or orbital. In the case of the geostationary
orbit the term 'nominal orbital position' is used. The indication of
this nominal position meansthat the use of this part of an orbit for a
transmitter is compatible with an operation of the system free of inter-
ference to or from ot_er users. ''95 Butler also indicated that "The
mention of this position does not, from the ITU point of view, constitute
an appropriation." The "Plan" takes into account country symbol and
IFRB Serial Number, nominal orbital position in degrees, channel number,
boresight geographical coordinates in degrees and tenths of a degree,
antenna beamwidth, orientation of the ellipse, polarization, "E.i.r.p.
in the direction of maximumradiation in dW," and remarks. Considerations
relating to antenna beamwidthand orientation of the ellipse are specified
93Richard E. Butler, "World Administrative Radio Conference for
Planning Broadcasting Satellite Service," 5 Journal of Space Law 94
(1977). He also stated that "thus, it can be said that the outcome of
the conference is binding on all members." Ibid.
94Seventeenth Report by the International Telecommunication Union
on Telecommunication and the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, submitted to
the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/213,
p. 27, 22 December 1977.
95Butler, op. cit., p. 98.
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in further detail. 96
The Conference was able to plan frequency assignments for the
broadcasting-satellite service for Regions 1 and 3, but was not able to
arrive at a plan for Region 2 consisting of the Americas. For Region 2
it was considered that the technical bases for sharing conditions between
the broadcasting satellite service and the fixed-satellite service, e.g.,
telecommunication satellites, were in need of further delineations. It
was determined for both of these services that planning could best be
accomplished through the convening of a Regional Conference to meet no
later than 1982. According to Butler "The results of that proposed
Regional Conference will necessarily conform to the principles of the 1977
Conference and the Radio Regulations. ''97 The preparatory work for the
Conference, the negotiations, and the "Plan" put forward in the Final
Acts were heavily influenced by the terms of Article 33 of the 1973 ITU
98Convention.
The 1977Conference was convened to plan the equitable, effective,
and economical use of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency
bands 11.7 - 12.2 GHz(in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7 - 12.5 GHz (in
Region I). Its charge was to establish the sharing criteria for the
identified bands between the broadcasting-satellite service and the other
services to which these bands are allocated, to plan for the
96U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/213, pp. 27-28. "E.i.r.p." is equivalent
isotropically radiated power. It is the product of the power of an
emission as supplied to an antenna gain in a given direction relative to
an isotropic antenna.
97Butler, op. cit., p. 95.
98Supra, p. 6.
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broadcasting-satellite satellite service in the indicated bands; to
establish procedures to govern the use of these bands by the broadcasting-
satellite service and by the other services to which the bands have been
allocated, and to consider expert studies relating to the possible
re-arrangement of the existing Radio Regulations and the Additional
Radio Regulations.99
Although the 1977 Conference has been characterized by "planifica-
tion" for the sharing of radio frequencies in an essentially limited
frequency area, nonetheless the ITU engagedin procedures to "govern the
use" of the identified bands.I00 It bears repeating that the Conference
considered that the 1979 WARC"should be asked to incorporate these Final
Acts as an integral part of the Radio Regulations. ''I01 Moreover, "when
the final Acts are incorporated in the Radio Regulations, they will be
binding on all Members,on the samefooting as the Telecommunication
Convention to which the Radio Regulations are annexed.''I02
The 1977 Conference accepted as principles a numberof propositions
that have been previously identified with ITU Conventions and prior
Radio Regulations. Amongthese are: the equitable, effective, and
economical use of the linked orbit-spectrum, the equal rights of all
countries, the view that the geostationary satellite orbit and the radio
frequency spectrum are limited natural resources, no permanent priority
for a nation-state to be obtained by the registration with the ITU of
99Final Acts, Preamble, p. 1
IOOu.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/213, p. 5.
I01 Ibid.
1021bid"
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frequency assignments for space radiocommunication services and their
use, such registration not to constitute an obstacle to the establishment
of space systems by other States, and registration of frequency assign-
ments for space radiocommunication services by one country should allow
for sharing in a practical way with new space systems of other countries
who wished to engage in such a sharing. The Conference also was guided
by the terms of Paragraph 428A of the 1971 Radio Regulations dealing
with "spillover" of broadcasts into a memberState other than the country
103of dissemination.
A technically complex and critically important problem that was
finally overcomeat the Conference related to the avoidance of inter-
terence between regions. Necessitated was a sharing between regions of
given frequencies. Protection was required for Region 2, where the
planned fixed service will operate with low power flux densities, from
interference by broadcasting satellites serving Regions 1 and 3. In
its 17th Report to COPUOSthe ITU indicated:
The problem was especially critical for satellites
situated on the orbital axis above the Atlantic,
since broadcasting-satellites are situated further
to the west than the region to be served (owing to
lack of illumination of solar cells during
equinoctial eclipses) and in the case of the
Atlantic can cause problems in the Americas,
particularly Brazil.
After a long discussion, it was decided that Regions
1 and 3 should use the orbital positions between
37°W and 146°E. In addition, supplementary
attention was provided for the transmitting antenna
1031bid., pp. 5-6. Paragraph 428A provides that "in devising the
characteristics of a space station in the Broadcasting-Satellite Service,
all technical meansavailable shall be used to reduce, to the maximum
extent practicable, the radiation over the territory of other countries
unless an agreement has been previously reached with such countries."
23 UST1527, 1648, TIAS 7435.
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of broadcasting-satellites (5 dB for the sidebands).
Furthermore, assignments to the satellites most
likely to cause interference were madefor prefer-
ence in the band between 12.2 and 12.5 GHz, which is
not allocated to the fixed-satellite service in
Region 2. Annex II to the Final Acts gives the
limits of power flux density produced JR Region 2
and a check point situated in Brazil.104
The 1977 WARCBS produced an agreement consisting of 16 articles
in the Final Acts, II annexes, a Final Protocol, 9 Resolutions, and 8
Recommendations.I05
Article 1 consists of general definitions. It uses the expression
"Frequency assignment in accordance with the Plan," and this is defined
as "Any frequency assignment which appears in the Plan for which the
procedure of Article 4 of the Final Acts has been successfully applied. ''I06
Article 2 refers to the frequency bands dealt with at the Conference,
as well as "to the other services to which these bands are allocated, so
far as their relationship to the broadcasting-satellite service in these
bands is concerned."
Article 3 imposes on States situated in Regions 1 and 3 the duty to
operate their broadcasting-satellite space stations on radio frequencies
specified in the "Plan." States in Region 2 are to apply interim
provisions contained in Article II of the Final Acts. Further the
members agreed not to "change the characteristics specified in the Plan,
or establish new broadcasting-satellite space stations or stations in
the other services to which these frequency bands are allocated, except
I04U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/213, p. 7.
105Final Acts, Intertelecommunication Union, Geneva, 1977.
1061talics added. Attention is called to this terminology, since
the IFRB has been charged with making allocations of frequencies.
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as provided in the Radio Regulations and the appropriate Articles and
Annexesof these Final Acts."
Article 4 is entitled "Procedure for modifications to the Plan."
Noteworthy in this complex article is the fact that the term "modifica-
tion" covers the inclusion or cancellation of a frequency assignment.
Annex I0, entitled "Orbital Position Limitations," provides detail
for the application of Article 4 in achieving modifications of the
"Plan." MemberStates are to observe the following criteria in respect
to limitations on orbital positions:
I. No broadcasting-satellite serving an area in Region 1 and
using a frequency in the band 11.7 - 12.2 GHzshall occupy
a nominal orbital position further West than 37°Wor
further East than 146°E.
2. Any new nominal orbital position in the Plan in the range
of orbital arc between37°Wand IO°E associated with a
newassignment, or resulting from a modification of an
assignment in the Plan, shall be coincident with, or
within 1° to the East of, a nominal orbital position in the
Plan at the date of entry into force of the Final Acts.
Annex I0 also takes into account the use of a new nominal orbital position
not coincident with any nominal orbital position in the "Plan" at the date
of entry into force of the Final Acts. Such a use would be associated
with a reduction in orbital activity on the part of the space resource
State.
Article 5 deals with giving notice to the IFRB of frequency
assignments for recordation in the Master Register for Broadcasting-
Satellite Service in Regions 1 and 3. The notice must reach the IFRB
not earlier than three years before the date on which the assignment is
to be brought into use and not later than 90 days before that date. The
Article also makesprovision for the cancellation of entries in the
Master Register.
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Article 6 sets out procedures relating to frequency assignments to
terrestrial stations affecting the frequencies dealt with at the
Conference. The technical complexity of the problem is indicated by the
fact that 56 paragraphs are required to deal with the subject.
Article 7 deals with procedures leading to the recording in the
IFRB's Master International Frequency Register of frequency assignments
to stations in the Fixed-Satellite Service in the 11.7 - 12.2 GHz
frequency band for Region 2 when such assignments are to broadcasting-
satellite stations in accordance with the "Plan." Over 30 paragraphs in
the Final Acts focus on coordination to be effected by ITU memberson
this subject.
Article 8 contains miscellaneous provisions relating to IFRB
procedures. Article 9 contains procedures to protect terrestrial services
in Regions 1 and 3 from interference from broadcasting-satellite space
stations in Region 2. Article I0 is designed to protect space services
in Region 2 from interference by broadcasting-satellite space stations
of Regions 1 and 3. Article II identifies the nine items appearing in the
,,I07
column headings of the "Plan.
Article 12 is of particular interest to the United States since it
relates to Region 2. The article purports to deal with the broadcasting-
satellite service pending the establishment of the detailed "Plan" for
this region at the Regional Conference to be convened no later than 1982.
The article constitutes interim provisions. Continuing the ITU's
association of frequencies and orbits it is provided that "Space stations
in the broadcasting-satellite service shall be located in the following
107See footnote 94 supra.
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portions of the orbit":
75°Wto IO0°Wlongitude (however, for service to
Canadathe USAand Mexico, the elevated portion
shall be only between75°Wand 95°Wlongitude);
140°Wto 170°Wlongitude.
The article also provides that space stations in both the broadcasting-
satellite service and in the fixed-satellite service may be located in
specified orbital areas. Such space systems in the 11.7 - 12.2 GHz
frequency band are to use "to the maximumextent technically and
economically practicable, available techniques in order to make the most
efficient use of the geostationary orbit and the frequency spectrum."
Article 13 deals with the approval of the Final Acts. Article 14 contains
a promise of the ITU membershipto "endeavor to agree on the action
required to reduce harmful interference which might be caused by the
application of these provisions and the associated plan." Article 15
states that the Final Acts are to enter into force on January I, 1979.
This date has to be weighed against the fact that the WARCto be held in
1979 is to be asked to incorporate the Final Acts into the Radio
Regulations as an integral part of them.
Article 16 asserts that the provisions and the associated "Plan"
have been designed for the future and that the agreement should be
binding for a period of 15 years or until revised by a duly constituted
Administrative Radio Conference.
Annex 1 to the Final Acts of the 1977 Conference sets criteria to
be used in determining whether a service is considered to be affected
by a proposed modification of the "Plan." Annex 2 specifies the basic
characteristics to be furnished in notices relating to space stations in
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the broadcasting-satellite service. I08 Annex 3 deals with a method for
determining the limiting interfering power flux density in specific
situations. Annex 4 identifies the need for coordination of a fixed-
satellite space station or a broadcasting-satellite space station in
Region 2 with respect to Article 7 of the "Plan." Annex 5 also deals
with power flux density as related to Article 9.
Annex 6 is entitled "Planning principles in Region 2." In this
Annex the membersof the ITU provide instructions for States located in
Region 2 and to the regional conference to be convened to deal with the
11.7 - 12.2 GHzband. In keeping with the ITU's association of radio
frequencies with orbital positions reference was madeto "equitable
rights of access to the geostationary orbit spectrum resource." Although
the Final Acts do not provide a definition for the expression "Geostationary
orbit spectrum resource," paragraph 4 of this Annex states:
Subject to the provisions of the Convention, the
Radio Regulations and the Resolutions in force,
it is recognized that all administrations have the
right of access to the geostationary orbit spectrum
resource in order to fulfill their requirements. I09
Undoubtedly, the quoted language is consistent with the ITU position
that both the position in space occupied by a space object and the radio
frequency employed in broadcasting from such a space object are natural
resources legally available for the use of all States.
Annex 6 also advises Region 2 States that the forthcoming regional
plan is to make provisions for the efficient use of the geostationary orbit
108Because of the relevance of the identified criteria to possible
future allocations of frequencies at the lower GHz range, the criteria
are included in Annex 1 to this Chapter.
109The term is not defined in the 1971WARC ST.
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and the spectrum. Thus:
The plan for Region 2 shall use, to the maximum
extent technically and economically practicable,
the techniques available so as to makethe most
efficient use of the geostationary orbit and the
frequency spectrum to fulfill the requirements
both of the Region as a whole and of the individual
administrations.
Annex 7 acknowledges that the shared "use of the spectrum/orbit
resources" in Region 2 poses problems for two services, namely, the
broadcasting-satellite and the fixed-satellite. This annex identifies
ten techniques suited to the efficient exploitation of the "spectrum/orbit
,,II0resource.
The 16 pages of Annex 8, entitled "Technical Data Used in Establish-
ing the Provisions and Associated Plan and which should be Used for
Their Application," attest to its complexity. This Annex identified
disagreement amongmemberStates on the subject of polarization. Thus,
the United States expressed concern over the acceptance of circular
polarization for the broadcasting-satellite service. The United States
"indicated that the very probable adoption of linear polarization by the
fixed-satellite service would preclude the use of cross-polarization to
facilitate sharing between the two space services and would affect orbit
and spectrum utilization within the Region. ''III Iran "expressed a
reservation regarding the adoption of circular polarization for planning
the broadcasting-satellite service in Region 3 and states its intention
,,112to use linear polarization.
llOThese techniques are set out in Annex 2 to this Chapter.
lllFinal Acts, Annex 8, p. 5.
ll21bid"
58
This Annex provided an additional set of definitions, one being
"nominal orbital position." This is identified as "the longitude of a
position in the geostationary satellite orbit associated with a frequency
assignment to a 'space station in a space radiocommunication service. The
,,113position is given in degrees from the Greenwich meridian.
This Annex also deals with orbital spacing and with satellite
station keeping. The Annex refers only to the "Plan" for Regions 1 and
3, and indicates general acceptance of "nominal orbital positions spaced
uniformly at intervals of 6°. ''I14 As to station keeping it is stated
that "space stations in the broadcasting-satellite service must be
maintained in position with an accuracy of better than ± 0.I ° in both
the N-S and E-Wdirection. (These tolerances lead to a maximumexcursion
of ± 0.14° from the nominal satellite position.) ''I15
Annex II sets out technical methods for the calculation of power
flux density produced in the territories of Region 2 by space stations
in the broadcasting-satellite service in Regions 1 and 3. This Annex
contains a table identifying 88 orbital positions assigned in the "Plan"
which orbital positions occupy the area from 37°Wto 5°E and channels 1
to 25. These assigned orbital positions pertain to broadcasting space
116
stations of Regions 1 and 3.
Resolutions A through I deal generally with the acceptance of the
work of the 1977 Conference by the 1979WARCand with the expectation
ll31bid., p. 2.
ll4Ibid., p. 14.
ll51bid"
ll61bid., Annex II, pp. 2-6.
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that the Final Acts of WARCBSwould enhance the beneficial uses of the
radio spectrum. Several deserve mention. Thus, Resolution A resolved
that "the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference be requested to
annex the provisions and associated Plan to the Radio Regulations as an
integral part thereof, in the form and to the extent it deemsmost
appropriate without thereby affecting their content or integrity."
Resolution B has express legal significance. The 1977 Conference resolved
that "both during this interim period and after the date on which they
have been annexed to the Radio Regulations, the provisions and the
associated Plan shall retain their integrity as a legal instrument; that
during this period the IFRBand the other appropriate organs of the Union
shall be guided by the provisions of these Final Acts and the Radio
Regulations."
Resolution C dealt with the updating of the Master International
Frequency Register for Regions 1 and 3. Resolution D was concerned with
the Register in Region 2. Resolution E dealt with the samesubject.
Resolution F connected frequencies with the geostationary orbit. This
resolution took note of the fact that WARCBS had established a "Plan"
designating frequency bands and positions in the geostationary orbit for
Regions 1 and 3. It stated that the Conference expected that the Region 2
Conference would design a similar "Plan." It took note of the fact that
the operation of space radiocommunication services in the indicated
frequency bands in orbits other than the geostationary orbit would be
incompatible with the efforts of the Conference. The conclusion was that
memberStates "shall ensure that their space stations in these frequency
bands are operated in the geostationary orbit and no other."
6O
Resolution G called upon the International Radio Consultative
Committee (CCIR), a technical body of the ITU, to assist in the planning
of the Region 2 Conference. Resolution H reidentified the goals of the
Region 2 Conference, e.g., that it is to "draw up a detailed plan for
the orbit spectrum resource," and that "the plan is to provide for the
detailed assignment of the orbital positions and frequency channels
available, ensuring that the broadcasting-satellite service requirements
of the various administrations are met in an equitable manner satisfactory
to all the countries concerned." The IFRBwas invited to request the
States participating in the Region 2 Conference to submit their require-
ments at least one year prior to the convening of the Conference.
Resolution I dealt with the collection of data on the functioning of the
"Plan" for Regions 1 and 3.
The Recommendationswere directed in large part to the 1979 WARC.
RecommendationAA invited the CCIRto study spurious emissions in the
broadcasting-satellite service. RecommendationBB asked the CClRto
submit information relating to transmitting antennae for the sameservice.
RecommendationCCasked the CClRto submit information on propaganda
at 12 GHzfor the sameservice. RecommendationDD invited the CClRto
study polarization characteristics of receiving antennae of space
stations with the view of obtaining protection for the up-links of systems
for satellites occupying a given position in the geostationary orbit.
RecommendationEE asked memberStates to estimate the future technical
requirements for up-links. RecommendationFF asked the CCIRto study the
interdependence of receiver design, channel grouping, and sharing
criteria. RecommendationGGtook into account that frequency band
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23.6 - 24 GHzhad been allocated to the radio astronomy service on a
primary basis. The Conference recommendedthat space stations be designed
in such a manneras to reduce the radiation level of the second harmonic
so that observations by radio astronomers would not be seriously
disturbed. RecommendationHHrecommendedthat the forthcoming Region 2
Conference "draw up a detailed plan for the orbit/spectrum resource
available for the broadcasting-satellite services in the 11.7 - 12.2 GHz
band." The recommendationis notable for its specificity:
The plan shall provide for the detailed assignment
of the orbital positions and frequency channels
available, ensuring that the broadcasting-satellite
service requirements submitted by the various
administrations are met in an equitable manner
satisfactory to all the countries concerned. It
should be laid downas a matter of principle that
each administration in the Region should be
guaranteed a minimumnumberof channels (4) for the
operation of the broadcasting-satellite service.
Above this minimum, the special characteristics of
the countries (size, time zones, language differences,
etc.) shall be taken into account.
2.10 Assessment of Role of ITU in SPS Activities
Several broad conclusions can be derived from what has been written
above. The ITU, despite some assessments that would constrict it to
fairly narrow influences and powers, has staked out for itself a wide-
ranging function regarding what has come to be identified as the
"geostationary orbit spectrum resource." The ITU's involvement stems
from Article 33 of the 1973 Convention, and in particular, relies on the
provision that "In using frequency bands for space radio services Members
shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite
orbit are limited natural resources, that they must be used efficiently
62
and economically so that countries or groups of countries may have
equitable access to both in conformity with the provisions of the Radio
Regulations according to their needs and the technical facilities at
their disposal. ''I17 The World Administrative Radio Conferences, and in
particular WARCBS of 1977, confirm the ITU's efforts to realize the
foregoing commitment. It is to be expected that the 1979 WARCand the
proposed Region 2 Conference prior to 1982 will arrive at important
decisions as they seek to put into operation the foregoing concepts.
In the mass of complex and technical documentation produced by the
ITU and its radio conferences the theme is constantly repeated that all
nation-states have a right of access to the geostationary orbit spectrum
resource. Hence, the ITU is engagedin implementing the guarantee set
forth in the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moonand
other Celestial Bodies. ''I18 Article I, paragraph 2 provides:
Outer space, including the Moonand other celestial
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by
all States without discrimination of any kind, on a
basis of equality and in accordance with international
law, and there shall be free access to all areas of
celestial bodies.
Since the ITU has expressed a concern for the equitable access to the
space resource by countries, including the needs of the less-developed
countries, Article I, paragraph 1 of the Principles Treaty is also
relevant. It provides:
II7TIAS 8572, pp. 35-36.
11818 UST2410, TIAS 6347. The treaty entered into force for the
United States on October I0, 1967. It will be referred to hereafter as
"Principles Treaty." SeeAppendix A.
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The exploration and use of outer space including the
Moonand other celestial bodies, shall be carried out
for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.
Operating on the premise that the frequency/orbit resource is both
international, natural, and limited the ITU has endeavored to effect
an orderly disposition of the linked resource. This has taken the form
of seeking to avoid harmful interferences. This has involved a vast
amount of coordination by the IFRBas it has engaged in its function of
receiving national assignments of frequencies, in according registration
and notice, and in making service allocations. The ITU has focused on
the duty of its memberStates to use the allocations that have been made.
Failure to use can result in possible loss of registration. This has
rendered somewhatless meaningful than prior to 1973 the claim that
priorities could be established through the "first come- first served"
concept. In this situation the earlier rather abstract discussions are
giving way to practical considerations in which the technical needs of
States and the special competenceof the IFRBplay a role. Whenever
there is competition for a given resource, and advantages are to be derived
from its use, there emerges a need for somekind of administrative
process and entity. For the time being the ITU has accepted the role
of such a central and community-oriented intergovernmental institution.
The ITU is not the only world organization that is involved in the
managementof the space resource. In comparison with the UN, the ITU has
been identified as a primarily technical body with the UN being a
primarily political body.I19 Nonetheless, there have been points of
ll9David M. Leive, The Future of the International Telecommunication
Union, op. cit., p. 42.
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competition. It has been suggested that the ITU possesses special
competence in "the regulation of the technical and operating aspects ."
of space activities. 120 While the UN is seen as the institution for
debating and reaching a consensus on international legal aspects of space
activities, it is considered that in working together they "have shown
a realistic appreciation for the interdependence of technology,
institutional requirements, and the legal implications of space programs. "121
In the ITU's report to the legal sub-committee of COPUOS in 1977
relating to the work of the 1977 WARC BS it was noted that "no doubt the
member countries concerned will ask for the appropriate consideration
when the definition of outer space is taken up by the Sub-Committee. ''122
The foregoing has been interpreted to mean that "the subject of sovereign
claims over portions of the geostationary orbit was related to the
definition of outer space and that the question was properly one
for consideration by the Legal Sub-committee rather than the International
,,123Telecommunication Union.
In fact, the UN has long been involved in seeking to obtain a
clarification of the relationship between the legal regimes applicable
120A. L. Moore, "Direct Broadcast Satellites by Treaty or Regulation:
The Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space v. the ITU," Proceedings of
the 19th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 349 (1977).
121
Ibid.
122Butler, "World Administrative Radio Conference for Planning
Broadcasting Satellite Service," op. cit., p. 98. This statement follows
Mr. Butler's observation that "The indication of this nominal position
means the use of this part of an orbit for a transmitter is compatible
with an operation of the system free of interference to or from other users.
The mention of this position does not, from the ITU point of view,
constitute an appropriation."
123Eilene Galloway, "Present Status in the United Nations of Direct
Television Broadcast Satellites," 2 Annals of Air and Space Law 275 (1977).
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to the sovereign area of airspace 124 and the non-sovereign areas of outer
space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies. 125 As noted in the
Introduction, the United Nations through its Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space began in 1959 to consider the boundary
between space and airspace. Although the subject received occasional
reference at the UN prior to 1967 it was not until that year that the
issue became an agenda item for the legal subcommittee of COPUOS. Even
then the problem was not given careful scrutiny until 1977. The focus
of the subcommittee on this subject is illustrated in the successive
agenda titles. In 1970 the subcommittee received a background paper from
the UN Secretariat entitled "The Question of the Definition and/or the
Delimitation of Outer Space," which in large part dealt with the spatial
approach to the subject. 126 In 1977 the chairman of the subcommittee
assigned the following title to the agenda: "Matters relating to the
definition and/or delimitation of outer space and outer space
activities. ''127 This was changed in 1978 by the legal subcommittee to
"Questions relating to the definition and/or delimitation of outer space
and outer space activities, also bearing in mind questions relating to
the geostationary orbit. ''128
124Convention on International Civil Aviation of December 7, 1944.
3 Bevans 944, TIAS 1591. This agreement entered into force for the
United States on April 4, 1947.
125"Principles Treaty," Article 2.
126U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/C.2/7, 7 May 1970.
127U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/196, II April 1977.
128U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/218, 13 April 1978.
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The styles and decisional processes of the ITU and the UNare
different. As a specialized agency of the UN the ITU has for manyyears
developed procedures and processes to deal with radio frequencies. The
ITU uses a Plenipotentiary Conference scheduled to meet at regular
intervals and normally every five years. It conducts periodic administra-
tive conferences to issue specific regulations. It has an administrative
council of 36 membersand an experienced general secretariat. Its IFRB
and the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) are staffed by
129
experts.
The ITU's decisional process is mannedby technicians representing
memberStates who work with the specialists of the ITU. Presumably the
national technicians interrelate with politically oriented decision makers
in their homeStates before they engage the procedures and processes of
the ITU. The impression exists that the ITU in the totality of its
operations is weighted more in the direction of technical feasibility than
in the direction of a balancing of competing political interests. The ITU,
although certainly not immunefrom the pressures of competing ideologies
and the differing interests of the newand the old States, is separated
from the great concerns for the maintenance of international peace and
security that reside in the UN.
Outer space decisions at the UNare focused in COPUOS.It has two
subcommittees, namely, legal and scientific and technical. Each
establishes working groups to assist in the preparation of draft
129For an assessment of ways to strengthen the ITU see "The Future
of Satellite Communications, ResourceManagementand the Needsof Nations,
Second Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on International
Satellite Communications," pp. 21-27 (1970).
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international agreements. Reports are received by COPUOSfrom the ITU,
other specialized agencies, and from a variety of non-governmental
organizations, such as the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR)of the
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). It also receives
statements from the International Astronautical Federation (IAF) and works
with the UNSecretariat. WhenCOPUOSagrees on a draft treaty the matter
is referred to the First Committee of the General Assembly. If the First
Committee supports the draft it is submitted to the General Assembly for
its approval. Obtaining the latter's approval the agreement is submitted
to memberStates for their approval. Thus, for such an agreement to enter
into force it has been necessary for a very considerable consultation
to have been effected between decision makers having both legal-political
perspectives and also scientific and technological outlooks. However,
in contrast with the ITU, it is clear that there is a heavier weighting
of legal-political outlooks at the UN. Becauselegal-political considera-
tions must always press heavily on scientific and technological facts and
interests, it is possible that the larger involvement at this time by the
ITU in the matter of the orbital patterns of geostationary space objects
will not preclude the UNfrom claiming a dominant involvement. It is
doubtful that the ITU has preempted the subject of orbital slots. Of
necessity both of these international organizations will have to consult
and cooperate with each other in arriving at international agreements on
this subject.
The utilization of the geostationary orbit will depend on the
characteristics of this world natural resource. Since 1973 the position
of the ITU has consistently been that the resource is a limited resource.
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The ITU operates on the basis that the radio frequency spectrum is a
limited world resource, places the radio broadcast facility on the space
object in geostationary orbit, and links the limitedness of the radio
spectrum to the asserted limitedness of parking slots for geostationary
space objects. Attention will next be given to the issue whether the
orbital slot suited to radio broadcasts is in fact a limited natural
resource, in the sense of imposing large constraints upon the effective
use of radio broadcasts emanating from space objects in geostationary
orbit, and, if so, the nature or extent of such limitations. Political
and legal considerations will affect the use of any resource whether
plentiful or limited.
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ANNEX 1
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS TO BE FURNISHED IN NOTICES
RELATING TO SPACE STATIONS IN THE BROADCASTING-SATELLITE SERVICE
I. Country and IFRB number
2. Nominal orbital position (in degrees from the Greenwich meridian)
3. Assigned frequency or channel number
4. Date of bringing into use
5. Identity of the space station
6. Service area (if necessary, the service area may be defined by a
number of "test points")
7. Geographical coordinates of the intersection of the antenna beam
axis with the Earth
8. Rain-climate zone
9. Class of station
I0. Class of emission and necessary bandwidth
II. Power supplied to the antenna (Watts)
12. Antenna characteristics
- gain of the antenna referred to an isotropic radiator
- shape of the beam (elliptical or circular)
- major axis (degrees) at -3 dB points
- minor axis (degrees) at -3 dB points
- orientation of the ellipse
- AG (difference between the maximum gain and the gain in the
direction of the point in the service area at which the
power flux density is at a minimum)
- pointing accuracy
- type of polarization
- sense of polarization
- radiation pattern and cross-polar characteristics
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ANNEX 2
Use of the Spectrum/Orbit Resource
Since the equal sharing of the spectrum/orbit resource between the
broadcasting-satellite service and the fixed-satellite service in
Region 2 is inherently difficult and may impose some restrictions on
both services, it is important that the technical parameters be chosen,
and the techniques for efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resource be
applied in such a way that both space services will benefit as much as
possible.
The following techniques are among those identified as leading to
a more efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resource and should therefore
be applied to the maximum extent technically and economically practicable
-consistent with the capability of systems to fulfill the requirements for
which they were designed.
I. Clustering
2. Cross-polarization
3. Crossed-beam geometry
4. Paired service areas
5. Frequency interleaving
6. Minimum space station spacings
7. Space station antenna discrimination
8. Earth station antenna discrimination
9. Minimizing e.i.r.p, differences*
I0. Realistic quality and reliability objectives
*See footnote 96 for definition.
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Chapter Three
INTERNATIONALSPACELAWANDTHEUSE
OFNATURALRESOURCES:ORBITALPOSITIONS
3.1 The Orbital Position as a World Natural Resource
International space law deals with man's activities in the space
environment, including the use of the natural resources of the space
environment. Focus will be given here to the geostationary orbital
position as a world natural resource. Attention will be given later
to the use and exploitation of solar energy at geostationary orbital
heights. Both subjects have a similar characteristic. In effect, each
resource is consumed but renews itself so that its use does not deplete
it. Resources of this kind traditionally have been open to common use
and constitute ares communis. Thus, they are not open to ownership in
the sense of exclusivity of use by a claimant, but rather are available
for the use of all. The traditional international law of the sea is
based on the foregoing principle. This concept was captured in Article 2
of the PrinCiples Treaty, which provides that "Outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropria-
tion by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means."
3.2 The Debate over the Number of Orbital Positions
In a mechanical sense it might be supposed that the space available
for space objects in geostationary orbit would be a limited natural resource.
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Thus, if such space objects were to be obliged to maintain a distance
of 2° from each other while in orbit above the equator, then no more
than 180 such space objects would ever have safe access to or a presence
at geostationary level.l However, such a simplistic approach must give
way to the practical prospect of using one space object in one orbital
slot for a multiplicity of functions thereby extending its performance.
It has been suggested that 1,800 space objects could function simultan-
2
eously at the geostationary height. The antennas on communications
satellites have been small. That of Intelsat IVA was 1.27xi.27 m. That
3of Intelsat V was 2.44 m. That of the ATS-6 was 9 m. It has been
proposed that the microwave antenna for a geostationary space object
4broadcasting on a 2.45 GHzfrequency would be 1 km in diameter. However,
muchlarger solar panels are neededon a SPSto capture solar energy for
conveyance to the microwave antenna and ultimately to Earth. Both types
IThe figure of 180 satellites placed along the equator was mentioned
by the Colombiandelegate to the Legal Sub-committee of COPUOSon March 31,
1977. U.N. Doc. I05/C.2/SR.277, po 3, April 5, 1977.
2This is based on the following proposition: "The circumference of
the geostationary orbit is approximately 165,000 miles. A one-degree
segmentof this orbit is about 460 miles. If satellite station-keeping
were good to about ± 0.I degree (actually it can be maintained more
precisely), then one degree of orbit space could hold five satellites with
virtually no danger of collision, and the full 360° could accommodate
1,800 satellites. Actually, since the geostationary orbit has considerable
depth and width and present satellites range between ten and twenty feet
in diameter, the orbit could physically accommodatea muchgreater number
without collision. The question of orbital slot scarcity thus has little
to do with purely physical limitations." Walter R. Hinchman, "Issues in
SpectrumResourceManagement," in The Future of Satellite Communications]
Resource Management and the Needs of Nations, The Twentieth Century Fund,
p. 52 (1970).
3Burton I. Edelson and Walter L. Morgan, "Orbital Antenna Farms,"
15 Astronautics & Aeronautics, No. 9, p. 22 (September 1977).
4MSFC-JSC, "Solar Power Satellite Baseline Review, (Preliminary),"
p. 16, NASA, Washington, D.C. (July 13, 1978).
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of panels would considerably reduce the amount of collision-free space
for geostationary orbits. Thus, the gallium arsenide array could measure
4800 m x 9600 m, with a blanket area of 44.31 km2 and a planform area of
45.08 km2. A silicon array could measure 5200 m x I0400 m, with a
blanket area of 52.34 km2 and with a planform area of 54.08 km2.5
Another estimate of the size of the collecting area of a photovoltaic
system on a geostationary space object is between lO0 and 200 km2. 6 The
silicon solar cells consist of "two extremely large arrays. ''7 Following
the photovoltaic concept the usual design of this panel "consists of
rectangular arrays about 2.7 mix 3.2 mi (4.3 km x 5.2 km) separated by a
................. o,,,,_=,. ._a_r suggests different dimensions for the
photovoltaic solar cell where 5,000 MW are to be produced. This would
require a. space object measuring "about 4 kilometers by II kolometers
with a transmitting antenna 1 kilometer in diameter. ''9 One hundred units
I0
were not considered to be burdensome on the geostationary orbital area.
It has been estimated that over I00 space objects employing photovoltaic
cells with dimensions of between I00 and 200 km2 would be required to meet
only one-half of the new energy needs of the United States by the year
51bid., p. 28 at PD646-78C.
6physical Nature and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/203, p. 17, August 29, 1977.
7Charles E. Bloomquist, A Suryey of Satellite Power Stations, PRC
R-1844, PRC Systems Sciences Co., p. 6 (September 1976).
81bid.
9peter E. Glaser, "Solar Power from Satellites," Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Aerospace Technolggy and National Needs of the Committee
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
p. 4 (1976). Cited hereafter as Hearings.
lOIbid., pp. 7, 33.
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2025. 11 However, only one satellite would suffice to "generate very
substantial power for use on Earth. ''12 Structures as large as those
identified above will be subjected to "orbital perturbations. ''13
Stationkeeping and attitude control will be obliged to meet clearly
identified legal standards. The distance between such space objects
will depend on their size and the methods available to manage their
positions.
Viewed in this light, and depending on the scientific and technolog-
ical capabilities brought to bear on the subject, the contention that
the orbital position is a limited natural resource becomes somewhat less
meaningful. The issue then turns to the effective management of spectrum
14
and orbit resources.
A principal goal in the management of spectrum resources is to avoid
radio interference. Techniques have been devised so that "radio systems
can employ the same operating frequencies without mutual interference
provided their radio signals are adequately distinguished by location,
orientation and breadth of transmission paths, polarization of radiated
energy or type of modulation [as well as by] operating at different
times. ,,15
II
U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/203, p. 17, August 29, 1977.
12Hearings, op. cit., p. 3.
131bid., p. 17.
14For a basic assessment of spectrum management, see The Radio
Frequency Spectrum, United States Use and Management, Office of Tele-
communications Policy, Executive Office of the President (1975). The
study notes constraints on spectrum management including the fact that
the spectrum is limited, it is not elastic, it is not flexible, and it
does not follow national boundaries, pp. A-4-6.
15Walter R. Hinchman, "Issues in Spectrum Resource Management," in
The Future of Satellite Communications_ Resource Management and the Needs
of Nations, The Twentieth Century Fund, p. 34 (1970).
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Hinchmanhas given careful attention to the view that the spectrum/
orbit resource is a limited one. Hestates that "the so-called scarcity
of spectrum/orbit resources is emerging as more myth than fact. ''16 The
geostationary orbit "may be considered as a thick, broad band of space
lying roughly 22,300 miles above the earth's surface, directly above and
concentric with the equator. ''17 The 1971WARCST definition is: "A
satellite, the circular orbit of which lies in the plane of the Earth's
equator and which turns about the polar axis of the Earth in the same
direction and with the sameperiod as those of the Earth's rotation."
Further, "the orbit on which a satellite should be placed to be a
geostationary satellite is called the 'geostationary satellite orbit. '''18
Such space objects are not all in the samecircular orbit in the
plane of the Earth's equator. Their pattern in space "is an annulus-like
three-dimensional corridor in which satellites travel at different speeds,
altitudes and inclinations to the plane of the Earth's equator. ''19 Thus,
while geostationary space objects "tend to group into segmentsalong the
geostationary orbit, these enormousvolumes [of space occupied per
satellite] reduce the possibility of collision to a negligible level.
Generally, the availability of physical space is not a matter of concern.
Orbit limitation is a problem of electromagnetic interference between
16Ibid., p. 51.
17Ibid_--., p. 52.
18paragraph 84BG, Annex I, Revision of Article 1 of the Radio Regula-
tions, 23 UST 1527, 1579, TIAS 7435.
19james J. Gehrig, "Geostationary Orbit--Technology and Law,"
Proceedings of the 19th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 268 (1977).
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satellites using the same frequency band of the radio spectrum. ''20
The size of the space object will, however, affect the possibility
of collision. One estimate has been based on a satellite possessing a
radius of 25 m. Two space objects having this dimension will have to
pass each other by more than double that distance in order to avoid a
collision or other possible interference. 21 With lO0 satellites of this
size in geostationary orbit it is estimated that the collision cross-
section would be 0.8 km2 and with a "total of 200 passages through the
equatorial plane per day, there will be less than one collision per 500
years. ''22 Thus, for both active and passive satellites of this size the
danger of collision is negligible. However, "a totally different picture
emerges if large space structures are considered such as those envisaged
for collection and transmission of solar energy. Assuming that such a
space structure would have an area of lO0 km2, it would suffer one
collision on the average of every five years from the hypothetical lO0
small inactive satellites, which is signficant because its planned
life-time would be about 30 years. ''23 Since such collisions would not
necessarily result in the destruction of, or even change the motion of the
large SPS, it might need only repairs and station-keeping. However, the
impact could place the inactive satellites on a new orbit in which it
would continue to cut through the geostationary orbit causing more than
the first collision.
20Ibid., pp. 268-269.
21
Physical Nature and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/203, p. 7, August 29, 1977.
221bid.
231bid.
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To optimize the use of the radio spectrum a number of technical
procedures may be employed. These have been identified by Hinchman under
the heading "design variables," namely:
I. The degree of common frequency usage;
2. The degree to which both satellites illuminate the same
area of the earth's surface;
3. Earth station antenna size and design;
4. Antenna polarization;
5. Reversal of frequency assignments;
6. Modulation type and degree; and
247. Interference allowance.
In his view all of the foregoing variables "in all their combinations and
variations must be considered in examining the concept of discrete
orbital 'slots' and the danger of spectrum/orbit 'scarcity. '''25 Thus,
the availability of radio frequencies must be established. If such
frequencies can operate without interference, the space object can be
accommodated in orbit.
Gehrig lists ten of the more important technical considerations
which allow for an increased use of the geostationary orbit and an
enlargement of the number of satellites using the same frequency assign-
26
ment in an effective way.
The relevance of these technical considerations was accepted by
the 1977 WARC BS. It also identified ten processes which would allow
24Hinchman, op. cit., pp. 52-55.
25Ibid.., p. 55.
26Gehrig, op. cit., p. 269.
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for an efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resource. Pursuant to Annex 7
"Use of the Spectrum/Orbit Resource," the Conference prescribed that the
following techniques should be applied "to the maximum extent technically
and economically practicable consistent with the capability of systems
to fulfill the requirements for which they were designed":
I. Clustering
2. "Cross-polarization
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I0.
With a suitable use of the foregoing elements in the management of
the radio frequency spectrum it can be concluded that radio frequencies
emanating from space objects located in geostationary orbit need not be
Crossed-beam geometry
Paired service areas
Frequency interleaving
Minimum space station spacings
Space station antenna discrimination
Earth station antenna discrimination
Minimizing e.i.r.p, differences
27
Realistic quality and reliability objectives.
27Final Acts, WARC BS, Annex 7, pp. I-2. Equivalent Isotropically
Radiated Power (e.i.r.p.) is defined as "the product of the power of an
emission as supplied to an antenna and the antenna gain in a given
direction relative to an isotropic antenna." Final Acts, WARC ST, 23 UST
1527, 1579, TIAS 7435. The 1977 WARC BS Conference agreed to Annex 8
entitled "Technical Data Used in Establishing the Provisions and Associated
Plan and Which Should be Used for Their Application." The Conference under
the heading of basic technical characteristics, in paragraph 3.10 referred
to the "Plan" for orbital spacing for Regions 1 and 3. This was "based
generally on nominal orbital positions spaced uniformly at intervals of
6°. '' Reference was also made to satellite station-keeping, as follows:
"Space stations in the broadcasting-satellite service must be maintained
in position with an accuracy of better than ± 0.I ° in both the N-S and E-W
direction. (These tolerances lead to a maximum excursion of ± 0.14 ° from
the nominal satellite position.)." Final Acts, WARC BS, Annex 8.
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a limited natural resource. Experiments have been conducted for many
years to determine how best to use the radio spectrum, including a
determination of "the minimum angle of separation possible. ''28 Smith
has observed that "as with other problems of this type, the technical
solution to the problem of over-crowding of orbital positions will only
prove effective to the extent that a political accord has been reached. "29
In analyzing the assessments that have been made as to the number
of orbital positions, it should be kept in mind that the effective use
of such positions is more important than the specific number of positions.
Such positions can be extended in a practical sense through allocating
additional frequencies and installing more broadcast capabilities on
each space object. Each broadcast can be focused on a relatively
limited area so as to avoid harmful interference. With the installation
of a second satellite system frequencies could be reversed so that a
higher frequency band could be employed for up-links and a lower
frequency for down-links. Present technology allows for enlargement of
broadcast capabilities through antenna polarization, variable types and
degrees of modulation, and establishing lower standards for noise without
violating harmful interference expectations. While, from the scientific
and technological perspective, it "seems likely that the spectrum/orbit
resources are potentially adequate to meet almost any demand at present
conceivable, "30 this position has not obtained universal international
acceptance. Evidence of the unresolved issue of the number of effective
28D. D. Smith, International Telecommunications Control 161 (1969).
291bid.
30A. Chayes and Others, Satellite Broadcasting 17 (1973).
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orbital slots available at geostationary level is a statement of the
head of the Outer Space Division of the United Nations in October 1978.
He indicated that despite a careful review of all present factual informa-
tion that it was wholly impossible to place a number on the useful
geostationary orbital positions.
3.3 The Application of International Space Law to Orbital Use
From the political-legal point of view some States have taken the
position that the mere use of an orbital slot by a space object may
constitute an appropriation of this portion of the space environment in
violation of Article 2 of the Principles Treaty. To this concern that
nation-states would preempt a common world resource some of the non-space
resource States have advanced the view that the ITU should have the
authority to register allocations of orbital slots. This last position
seeks to link the powers of the ITU in the area of allocating and
registering radio frequencies with the associated subject of orbital
slots. To complicate matters on December 3, 1976, eight equatorial
States put forward their views relating to special national rights at
geostationary levels. All of these three situations, namely, national
claims relating to the use of the radio spectrum, to the use of orbital
slots, and to special rights at geostationary levels, have enlarged the
role of law and politics relating to the spectrum/orbit resource.
The 1967 Principles Treaty was designed to facilitate the explora-
tion and use of the space environment "on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law. ''31 In encouraging States to engage
31Article I, paragraph 2. See also Article 3.
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in space activities the treaty also sought to provide for the orderly use
of the resources of the space environment. Thus, resource States that
have placed geostationary space objects into orbit have taken the
position that this activity is a use foreseen by the Treaty. Since the
Treaty prohibits an appropriation of the space environment, or parts
thereof, States operating geostationary space objects in orbit have
maintained that they are engaged in a use and not a permanent appropria-
tion. This position is buttressed by the fact that a space object cannot
be absolutely maintained at a given orbital position, although a proximate
position can be maintained with the aid of station-keeping procedures.
Also, orbital positions cannot be maintained permanently by a space
object, since the object or its component parts wear out. While Intelsat
IV has a projected lifespan of lO years, a lifetime of up to 30 years
would be preferred for the SPS. When the satellite becomes unproductive
it is transferred out of the geostationary orbital position and becomes
unoperational. Further, for an "appropriation" to take place there must
be such an intent by the launching State. Absent such an intent under
present international law the space environment is being treated as a
res communis. Therefore, at the present time the proposition is tenable
that it is possible to use the orbital resource without owning it, e.g.,
without either having or obtaining a vested property right in such a
resource.
It has been suggested, especially by equatorial States, that the
presence of a nation's space object in geostationary orbit constitutes
a de facto occupation of the orbital slot. Additionally, in 1969 in
commenting on the provisions of Article 2 of the Principles Treaty,
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which denies to States the right to appropriate the space environment,
a representative of France at COPUOS urged that this provision implied
a limitation on the complete #reedom of States in space. He stated:
In fact, the very use of geostationary satellites
can be regarded as an "appropriation" of the
equatorial orbit, which is a privileged portion of
space. In return for such a de facto occupation,
the State responsible for the satellite should
agree to submit to certain rules. The same
applies to the use of a frequency band for broad-
casting .... 32
In reply to this position the representative of the United States
said:
• the use of space or a celestial body for
activities that are peaceful in character and
compatible with the provisions of the Outer Space
Treaty is, by definition, entirely legitimate.
Using a favorable orbit for a legitimate activity
cannot reasonably be classified as a prohibited
national appropriation in the sense of Article II.
The point I wish to make is that using a
favorable geostationary orbit is no more an
"appropriation" or "de facto occupation" than using
a particularly favorable area of the lunar surface
for a manned landing. 33
If, as suggested, a primary purpose of the Principles Treaty was to
allow States to enjoy the peaceful use of the space environment, then the
intent of a using State becomes important• If the intent is not an
intent to assert an exclusive right to a given use, and if that use is
designed to and is carried out, as provided in Article 1 of the Principles
Treaty, "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries
32U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/62, pp. 3-4 (June 1969).
33United States Delegation to the Second Session of the Working Group
on Direct Broadcast Satellites, Statement made by United States representa-
tive Herbert Reis at the Working Group Meeting, July 31, 1969 (mimeo.).
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then such conduct would not consist in an appropriation by the using
State. A using State can support such conduct by reference to the first
three articles of the 1967 Treaty. 34
It has been suggested that the underlying basis for the French
position was that "a geostationary satellite occupies a definite orbital
position in space and this, by any practical measure, amounts to de facto
appropriation. ''35
The United States position hinges on its commitment not to appropriate
orbital space. The United States distinguishes between the encouragement
in the Treaty to use the space environment pursuant to Article l, to
engage in activities pursuant to Article 3, and the terms of Article 2
interdicting "appropriation by means of use." On this position Glazer
has observed that "if this line of reasoning is followed, then the use of
orbital space without submission to an enlarged regulatory regime is
permitted provided that there is no 'intent' to appropriate the orbital
space involved and the use thereof is otherwise consistent with Article 3
of the Treaty. ''36 He stated: "The French position on de facto
appropriation of the geostationary orbit at least raises a real conflict
since states with advanced technology do have the capability of preempting
34See Appendix A.
35Clyde E. Rankin, Ill, "Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit--A
Need for Orbital Allocation?" 13 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
lOl (1974). Compare J. Henry Glazer, "Domicile and Industry in Outer Space,"
17 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 81 (1978).
361bid., p. 81. Article 3 provides "States Parties to the Treaty
shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting
international co-operation and understanding."
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the use of that orbit to the exclusion of other states. ''37
The French position, if it were to be accepted, would require the
establishment of an international body authorized to make allocations of
geostationary orbital positions. This would appear to be contrary to the
prohibition against national appropriations in Article 2 of the
Principles Treaty insofar as such an allocation could be treated as an
approval of a national claim or appropriation of a segment of the space
environment. On this point Rankin has observed that "assignment of orbital
slots by an international body would not be a violation of Article 2
since the article speaks in terms of '. national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty. '''38 Two objections can be voiced concerning this
outlook. First, no international institution exists having allocative
powers with respect to orbital slots, and it is unlikely that such an
institution will be formed in the near future. Second, the granting of
such authority to an international body would require changes in the 1967
Treaty, which, as has been emphasized, seeks to free the space environment
for peaceful and beneficial uses for States generally. The Treaty does
not impose special constraints in this respect on States having an
advanced scientific and technological base. Moreover, if such orbital
allocations were to be forthcoming from such an international organization,
although not according the claimant State a sovereign right to a given
orbital area, such allocations would undoubtedly confer so much exclusivity
of use that the benefiting State would be able to assert a kind of
quasi-sovereignty or preferred status over the orbital slot. A priority
371bid., p. 82.
38Rankin, op. cit., p. I01.
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of use, even though not permanent and not exclusive, could, with the
approval of such an institution, ripen into more than a right to engage
either exclusively or with other States in activities and to use. It
could provide a basis for a claim of quasi-sovereign rights or preferred
status which might then possibly be extended or converted to claims of
sovereignty. Such an outcomewould be diametrically opposed to the letter
and spirit of the Principles Treaty.
One analysis of the Principles Treaty, as it relates to the use of
the geostationary orbit, bears out the foregoing assessment.39 Attention
was given to Articles I, 2, and 9 of the Treaty. Thus, it is noted that
while the "commoninterests" provision of Article I, paragraph I, might
be considered to be "vague," nonetheless it could not be construed to
prevent national use of a "segment of the geostationary orbit for the
purpose of satellite power generation. ''40
As previously stated, the "free use" clause of Article I, paragragh 2,
is interpreted as designed to promote space activity, even though such
free use is not unlimited. Such limitations are set forth in Article I,
paragraph I, and Articles 2, 4, and 9. 41 Free use imposes a duty on such
a user to provide benefits to the general community, but the entitlement
of the general community under the language of "for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries" of Article I, paragraph I, cannot be used to
39political and Legal Implications of Developing and Operatin 9 a
Satellite Power System, Final Report, Econ, Inc., Princeton, N.J., 77-195-I
(August 15, 1977).
401bid., p. 54.
41
Article 4 imposes restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction.
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deny to the space resource State the right to "free use. ''42
The purpose of Article 2 is seen to implement the "free use" guarantees
of Article I, paragraph 2. From this the conclusion was drawn, that while
a space resource State cannot "appropriate" an orbital slot, such a slot
can be used. The validity of such orbital use will be governed by the
intent of the using State not to have exclusive use of the slot, and
intent can be measuredat least in part by the permanenceor relative
43permanenceof the use.
The role of Article 9 is to insure that space environment activities,
especially as related to exploration and use, will be "guided by the
principle of co-operation and mutual assistance." Space resource States
are to conduct their activities "with due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty." These terms are
construed to be a limitation on the "free use" of the space environment
44
assured in Article I, paragraph 2. But, since consultation among
States is required by Article 9, it is clear that the drafters of the
Treaty expected such consultation to ease the way for States to protect
their rights to "free use" while taking into account the corresponding
interests of the other signatories. 45
The foregoing analysis accepts the position that the resource
States are to have the free use of, but not a sovereign right of
42Ibid., p. 54.
431bid., pp. 55-56.
44Ibid., p. 59.
45jerzy Sztucki, "International Consultations and Space Treaties,"
Proceedings of the 17th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 147 (1975).
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appropriation to, the space environment. They are to have equal rights
of access and use pursuant to the res communis legal principle. Although
States by reason of the stage of their development do not have equal
space capabilities, nonetheless the space resource States are not to be
denied by the non-space resource States the right to free use. Over time,
however, as provided in Article I, paragraph I, the resources of the
space environment are open for sharing "irrespective" of the degrees of
"economic or scientific development" of the signatory States, since such
space environment resources are "the province of mankind." In short,
the use of an orbital slot by space resource States is not a de facto
appropriation. It is merely a use for an indeterminate but temporary
period. The ultimate utility and validity of such use will be subject
to later community judgments and must conform to the goal of serving the
general interests of mankind.
3.4 Preferential Claims to the Orbit Resource
Because of the belief on the part of some States that geostationary
orbital slots constitute a limited natural resource--a belief that has
been termed a myth, and in any event has not been proven to be a
scientific fact despite the language of Article 33 of the 1973 ITU
Convention--some States have sought to establish preferential claims to
the resource. These claims have taken two directions. Some of the non-
resource States, including some of the LDCs, have urged that the ITU make
allocations of orbital slots. Others, namely the principal equatorial
States, have asserted sovereignty over geostationary orbital positions.
89
Israel, supported by Algeria and Kuwait, presented a proposal to
the 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU seeking enlarged powers
for the ITU relating to the allocation of orbital positions. The
underscored words constitute the proposal and would allow the ITU to:
effect allocation of the radio frequency spectrum
and of the geostationary orbit and registration of
radio frequency assignments and of position slots
on the 9eostationary orbit, in order to avoid
harmful interference between radio stations of
different countries .... 46
The acceptance of the Israeli proposal would have modified the traditional
practices of States of assigning for use on a unilateral basis the orbital
positions best suited to their needs. Resource States, including the
United States, opposed the position of Israel, and ultimately its
proposal was tabled.
Aside from the major issue as to whether such a responsibility should
be assigned to a technical body such as the ITU, a number of arguments
were made against the Israeli proposal. As noted above, the 1967
Principles Treaty would have to be reconsidered if an organization were
to be granted authority to allocate orbital positions, and such an instru-
mentality would have to be equipped not only with a very high degree of
technical competence but also would have to possess a considerable amount
of political authority, particularly if the issue of compliance with
allocations were ever raised.
Second, the United States had taken the position at WARC ST in 1971
that an orbital allocation "would inhibit the development of the
,,47
geostationary orbit as a natural resource.
46Rankin, op. cit., p. 102, fn. 25.
47Rankin, ibid., p. 104. Citing, United States Department of State,
Office of Telecommunications, Position Paper oh the Allocation of Orbit
Positions and Specific Radio Frequency Channels, WARC ST (June 1971).
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Third, it was urged that an allocation plan would possibly have a
"detrimental effect on the conservation of the geostationary orbit. ''48
It was feared that a premature and even excessive amount of regulation
could thwart innovative uses of space objects and might even impose
constraints on their development.
Finally, as previously indicated, an institutional allocation of a
permanentorbital position would violate the freedom of use provisions
of the Principles Treaty and also its prohibition against a national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty or by any other means. It has been
suggested that an alternative to international allocations or to national
assignments would be a "rational licensing or sharing system operated by
an international agency. ,,49 A fully negotiated agreement following
such a direction would undoubtedly advance the province of mankind
prescription of the Principles Treaty. Presumably any licensing would
authorize use of positions having special value to States. The portion
of the geostationary orbit "of greatest interest to the United States lies
between 60° and 135° West longitude. This arc covers the forty-eight
contiguous mainland states; and all satellites in that sector are visible
for radio transmission from any earth station within the continental
United States. ''50
The Israeli initiative mayhave influenced the 1973 revision of
Article I0 of the ITU convention dealing with the functions of the IFRB.
The 1965 ITU convention, Article 13 dealing with the IFRB, did not
481bid.
491bid_, p. 105.
501bid_, p. 103.
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mention geostationary orbits. However, in 1973 the IFRBwas empowered
to effect "an orderly recording of the positions assigned by countries
to geostationary satellites." It was authorized to furnish advice to
members"with a view to the equitable, effective and economical use of
the geostationary satellite orbit," and it was instructed to perform any
additional duties "concerned with the . utilization of the geostationary
satellite orbit .... ,,51
Onecommentator has characterized the new functions for the IFRB
as expanded"recording functions to include the gathering of information
on geostationary satellites, yet failed to tell it what to do with the
information once it was obtained. ''52 The Conference by emphasizing in
Article 33 of the Convention the freedom of access by States to the space
environment gave its support to Articles 1 through 3 of the 1967 Principles
Treaty. The 1973 ITU Conference by according new powers to the IFRBdid
not imposeconstraints respecting the use by space objects of the
geostationary orbit position. The ITU was not empoweredto regulate or
allocate the use of orbital slots. The ITU's most recent pronouncement
on the subject relates to equitable rights of access to the geostationary
orbit spectrum resource. 53 In 1977 it was agreed that membersof the ITU
51Article I0, paragraph 3, 1973 Telecommunication Convention and
Final Protocol, TIAS 8572.
52Rankin, op. cit., p. 169. The tools used by the IFRB allow for
the verification of coverage areas of the satellite transmitting antenna
beams, verification of link parameters for individual assignments, and
for the completion of incompatibility analysis for the WARC BS "Plan."
International Telecommunication Union. Seventeenth Report by the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union on Telecommunication and the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space. U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/213, p. 20, December 22, 1977.
53Annex 6 to Final Acts of the WARC BS, 1977.
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"have the right of access to the geostationary orbit spectrum in order
to fulfill their requirements. ''54 No preferential rights can be derived
from this language. If anything, it is supportive of the free use
provisions of Articles 1 through 3 of the 1967 Principles Treaty. This
is consistent with the ITU's position that the geostationary satellite
orbit, like the radio-frequency spectrum, is a natural resource " to be
exploited for the benefit of all and are not subject to appropriation. ''55
In 1977 the ITU emphasized that the general principles governing its
activities include "the effective use of the orbit/spectrum and the equal
rights of all countries. "56 It should not be forgotten, however, that at
the 1977 WARC BS Conference the ITU made plans for submissions to the
1979 Conference, which, if accepted, would allow the ITU to allocate
geostationary orbital positions as well as frequencies to Region 1 and 3
States for channels in the 12 GHz band. It will also be recalled that the
1977 Conference prepared a "Plan" for the consideration of a Region 2
Conference prior to 1982 in which the Conference would be asked to
allocate orbital positions at geostationary levels that would not be in
conflict with others previously made.
The claims for preferential rights respecting space environment
resources have taken two courses. The claims that have just been identified
541bid., paragraph 4.
55
International Telecommunication Union. Report on Types of Assistance
Extended by the United Nations System to Developing Countries in the Field
of Practical Applications of Space Technology, U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/124/Add. I,
p. 13, April 3, 1974.
561nternational Telecommunication Union. Seventeenth Report by the
International Telecommunication Union on Telecommunication and the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/213, p. 5, December 22, 1977.
93
have been put forward especially by the LDCs. Their concern has been
for a generalized equitable sharing of a resource characterized as the
province of mankind. Their position is consistent with the res communis
principle of international law. They accept the common ownership of the
space resource. They seek to share in the resource as a result of
community decisions.
3.5 Sovereign Claims to the Orbit Resource: The Boqot_ Declaration of
December 3, 1976
On December 3, 1976 eight equatorial States, namely, Brazil, Colombia,
Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire signed in Bogot6 a
document, now referred to as The Bogot6 Declaration, containing their
conclusions relating to the use of geostationary orbits by space objects.
Colombia had previously taken the initiative on this subject. In 1975 it
had made a presentation to the First Committee of the General Assembly in
which it claimed that since the geostationary orbital arc is a national
natural resource that sovereignty could be exercised over it by subjacent
States. 57 A similar statement of policy was also made in 1976.
Since the Bogot6 Declaration advances positions in conflict with the
1967 Principles Treaty, the relationship of these States to the Treaty
should be recorded. Brazil, Ecuador, and Uganda were bound by it on
January I, 1978. 58 Indonesia and Zaire were signatories but are not
57U.N. Doc. A/C.I/PV.2049, pp. 43-46, October 13, 1975.
58Treaties in Force, U.S. Department of State Publication 8934 (1978).
The Declaration is set out in Appendix B. Appendixes D through J provide
detailed information concerning States parties to all relevant UN and ITU
international agreements.
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included as being bound by the 1978 listing in Treaties in Force. Congo,
Colombia, and Kenyadid not sign the Treaty and are not bound by it. The
1978 position of Colombia is that there is no intention to ratify the
agreement "so long as its provisions had not been expanded in such a way
as to permit a definition and delimitation of outer space that recognized
the geostationary orbit as s limited natural resource under the sovereignty
of equatorial states insofar as those segmentswhich correspond to their
national territories were concerned.''59 Further, in the absence of a clear
and precise definition of "outer space" States in the exercise of their
"full and sole sovereignty as a subject of international law, could enact
laws defining their national space and therein exercise the rights and
assumethe obligations established under national law. ''60
The commoninterest of these eight States stemmedfrom the fact that
the space resource States, because of the ellipticity of the equator,
have found that geostationary space objects have an ideal orbital position
at a height of approximately 22,300 miles above the equator. 61 With the
use by such States of the geostationary orbital position, and with plans
on their part for an augmenteduse of such slots, the equatorial States
have wondered whether such use might constitute a de facto "appropriation"
of such slots. In convening in Bogot_ these States were unquestionably
influenced by the fact that space objects of the ERTS and LANDSAT type
were capable of sensing and identifying the presence of natural resources.
Moreover, there had been a strong tradition on the part of the new and
59U.N. Doc. I05/C.I/SR.199, p. 2, February 28, 1978.
60Ibid., p. 4.
61
U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/203, p. 5, August 29, 1977.
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less-developed countries at the UN to secure the adoption of resolutions
62dealing with permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
The product of the Bogot_ meeting has been described both as a
"pretension" and as a "counterpoise" by the equatorial States against a
"de facto appropriation by states with advanced technology [they]
asserted de jure 'territorial' claims to sectors of the geostationary
orbit notwithstanding the prohibitions against national appropriation
set forth in the space treaties. ''63
The Bogot_ Declaration identified five areas of concern. First, the
eight States described the geostationary orbit as a natural resource.
They said:
Equatorial countries declare that the geostationary
synchronous orbit is a physical fact linked to the
reality of our planet because its existence depends
exclusively on its relation to gravitational
phenomena generated by the earth, and that is why it
must not be considered part of outer space. Therefore,
the segments of geostationary synchronous orbit are
part of the territory over which Equatorial states
exercise their national sovereignty. 64
62A notable illustration is General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVlI)
of December 13, 1962. Actually, General Assembly Resolutions dating
from 1952 advance this claim. The Bo_ot_ Declaration made reference to
General Assembly Resolution 2692 (XXV) of December II, 1970, entitled
"Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing Countries and
Expansion of Domestic Sources of Accumulation for Economic Development."
This Resolution spoke of land and marine resources but not air or space
resources. Also motivating the Bogot_ States was a general feeling that
proposals emanating from the ITU relating to orbits and frequencies were
impracticable and unfair.
63j. Henry Glazer, op. cit., pp. 81, 114. Scholarly comment on the
claims of the equatorial States has been generally negative. See the
articles set forth in the Addendum to the Bibliography. These were
presented at the 20th and 21st Colloquia on the Law of Outer Space of the
International Astronautical Federation in 1977 and in 1978.
64"First Meeting of Equatorial Countries," p. 2, mimeo.
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Consequently, they decided "to proclaim and defend on behalf of their
peoples the existence of their sovereignty over this natural resource. ''65
Second, the Declaration refers to "Sovereignty of Equatorial States
over the Corresponding Segmentsof the Geostationary Orbit." Here the
authors mention the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
and in particular, General Assembly Resolution 2692 (XXV). Reference is
also madeto General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) which is "The Charter
of EconomicRights and Duties of States." Relying on these documentsthe
Bogot_ States conclude that "the above mentioned provisions lead the
equatorial states to affirm that the synchronous geostationary orbit,
being a natural resource, is under the sovereignty of the equatorial
states. ,,66
Third, they refer to the "Legal Status of the Geostationary Orbit."
In this section the Bogot_ States indicate that their movewill benefit
their national interests and those of the universal community instead of
the most developed countries. They makeno claim to segments of the orbit
situated above the "open sea." This area is considered to be beyond the
"national jurisdiction of states" and is to be considered as appertaining
to the CommonHeritage of Mankind.67 During the discussions of the Bogot_
Declaration at meetings of the Scientific and Technical Sub-committee of
COPUOS,attention had been drawn to the CommonHeritage of Mankind concept.
Thus, Ecuador has noted that segmentsof the geostationary orbit
"corresponding to the high seas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
651bid.
661bid., p. 5.
671bid___L.,pp. 5-6.
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would be Considered the common heritage of mankind, and there would be
safeguards for everyone, provided the international community regulated
the use and exploitation of the orbit. ''68
In the following language the Bogot6 States agreed to the transiting
of space objects when outside the geostationary orbital positions of the
signatories. Thus, "The equatorial states do not object to the free
orbital transit of satellites approved and authorized by the International
Telecommunication Convention, when these satellites pass through their
outer space in their gravitational flight outside their geostationary
orbit. ''69 This statement appears to be consistent with their view that
the geostationary orbit is a natural resource of the State, since in the
relevant passage the geostationary orbit was identified as not being a
part of outer space. The equatorial States contemplate granting permission
to the space resource States to place permanently in the geostationary
orbital area of the granting States the foreign space object. Such
permission is to be in the form of a "previous and expressed authorization
on the part of the concerned states, and the operation of the device
should conform with the national law of that territorial country over
which it is placed. ''70 By such consent the authorizing State is allowing
a foreign State to operate within the territory of the former. The Bogot6
States also indicated that the presence of foreign space objects currently
68U.N. Doc. A/AC.lO5/C.l/SR.199, p. 7, February 28, 1978. Carl Q.
Christol, "The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Capturing an Illusive
Concept and Applying it to World Needs," Proceedings of the 18th Colloquium
on the Law of Outer Space 42 (1976).
69Declaration, op. cit., p. 6.
701bid., p. 6.
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in their sovereign orbital areas is not condoned nor will these States
allow such presence to constitute the basis for a claim of preemptive
rights.
Fourth, they assess their relationship to the Principles Treaty.
That Treaty is not to be considered a "final answer" to the exploration
and use of outer space. 71 It was entered into at a time when the LDCs
"could not count on adequate scientific advice and were thus not able to
observe and evaluate the omissions, contradictions and consequences of
the proposals which were prepared with great ability by the industrialized
powers for their own benefit. ''72 Here the Bogot_ States refer to the
absence of a final definition of outer space. A consequence of the lack
of such a definition, according to the Declaration, has been to allow the
resource States to engage in a national appropriation. Since the
Principles Treaty is regarded as incomplete, this provides a basis for
the equatorial States to claim that the geostationary orbit was intended
to be excluded from its coverage. Further, the absence of a definition
of outer space in the Treaty allows the equatorial States to conclude
that the prohibition against appropriation has no application to the
geostationary orbital area. This being the case the equatorial States
that had ratified the Treaty are not inhibited from claiming the orbital
slot area as a part of their sovereign areas.
Fifth, the equatorial States refer to diplomatic and political action.
They acknowledge that the 1967 Treaty does not specifically exclude the
geostationary orbital position from the prohibitions against appropriation
71
Ibid., p. 7.
721bid.
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contained in Article 2. They seek to persuade countries that have not
ratified the 1967Treaty to refrain from "undertaking any procedure
that allows the enforcement of provisions whosejuridical omission has
already been denounced.''73 Approval was given to the comparable positions
previously taken by Colombia and Ecuador at the United Nations, and they
promised to work together to obtain acceptance of their position that
"the geostationary orbit
territory. ,,74
.[is] an integral part of their sovereign
The equatorial States have advanced the foregoing claims at meetings
of the ITU and the UN. At the close of the February 1977 WARCBSthey
submitted a formal statement which was incorporated in the Final Protocol
of the conference. In this they indicated that
they were not bound by the decisions of the Conference
regarding the location of geostationary satellites on
the segments of the orbit over which these States
exercise sovereign rights, nor the positioning of such
satellites requiring the prior authorization of the
equatorial countries concerned. They would also
reserve the right to take whatever steps they may deem
fit to preserve and secure the observance of their
rights. No claims were madeon either side of the
geostationary orbit or for other orbits. 75
3.6 Consideration of the Boqot_ Declaration by COPUOS
Such claims have not gone unnoticed, and they have been vigorously
rejected by the space resource States and by signatories to the 1967
731bid., p. 8.
741bid., p. 8.
75Richard E. Butler, "World Administrative Radio Conference for
Planning Broadcasting Satellite Service," 5 Journal of Space Law 97
(1977); U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.2/SR 273, p. 4, March 28, 1977.
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Principles Treaty. Since the Bogot6 Declaration focused on political-
legal considerations, it was natural that the UNwas to become'the
principal forum for debate on this subject.
The first formal and extended rejection of the Bogot6 Declaration
reaching COPUOSwas a working paper submitted by the Soviet Union
entitled "Considerations on the Legal Status of Geostationary Orbits. "76
Relevant portions of the working paper provide:
I. Geostationary orbit is inseparable from outer space and
all relevant provisions [of the 1967 Principles Treaty]
are applicable to it. Under the Treaty, geostationary
orbit, like outer space as a whole, is not subject to
national appropriation by any meanswhatsoever.
2. The placing of satellites in geostationary orbit by States
creates no right of ownership over the respective orbital
positions of the satellites or over segments of the orbit.
3. All States enjoy an equal right to the utilization of
geostationary orbit. The utilization of geostationary
orbit by States must not be detrimental to the interests
of other States.
Paragraph 4 of the working paper emphasizedthe need for States to
cooperate in placing communications satellites in geostationary orbit,
took into account the recommendationsand decisions of the ITU in this
area, and linked the effective use of radio frequencies with space objects.
The position of the United States was identified at a meeting of the
Scientific and Technical Sub-committeeof COPUOSon February 24, 1978.
Basing its position on a study by the Secretariat of the UN77 the United
States indicated that it was "clear that there was no scientific or
76U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/L.94, June 21, 1977; U.N. Doc. A/32/20, Annex Vl,
p. 29, 1977.
77physical Nature and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/203, August 29, 1977.
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technical basis for a claim of sovereignty over the geostationary orbit. ''78
The United States "agreed with others that had cometo that inescapable
,,79conclusion.
Representative of the views of the equatorial States was the position
of Brazil before COPUOS.Speaking of the geostationary orbit it was the
Brazilian view that "the very existence of dissimilar conditions among
States with regard to the exploitation of that limited resource means,
in practice, that the occupation of the synchronous orbit takes place on
a 'first come, first served' basis. That practice could create situations
where the annexation of a particular point of that orbit by a satellite
does represent an annexation of space that contravenes the terms of the
Treaty of 1967.''80
Support for the position of the United States and the Soviet Union
camefrom Poland on March 31, 1977.81 On the samedate Colombia urged,
since outer space had not been defined, that it was proper to assert that
the geostationary orbit was within the sovereign area of a State. Hence,
such a claim was not violative of the res communis principles of the
Principles Treaty. Consequently, "the use, enjoyment, and occupation of
that segment was subject to the prior authorization of the State concerned,
and any attempt by third parties to place stationary satellites in it was
therefore rejected .... ,,82
78U.N. Doc. A/AC/IO5/C.I/SR.199, p. 9, February 28, 1978.
79 Ibid.
80U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/PV.176, p. 21, July 27, 1977.
81U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.2/SR.277, p. 2, April 5, 1977.
821bid., p. 4.
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Also making a presentation to the Legal Sub-committee of COPUOSwas
Kenya. Emphasiswas placed on the need for the space resource States to
obtain the prior authorization of equatorial States before stationing
83
space objects in that orbit.
In discussions at the Scientific and Technical Sub-committee on
February 24, 1978, Colombia and Ecuador supported the positions advanced
in the Bogot_ Declaration. Ecuador specifically identified its sovereignty
to include "those segments situated above its mainland territory, its
continental territorial sea in the Pacific Oceanand its island territory
and territorial sea in Galapagos province. ''84 Japan and Australia rejected
the sovereign claims of the equatorial States on the grounds that the
geostationary orbit was clearly part of outer space.85 The Soviet Union
restated its position that the geostationary orbit was an inalienable
part of outer space.86 Reflecting the general views of the LDCswas the
position taken by Egypt on February 24, 1978, namely, that "no country
or group of countries had exclusive sovereignty over any part of outer
space. Outer space did not belong to the jurisdiction of any country,
and its resources were part of the commonheritage of mankind.''87 Among
the equatorial States there was a willingness to treat the geostationary
88
orbit over the high seas as a commonheritage of mankind.
83U.N. Doc. I05/C.2/SR.280, p. 2, April 7, 1977.
84U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.I/SR.199, p. 6, February 28, 1978.
851bid., pp. 7-8.
861bid., p. 8.
87U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.I/SR.200, p. 3, March I, 1978.
88U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/216, p. 26, March 6, 1978.
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Both the Scientific and Technical Sub-committee and the Legal
Sub-committee of COPUOSgave attention in their 1978 meetings to the
claims of the equatorial States relating to sovereignty over geostationary
orbital positions. In each of the subcommittees there were assertions of
diametrically opposing points of view. Since further debate on this
subject will be based on the differing perspectives, they will be
summarized. The basis for the summarization is the report of the Legal
Sub-committee on the Work of its Seventeenth Session (13 March-7 April
1978).89
The equatorial States urge that they have sovereignty over their
natural resources, and that such resources include the geographical area
used by geostationary space objects while in orbit. In support of this
proposition it is urged that the area is sui generis and most notably
that it falls within their territory since there has not as yet been
firmly established a legal boundary between sovereign airspace and the
res communis of the space environment. Since the equatorial States are
either clearly or essentially LDCs, they have sought to obtain the support
of LDCs generally by urging that the limited natural resource of the
geostationary orbit should be used in priority for the benefit of the
LDCs. Presumably the use would be effected on an equitable basis with
advantages going first to the equatorial States, then to the other LDCs,
and lastly to the developed countries because of the general advantages
already possessed by the latter.
89U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/218, pp. 9-10, April 13, 1978. Compare the
Report of the Scientific and Technical Sub-committee on the Work of its
Fifteenth Session, U.N. Doc. 105/216, pp. 26-27, March 6, 1978.
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Brazil, taking into account the possibility of making a distribution
of benefits to be derived from the use of the geostationary orbit,
suggested that the Principles Treaty did not preclude the establishment
of a specific legal regime for the geostationary orbit. Those States,
including Colombia, inclined to support the formation of such a regime
mentioned the sui 9eneris quality of the geostationary orbit as a limited
natural resource.
On the other hand, the space resource States urged that the
Principles Treaty fully covered the peaceful and beneficial use of the
geostationary orbital area by space objects. Pursuant to the Treaty
such orbits are inseparable from the space environment, and are not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, or by any other means. In their view, the geostationary
orbits are free for use by all States without discrimination of any kind
on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law and the
UN Charter. Emphasizing that geostationary space objects were engaged
in a use of the space environment, these States urged that such use did
not create a right of ownership over the respective orbital positions of
the satellites or over segments of the orbits. They also noted that under
the Principles Treaty users of the geostationary orbit were obliged to
take into account the corresponding interests of other States and that
they had to be guided by the principles of cooperation. The space resource
States also were inclined to doubt the legal worth of the General
Assembly resolutions relating to full and complete sovereignty over natural
resources. They were considered to be more a statement of political and
economic expectations than existing rules of international law.
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SomeStates mademention of the scientific and legal complexities
involved in the claims of the equatorial States. They suggested that
further studies along such lines would be required before it would be
possible to pass judgment on such claims. In assessing the nature of the
debate one commentatorhas added another dimension to the problem. It has
been suggested that "realism appears to dictate that international
rule-making either for the geostationary orbit or any other orbital
location in space should only be considered whenthere are real as opposed
to fanciful conflicts between states relative to the orbital locations
involved. ''90
3.7 Present Use of the Geostationary Orbital Position is Lawful
It is clear that the successful operation of a SPS will depend on
the use of the geostationary orbital position. In order to be successful
such use must conform to the principles, standards, and rules of interna-
tional law. At the present time the space resource States are using
orbital slots lawfully. The introduction of a SPS into orbit would
constitute a new use and activity in the space environment. Up to the
present there has been no evidence on the part of the resource States
that their orbital uses and activities reflect an intention or constitute
a claim to the appropriation of an orbital slot or segments of the space
environment. They have been guided by the belief that the 1967 Treaty
has confirmed the application of the res communis principle to the space
environment. The same principle would apply to a SPS operating at
geostationary orbital level. Thus, the mere presence of an operating
90Glazer, op. cit., p. 82.
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SPScould not constitute evidence of the intent of a space resource State
to establish either de facto or de jure rights to the orbital slot.
Although the SPS would be performing a different service than the space
objects providing radio or television broadcasts, the common commitments
of such space objects to a use of the space environment rather than its
appropriation would require the application of the same legal guidelines.
Consistency would require that the right to use rather than the acquisition
of property or sovereign rights be accepted. Thus, with respect to the
possible future use of a SPS, an advanced State is fully entitled to
urge that its prospective conduct fully conforms to existing international
law.
The equatorial States, speaking for themselves and generally for as
yet a highly amorphous contingency of LDCs, argue that they are now
within their rights in asserting that the space environment at orbital
levels is a part of their sovereign territory. The resolving of such
differing views, even assuming that such views can be reconciled, will
take much time. It may even lead to the formation of a new space regime
in the form of a new international organization. However, pending the
resolution of contending positions, it is clear that the space resource
States can rely on the Principles Treaty.
Further, a formal, treaty-contained definition of the delimitation
between sovereign airspace and the non-sovereign space environment is not
wholly needed. The practices of the resource States since 1957 have
clearly established a customary rule of international law to the effect
that outer space exists at distances from the Earth where space objects
successfully orbit, and this surely must include the heights at which
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geostationary space objects are in orbit.
If, as is believed to be the case, the geostationary orbital level
is not a wholly limited natural resource becauseof the elastic ways in
which it can be used, then the supposed conflicts between the equatorial
and space resource States may certainly be fanciful. Indeed, it maynot
be possible to determine this fact unless and until the space resource
States put at least one SPSinto operation.
Moreover, it is quite possible that the claims now being put forward
by the equatorial States, apparently designed to allow them to license
the use of the orbital slots to the space resource States, could be
satisfied in other ways. Rather than contemplating a bilateral relation-
ship by the users and those claiming sovereignty, it is possible that the
world communitywill establish methods and institutions for the allocation
of benefits derived from the exploration and use of the space environment.
The Principles Treaty speaks of the need to consider the well-being of
the entire communitythrough the implementation of the province of mankind
concept. The law of the sea negotations have confronted the need to
take into account the CommonHeritage of Mankind concept. By the end of
this century or in the next, it maybe possible to employ such concepts in
such a way as to favor the national-interest contentions now being raised
by the equatorial States as well as to effect an equitable distribution
of outer space resources and benefits to both space resource and non-space
resource States and peoples.
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Chapter Four
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW AND THE USE
OF NATURAL RESOURCES: SOLAR ENERGY
4.1 Solar Energy as a Source of Power
l
High altitude solar energy, like the geostationary orbital
position, is a world natural resource.
In this Chapter attention will be called to the natural character-
istics of this resource, to the relationship of international law
essentially as stated in the 1967 Principles Treaty to solar energy,
and to international political-legal efforts to facilitate the acquisi-
tion and transmission to Earth of such solar-based energy.
Solar energy is considered to be a vast, unlimited, inexhaustible,
and renewable source of power. It is also a very clear source of such
power. It is so vast and unlimited that no one has claimed exclusive
rights to it. It is even more inexhaustible and renewable than the
water of the ocean, a resource that has been treated as ares communis
and therefore not subject to exclusive rights but rather open to the
common use of all. High altitude solar energy, like the water of the
free high seas, is not subject to sovereign appropriation by States at
the present stage of science and technology.
The principal focus of an energy-hungry world on solar energy has
been a scientific and technological one. The main considerations have
IThis expression will be taken to mean that energy derived from the
sun at heights where geostationary space objects are able to orbit
effectively, namely, at the range of 22,300 miles above the surface of
the Earth.
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been the development of knowledge allowing for the conversion of the
solar energy situated in the space environment into electricity. Yo
this must be added the development of processes to beam such energy
safely to Earth. Finally, there is the need to develop practical means
2
to convert the beam to useful power on Earth. Quite conceivably solar
energy, especially at orbital levels, will be the most valuable and
important of all of the space environment resources. This forecast is
supported by a study made by the International Astronautical Federation
for COPUOS (IAF). It concluded that space-based solar power plants
constitute "perhaps the most imagination and potentially significant
prospect for the utilization of space in the service of mankind. ''3
The IAF study identified practical advantages resulting from the
use of orbiting space objects in the gathering and transmission of solar
energy. Particular emphasis was placed on the future need to have "solar
power plants capable of base-loaded operation, without dependence on
costly energy storage, or alternative energy sources for periods of low
isolation. ''4 It was considered that base-loaded power in space, where
there is virtually constant isolation, "is available at an average rate
2peter E. Glaser, "Testimony, Solar Power from Satellites," Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Aerospace Technology and National Needs of the
Committee on Aeronatuical and Space Sciences, United States Senate,
94th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3 (1976). These hearings contain numerous
assessments of the solar energy problem by experts in the field.
See also, Peter E. Glaser, "Solar Power Sate!!ites--A Global Power
Generation Option," Presentation to Scientific and Technical Subcommittee,
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, February 15, 1978. Cited
hereafter as "Solar Power Satellites."
3State of the Art and Assessment of Scientific and Technological
Developments in the Exploration and Practical Uses of Outer Space within
an International Framework, U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/173, p. 22, May 7, 1976.
41bid., p. 23.
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of the order of I0 times that at the best earth-surface-location. ''5
Further:
Space-based power plants can be constructed without
(a) the need for suDport against gravity (the
principal massconstraint on ground-based structures),
(b) design safety factors to allow for once-in-a-
lifetime events such as hurricanes, typhoons, tidal
waves, or earthquakes, (c) thermal-waste discharges
to the terrestrial biosphere, or (d) community
concerns about local power-plant siting. 6
4.2 Legalization of Use of Moon Resources bY sPs
ASPS has been suggested as a practical way to forward solar energy
from geostationary orbital level to the Earth. The effectiveness of
such a system may require the use of tangible resources located on the
Moon or other celestial bodies. COPUOS has been discussing the terms of
a proposed Moon Treaty since 1970. The exceedingly cautious negotiations
have produced countless drafts, with the last being the Austrian Working
Paper of April 3, 1978. 7 Article 6, paragraph 2, of the draft would
allow States bound by the agreement "the right to collect on and remove
from the moon samples of its mineral and other substances. ''8 The _1oon
Treaty negotiations illustrate an unwillingness on the part of States to
allow tangible and non-renewable resources to be treated as property
51bid.
61bid. A separate study by the United Nations Secretariat contrasted
the location of energy collection in space and on the ground. "The
constant illumination of the array in space would make the solar cells
about I0 times as efficient as an array on the ground." Solar Power
Stations in Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05 (XIX) CRP, p. I, June I, 1976.
7U.N. Doc., A/AC.I05/218, Annex I, p. 2, April 13, 1978.
81bid. Paragraph I of the Article provided that "There shall be
freedom of scientific investigation on the moon by States Parties without
discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance
with international law."
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appertaining to either juridical or natural persons. Thus, Article II,
paragraph 3, of the proposed Austrian text provides that "neither the
surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural
resources in place, shall becomeproperty of any State, international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization
or non-governmental entity or of any natural person. ''9 Nonetheless, the
parties to the agreement are to be granted the right to explore and
use the Moonwithout discrimination of any kind of a basis of equality
pursuant to international law and the Treaty. I0 Article I, paragraph 2,
in defining the Moonincludes "orbits around or other trajectories to or
around it. "II
The foregoing is relevant to the present analysis since the focus
of the proposed agreement is generally on tangible resources, since it
allows limited privileges for activities having a scientific or technolog-
ical orientation, and because it identifies an orbit to or around the
Moonas the legal equivalent of the Moonand thus subject to the non-property
limitations set out in Article II, paragraph 3. But, the Austrian draft
did not propose rules of international law pertaining to those natural
resources found in the spatial area adjacent to the Moon, nor to the
natural resources of the high altitude, such as solar energy.
The Austrian draft, following earlier drafts, does provide in
paragraph 1 of Article II that "the moonand its natural resources shall
be considered the commonheritage of mankind.... " This outlook or
trend was seen above in the analysis of the use of geostationary orbital
9Ibid., p. 6.
lOlbid., Article II, paragraph 4.
II
Ibid., p. 2.
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positions. That this doctrine would not apply to the spatial area
adjacent to the Moon, e.g., outer space, but would include orbits around
the Moon, acknowledges the difficulty of asserting claims to the intangible,
unlimited, inexhaustible, andrenewable resources of outer space.
If it is accepted at the outset that the space environment, including
outer space, constitutes ares communis, it is possible through interna-
tional agreement to establish a law governing the use of that environment,
including its resources. The proposed Moon Treaty seeks to protect
community interests in tangible natural resources in place on the surface
or the subsurface of the Moon. It also envisages the protection of
community interests in orbits around the Moon by including such orbits as,
in effect, an extension of the Moon. Thus, the proposed agreement has
been able to effect a transition from a tangible resource, e.g., Moon
rocks, to a less tangible but nonetheless measurable resource, e.g., the
orbital pattern of a space object.
From the legal point of view it appears that the intent of the proposed
agreement is to modify the res com_unis principle with respect to these
two resources. As previously stated, Article II, paragraph l, provides:
"For the purposes of this Agreement, the moon and its natural resources
shall be considered the common heritage of mankind .... " This concept
requires the employment of international procedures if community needs
and wants are to be realized. Article II, paragraph 5, provides: "States
Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international
regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of
the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become
feasible." Nonetheless, the solar energy of the space environment appears
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to be excluded from the proposed agreement. First, it is not in a
physical sense an attribute of the Moon. Second, it is much less
measurable than either rocks or orbital patterns because of its vast,
unlimited, inexhaustible, and renewable characteristics. Thus, at the
present the trends away from the res communis principle in favor of the
common heritage of mankind concept have relevance only to the indicated
fairly tangible resources and in specifically identifiable spatial
contexts. Solar energy at geostationary orbital level must still be
considered as controlled by the res communis principle. Nonetheless,
the extended Moon Treaty negotiations clearly indicate an expanding
consensus favoring a wide sharing of the resources of the space environment
and the benefits derivable from such resources. It should nonetheless be
noted that many of the provisions of the proposed Moon Treaty are
restatements of principles found in the 1967 Treaty or are derivable from
them.
4.3 The 1967 Principles Treaty and High Altitude Solar Energy
At the present time, to the extent that international law deals with
the gathering and transmission of high altitude solar energy, the 1967
Principles Treaty applies the res communis principle to such energy. The
Treaty was based on the belief that mankind should be able to derive
benefits from the use of the space environment and its resources.
Although the terms of the Treaty do not in all instances contain
common assurances relating to the three elements of the space environment,
namely, outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies, nonetheless,
the purpose of the Treaty is to facilitate activities by man in the
ll4
beneficial and peaceful uses of the environment. Thus, Articles I, 3,
9, I0, and 13 make reference to the exploration and use. Article 2
refers only to use. Article 4, paragraph 2, provides that only the Moon
and celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
The term "outer space" is not included in the requirement to use for
peaceful purposes. The same paragraph also states that "the use of
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes shall not be prohibited." Articles 9 and II refer to the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space.
Another major theme of the 1967 Treaty is that of scientific
investigation so that benefits might be derived from the activities and
uses of the environment. Conversely, such investigations was not to
result in harms to the environment. Thus, Articles I, 4, 5, and 9 deal
with the affirmative role of science and technology in the space environment.
Article I, paragraph 3, provides that there shall be freedom of scientific
investigation in the space environment and that international cooperation
shall be encouraged in this endeavor. Article 4 allows for scientific
research on the F1oon and celestial bodies. Article 4 by prohibiting the
use of nuclear and mass destruction weapons in the space environment
allows for effective scientific investigation and research. Article 5
facilitates use and research by requiring the reporting of phenomena,
including presumably scientific information, which could constitute a
danger to the life or health of astronauts.
Another major theme of the Principles Treaty relates to the avoidance
of harmful contamination and the need to conduct space activities in such
a manner as to give due regard to the corresponding interests of other States.
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The general purport of Article 9 is twofold. First, there is the
goal of facilitating scientific inquiry. Second, there is the expecta-
tion that such scientific inquiry and activities growing out of that
inquiry will allow for the exploration and use of space environment
resources for the benefit of human beings. The beneficial use of high
altitude solar energy certainly fits into this expectation.
Critical attention must be focused on Article 2 of the Principles
Treaty in assessing the lawfulness of acquiring solar energy. This
Article provides that "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." An initial
question relates to the scope of the Article. The critical term is
"outer space." Thus, while prohibiting the nationalization of outer space,
the agreement says nothing about taking possessing through use of the
resources of outer space. Thus, the capture and use of solar energy is
clearly outside the scope of the Article. Moreover, as previously stated,
the purpose of the Treaty was to facilitate the use of the space environ-
ment. As an inexhaustible and renewable resource of the space environment
it is clear that solar energy can be used for beneficial and peaceful
purposes by those able to capture and transmit it to Earth.
Nonetheless, the question has been raised whether the term "national
appropriation" should be interpreted so as to preclude national use of
space environment resources. Even if the national appropriation limitation
were relevant to a resource of outer space, as opposed to the area of
outer space, which it is not, the concept of national appropriation would
have to be analyzed and understood. Appropriation in the sense used in
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Article 2 relates to acquisition of national sovereignty with the conse-
quence that the sovereign would have the ultimate power to dispose of
property rights in outer space. Article 2 denies such exclusive rights
to a national sovereign. In rejecting such a possibility the Treaty
accepted the res communis principle, thereby allowing for competing users,
but not owners or potential owners of property, to exploit the available
resources. Thus, the national appropriation concept has no relevance
to the legal freedom of legal persons to capture and use high altitude
solar energy. Article 2 does not constitute an exemption from an arguable
prohibition against the use of such energy. Article 2 is irrelevant and
therefore inapplicable.
Up the the present, space objects have relied upon solar energy for
the power required for their functioning. To date no one has advanced
the notion that the capture and use of such energy is in violation of any
of the provisions of the Principles Treaty, of international law generally,
or the U.N. Charter. While this specific practice need not necessarily
be the basis for a customary rule of international law allowing for the
wholesale capture and use of high altitude solar energy, it does reinforce
the view that the permissibility of such use from a legal perspective will
depend very materially on the needs, wants, and practices of the space
resource States and ultimately the larger world community.
The United States has from the very beginning of the space age linked
the space environment to its use exclusively for peaceful and scientific
12
purposes. The United States also has often associated the objective
12Statement of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to the Political Committee
of the United Nations, January 14, 1957. 36 Department of State Bulletin
227 (1957). Section 102 (a) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958 states: "The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the
United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful
purposes for the benefit of all mankind." Public Law 85-568, 72 Stat. 426.
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of beneficial uses with that of peaceful purposes.
As noted above, the concept of peaceful purposes or uses has been
incorporated into the 1967 Treaty, and in a not entirely consistent way.
Thus, Article 4, paragraph l, which imposes constraints on the use of
nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction is limited
in spatial area to Earth orbits, and to outer space and celestial bodies.
However, the United States regards celestial bodies to include the Moon
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for the purposes of Article 4, paragraph I.
However, paragraph 2 of Article 4 merely provides that only the
Moon and other celestial bodies, presumably excluding both Earth orbits
and outer space per se, are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
On the other hand, Article 9 applies the peaceful exploration and use
concept both to outer space and to the Moon and other celestial bodies.
Article II dealing with the promotion of international cooperation also
applies the peaceful exploration and use concept to outer space and to
the Moon and other celestial bodies.
131n the opinion of Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, Article 4
"contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the earth, install
on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer
space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction." "Statement to
Committee One of the General Assembly, December 17, 1966, Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," Staff
Report, United States Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
90th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 16 (March 1967). Italics added. To the same
effect was Ambassador Goldberg's testimony before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on March 7, 1967. He stated with regard to paragraph l
of Article 4 that it "relates to outer space generally and provides that
any party shall not place in orbit any object, which means satellites,
carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celestial bodies, which would include the moon.
"Treaty on Outer Space," United States Senate, Committee on Foreig n
Relations, Executive D, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 22 (1967). Italics
added.
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Efforts to extend via interpretation the coverage of the "exclusively
for peaceful purposes" concept contained in Article 4 to outer space
per se, thereby imposing duties beyond the terms of the Article, which
limits the peaceful purposes requirement to the Moon and other celestial
bodies, have urged the relevance of Articles 9 and II. It has also been
argued that Article 4, paragraph 2, should be read in conjunction with
the provisions of Article I, paragraph I, which requires that the
exploration and use of the totality of the space environment "shall be
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. ''14
While it is possible to be sympathetic to the efforts to extend the spatial
coverage of the exclusively peaceful purposes concept to an area more
extensive than the Moon and other celestial bodies, the words of the
agreement and the negotiations of the agreement seem to preclude such a
15
conclusion.
Since by any valid characterization the gathering of solar energy
at geostationary orbital level is a peaceful use of outer space, the
limited applicability of the peaceful purposes provisions in Article 4,
paragraph 2, of the Principles Treaty imposes no constraints on the
capture or use of the solar energy resource. The general meaning assigned
to "peaceful purposes" both in the Treaty and by the practice of States
14For example, M. Markoff, "Disarmament and 'Peaceful Purposes'
Provisions in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty," 4 Journal of Space Law 3
(1976).
15Ambassador Goldberg told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
that the coverage of Article 4, paragraph 2, "relates only to the moon
and other celestial bodies .... " Op. cit., p. 22. C. Q. Christol,
"Article Four of the 1967 Principles Treaty: Its Meaning and Prospects
for its Clarification," Proceedings of the 21st Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space of the International Astronautical Federation (1978).
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clearly countenances the gathering of such high altitude solar energy
and its transmission to Earth.
Nothing is to be gained if the solar energy gathered at orbital
heights cannot be transmitted to Earth. The same legal considerations
that govern the capture of such energy will apply to the right to transmit
such solar energy to Earth. While the transmission is a free use of the
space environment, and is authorized by the 1967 Principles Treaty, the
radio frequency employed would have to avoid harmful interference with
other valid uses of the radio spectrum. The use of the radio spectrum
would consume nothing, need not be a permanent use, and serves the
well-being of the general community through the exploitation of an
inexhaustible resource.
The fact that the 1967 Principles Treaty does not extend the
"peaceful purposes" concept to space per se cannot be construed as a
denial of the fact that such gathering and transmission can serve peaceful,
beneficial, and scientific purposes. The fact that solar energy is being
gathered and used by existing space objects for their general operating
purposes supports the view that this natural resource not only can be,
but is being used for peaceful purposes.
At the present time, following the acceptance of the res communis
concept and the underlying theme of the 1967 Treaty that the space
environment is intended to be used for the general well-being of mankind,
it can be asserted with confidence that high altitude solar energy is
lawfully and freely available for peaceful, scientific, and beneficial
purposes on the part of all who have the capacity to gather it and to
apply it to such uses. This being the case, the legal problem, to the
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extent that there is one, is not one of the right to gather and use the
resource. As indicated previously, the hopefully resolved practically
in the interests of full use, the area of major international discussion
relates to the presence of an orbiting geostationary space object above
an equatorial State.
Prospects for the lawful use of high altitude solar energy are not
to be determined exclusively by interpretation of the language of the
1967 Treaty and perceptions of practices that mayhave ripened into
customary international law. Nor is the lawful use to be determined
wholly by the space resource States--powerfully influential though their
outlooks maybe.
4.4 Present Interest of COPUOS in Legal Use of Solar Energy
Although the United States had displayed an interest in developing
a SPS at least as early as 1972, this subject did not come to the attention
of COPUOS until 1975 at which time it asked the Secretariat to prepare a
background paper. This resulted in "Solar Power Stations in Space. ''16
In 1976 COPUOS recommended that the Secretary-General request States to
submit information relating to the generation or transmission of solar
energy by means of space technology. Such information was received in
1976 from three States, including the United States, and also from the
European Space Agency. 17 A report was received from Argentina in 1977. 18
16U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/(XlX) CRP.I, June I, 1976.
17U.N. Doc. 105/181, December I, 1976.
18U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/181/Add. I, February 15, 1977. Argentina had
previously responded to a 1975 statement of the Chairman of COPUOS on sources
of energy from outer space by supplying COPUOS in May 1976 with a working
paper entitled "International Problems Arising from the Exploitation of Solar"
and other Related Energies." U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/L.91, June 9, 1976.
121
For additional submission was made by the Soviet Union. 19 This report
was confined to an assessment of terrestrial uses of solar energy.
To the present the Scientific and Technical Sub-committee of COPUOS
has served as a limited forum for the consideration of solar energy matters.
In 1977 several States proposed that the subcommittee take a larger
interest in both solar energy and materials processing in space. This
was resisted by other States. They urged that for the time being most
applications of technology for the utilization of solar energy took place
on earth and not in space. 20 During its meeting in 1978, the Scientific
and Technical Sub-Committee again reviewed its future role and work and
made mention of solar energy platforms in space and the processing of
materials in space. It decided that for the moment it should only be
kept informed of developments.21 The Legal Sub-Committee has not given
direct attention to the issue. Thus, despite the importance to the
space-resource States of gathering and transmitting high altitude solar
energy to the Earth, there has not been much direct attention given to
the subject at the UN at the present. That the legality of the gathering
and transmitting of this space resource is of vital importance to all of
the members of the community cannot be denied. Thus, what now exists may
be likened to a calm before a possible storm. Political maneuvering is
now taking place within COPUOS pointing in the direction of a new
international conference to deal with the international law of the space
environment. The nature of such discussions and the possible outcomes
will be treated below.
19U.N. Doc. A/AC.lOS/181/Add. 2, February 16, 1977.
20U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/195, p. 26, March l, 1977.
21U.N. Doc. I05/216, p. 32, March 6, 1978.
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Chapter Five
THE SPS AND STANDARDS RELATING TO
EXPOSURE TO MICROWAVES
5.1 Transmission to Earth by Microwave of Solar Energy
An operational SPS will capture solar energy at geostationary
orbital levels and will transmit such energy via microwaves to Earth.
In an increasingly power-hungry world such energy will assist very
materially in promoting the well-being of mankind. Coupled with the
need to obtain and use this natural resource of outer space is the
requirement that the capture, transmission, and use not cause detriment
generally to the environment and more particularly to earth-based plants
and animals.
The process of gathering and transmitting solar energy has been
described:
The electricity from the array would be used to power
microwave generators which would feed a large
microwave antenna which would transmit a focused
microwave beam to a receiving antenna on the ground
where the power could be converted to the appropriate
voltage and frequency and fed into the local
electricity network. Of the power generated by the
solar cells, about 20 to 30 percent would be lost in
the process of conversion to microwaves, transmission
to the ground, and reconversion to electric current. 1
At the present there has been little if any experience with the
transmission of energy by microwave on a "wholesale" basis from space
objects located at geostationary orbital levels. However, dangers and
ISolar Power Stations in Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/(XlX) CRP.I,
p. 4, June I, 1976.
123
harms resulting from too muchexposure to microwaves are understood,
and national and local governments have established safety standards
relating to such exposure.
5.2 Protection Against Possible Harms from Microwaves
States have identified earth-based industrial and occupational
standards to protect the safety of humans. Occupational standards for
an eight-hour day range from I0 mW/cm2 for the United States to 0.01 mW/cm2
for the Soviet Union. The U.S. standard relates to tissue-heating
potential.2 An exposure level of 1.0 mW/cm2 was assumed to be safe for
continuous exposure of the general populace to microwave radiation by a
joint DOE/NASA workshop in October 1977. 3 In planning for the future
the United States NSAS has put forward as a proposed standard for SPS
transmissions a microwave power density not to exceed 23 mW/cm2 at the
center of a beam emanating from a space object in geostationary orbit
and 1 mW/cm2 at the edge of a rectenna situated on Earth.4
However, the world community acting through both public and private
institutions has given only an insignificant amount of attention to
international microwave standards. There is no legally binding interna-
tional treaty on microwave exposure standards.
2U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion, General Safety and Health Standards. OSHA 2206 (29 CFR 1910).
31nterim Environmental Guidelines for Satellite Power System (SPS)
Concept Development and Evaluation, PRC Energy Analysis Co., pp. D-I, D-2,
Figure D-I, June 1978, cited hereafter as Interim Guidelines.
4NASA, Solar Power Satellite Baseline Review by MSFC-JSC, p. 8,
July 23, 1978.
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Excessive amounts of microwave radiation can undoubtedly produce
harms and injuries to a variety of subjects. Such radiation can have
adverse biological effects. It is possible that such microwaves would
be detrimental to the ionosphere. 5 Aircraft and birds in flight could
experience detriment, but further study is required to determine if this
is factual. Through excessive temperature increases there could be
injury to the general ecosystem, including possible modifications in
weather patterns. It should be emphasized that these are merely suggested
possibilities, although it is known that excessive exposure to humans and
other animals on the ground can produce adverse biological effects.
5Glaser in discussing the environmental effects of the microwave
beam refers to ionosphere propagation. He identifies several possible
interactions of the microwave beam with the ionosphere, including dis-
placement, phase fluctuations, dispersion, and fluxes. He states: The
direct effect on high-power microwave transmission with densities of 20-30
mW/cm 2 is likely to be small, since the absorption at the 3 GHz frequency
remains negligible, even with an order of magnitude increase in electron
temperature and density. However, power densities greater than lO0 mW/cm 2
could produce large horizontal electron density gradients that could
cause significant beam displacement and dispersion."
He also stated: "Although only a small fraction of the microwave beam
is absorbed, it is still significant compared to the natural thermal input
to the ionosphere. For an incident flux of 20 mW/cm C, the ionosphere
ranges from lO to 40 during the day and from 40 to 160 during the night.
These significant changes in ionospheric properties will most likely be
local and reversible, but they will have to be evaluated, particularly for
continuous operation."
Further, "Given these considerations, it appears that microwave power
densities above 20 mW/cm 2 could result in major changes in ionospheric
properties. Microwave power densities greater than 20 mW/cm 2 could be
employed once more data on these interactions have been obtained in
experiments conducted with Earth-based as well as space-based transmitting
antennas."
Moreover, "The effects of changes in ionospheric electron density
caused by microwave power densities of 20 mW/cmZ at the SPS operating
frequency will have to be investigated for possible effects on other uses
of the ionosphere." Peter E. Glaser, "Solar Power Satellites," op. cit.,
pp. 12-13.
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Someof these concerns appear to be groundless. However, it should
be borne in mind that a recent review of the literature on biological
effects of microwaveexposure reached the following conclusion: "Only
intensive experimental study can reveal whether the SPSconcept safely
can be implemented.''6
On the basis of present information, and taking into account the
fact that manyof the studies of biological effects were done with pulsed
radiation and therefore do not necessarily apply to the continuous wave
emissions projected for the SPS, it is knownthat safety standards will
7have to be established. The samegeneral prescription is, of course,
applicable to all other objects likely to be impacted by SPSmicrowaves.
However, it is probable that aircraft with passengers and cargo passing
quickly through such a beamand birds in quick transit would not be
adversely affected. No adverse effect on the ozone layer of the atmosphere
is anticipated. 8
Further research will be necessary to determine safety margins insofar
as there is a possibility of harm to airspace and ecosystems. Measuring
skills and equipment may have to be perfected since until the 1970s precise
tools were lacking. Twoareas of scientific measurementare critical to
exposure standards. Densitometry is used to measure incident microwave
6D. R. Justesen, H. A. Ragan, L. E. Rogers, A. W. Guy, D. J. Hjeresen,
W. T. Hinds, and R. D. Philips,."Final Report, Compilation and Assessment
of Microwave Bioeffects: A Selective Review of the Literature on Biological
Effects of Microwaves in Relation to the Satellite Power System," Department
of Energy, Pacific Northwest Laboratory for Division of Solar Energy,
PNL-2634, UC-41, p. xiii, May 1978.
7Stanislaw Baranski and PrzemyslawCzerski, Biological Effects of
Microwaves, p. 183, 1976.
81nterim Guidelines, op. cit., pp. D-l, D-2, Figure D-l. See Annex
to this Chapter.
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fields. Dosimetry measures absorbed energy in living organisms. On the
basis of such measurements it will be necessary to establish exposure
standards that will take into account immediate and long-term effects and
to ascertain which of such effects may be benign or hazardous.
Baranski and Czerski differentiate between two different consequences
of biological exposure. One, entitled "maximal comfort," takes into
account the fact that "certain signs are observable but no differences
between the functional efficiency of the organism in optimal conditions
and on exposure are demonstrable. ''9 The other, entitled "physiological
compensation," gives special attention to the fact that "the exposure
causes various disturbances and imposes a stress on the compensatory
mechanisms . [but] no irreversible structural changes occur, i.e.,
exposure does not lead to deviations from the statistical norm. ''I0
Under the circumstances, those who are obliged to formulate policies
to cope with the uncertainty of the hazard will be obliged to be both
imaginative and prudent. In writing about decision making in relation to
the environment Hargrove has noted that:
When it is prudent policy, in light of all the facts,
to take action notwithstanding the inadequacy of the
scientific knowledge available, then the tentative
and stopgap nature of the action should be clearly
recognized. When, on the other hand, prudent policy
dictates forestalling action until more data is
available, then this course should be regarded not
as passivism but as the better-informed--and thus
more effective--activism. II
9Biological Effects of Microwaves, p. 183.
lOlbid.
lljohn L. Hargrove, Law, Institutions & the Global Environment, p. 41,
1972. Compare Carl Q. Christol, The International Legal and Institutional
Aspects of the Stratosphere Ozone Problem, pp. 3-12, 1975.
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The potential hazards of microwave radiation beamed to Earth from
geostationary orbital level unquestionably will be very carefully
assessed prior to a final policy commitment in favor of a SPS. The
environmental issues will be measured not only in terms of the safety
standards and limitations of solar energy but also will be compared with
the environmental issues posed by alternative energy sources. In
examining policy issues relating to such modest uses of solar energy as
those permitting the "retail" heating of homes and office buildings, as
contrasted with the "wholesale" supply of energy from a SPS, the
Commission on Environmental Quality has stated:
Necessarily there are uncertainties about technologies
that are under development, but research and develop-
ment efforts on all new sources can be planned so that
the control of pollutants and other impacts is an
integral part of R&D. Judged on environmental effects,
solar technologies appear the least threatening of
emerging alternatives although the impacts of large-
scale solar electric powerplants are uncertain. In any
case, the environmental effects of most solar technol-
ogies appear minor compared with known effects of coal
and nuclear power.12
5.3 Efforts to Establish Protective Standards: Institutions
Following the scientific discovery in the 19th century that ionizing
radiation produced biological effects, scientific societies established
protective standards. At the First and Second International Congresses
of Radiology in 1925 and 1928 two commissions were established, namely,
the International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU)
and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). The
12Environmental Quality, The Eighth Annual Report of the Council on
Environmental Quality, p. 276, 1977.
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Leagueof Nations Health Organization published radiation protection
recommendationsin 1931. Publications of the International Labor
Organization in 1932-1934madesubstantial reference to the subject. A
numberof the organs and instrumentalities of the United Nations have
examined the subject, and in 1955the UNScientific Committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR)was established. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Health Organization (WHO),and the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a non-governmental
organization, have all issued numerousrecommendations.
5.4 Efforts to Establish Protective Standards: Policies
In addition to the possibility of radiation hazards of a biological
and environmental kind, there is also the possibility that the microwaves
broadcast from geostationary orbital level would produce harmful inter-
ference with other users of radio frequencies. An assessment of the
harmful interference situation was made above and will not be repeated
here. Mention can be made of the fact, however, that just as human
values and interests are at stake when it comes to deciding among such
competing sources of energy as solar, nuclear, and fossil, so also values
are involved in determining whether radio frequencies should be used to
transmit solar energy or words or images. It is in this area that both
the ITU and the United Nations with their respective technical and political
capabilities may be able to assist in balancing competing values and
interests.
It is expected that over time as microwaves are employed to forward
solar energy to Earth that international agreements having the force of
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law will result. Suchagreements will identify or define valid interna-
tional standards. The self-interest of countries bound by such agreements
will lead largely to their self-enforcement. However, it is to be
expected that there will be violations of or departures from the agreed
standards. This will result in international liability and procedures
will be required to secure the implementation of the agreements, including
the assessmentof monetary damagesagainst the violator. This subject
will be treated below whenthe 1972 "Convention on International
Liability for DamageCausedby Space Objects" is analyzed.
5.5 The 1967 Principles Treaty and the Duty to Consult
Although the potential hazards of the transmission of energy by
microwave will be most carefully assessed in laboratory situations before
a SPS is put into operation, it is possible that limited experiments
involving the beaming of microwaves from geostationary orbital level to
Earth will be required in order to test the laboratory findings. Or,
the initial broadcast could be of more substantial dimensions. Whether
treated as an experiment or not the terms of Article 9 of the 1967
Principles Treaty are relevant. This Article imposes on a State embarking
on an activity or experiment which would cause potentially harmful
interference with the activities of other States bound by the agreement
in their peaceful exploration and use of the space environment to undertake
appropriate international consultations. Pursuant to the Article such
consultations are to be undertaken prior to proceeding with such activity
or experiment. In explaining the international commitment contained in
this Article to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate,
Ambassador Goldberg stated:
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This we regard to be an important provision. It
is one that we have pioneered in. We have long
made it a principle that space activities ought
to be conducted in such a manner so that the
atmosphere of the earth is not contaminated by
any experiments that are conducted in outer space.
We regard this to be a very salutory provision,
and one highly desirable in connection with the
peaceful uses of outer space.13
Followingthis lead the Committee reported the Treaty to the Senate. The
Committee stated that Article 9 called "upon parties to the treaty to
conduct their space activities in a spirit of international cooperation
and to take steps to avoid the contamination of outer space and celestial
bodies. Any state party may request appropriate international consulta-
tion if it has reason to suspect that any activity may cause harmful
interference with the peaceful exploration of outer space. ''14
This Article requires prior consultation only when it is reasonable
to believe that such activity would cause potentially harmful interference.
It does not give an objecting State a veto over the projected activity
of another signatory. While the consultation must be carried out in
good faith, the consulting States are not obliged to accept the judgment
of the State asking for the consultation. As noted above, the general
purpose of the Principles Treaty is to encourage the peaceful, scientific,
and beneficial uses of the space environment. Article 9 cannot be read
so as to defeat this major purpose of the agreement. Further, if one
State were to establish a pattern of conduct in which it consistently
13Treaty on Outer Space, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, LInited States Senate, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., Executive D,
p. 42, 1967.
14Treaty on Outer Space, Executive Report No. 8 to Accompany Ex. D,
United States Senate, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 3, 1967.
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caused harmful interference to the rights of others, the violator could
expect to find that States experiencing such detriment would be engaged
in conduct causing comparable harmful interferences to the initial
violator of agreement.
It was suggested above that the radio spectrum is a world natural
resource. Although in the view of some the resource is limited, it was
suggested that science and technology have allowed this position to be
challenged. Such a challenge, however, to be effective requires that
international law and international organizations join together to
establish substantive rights and procedures for the effective implementa-
tion of community policies. In the context of arriving at binding
microwave exposure standards existing world institutions have a role to
play. On the other hand, it might be possible to establish a new
international institution designed to cope with the world space environ-
ment. Since the subject of international microwave exposure standards
is a very special one, it could be made a part of a larger institution's
responsibilities. Or, a highly functional body could be established to
deal with the situation. The pros and cons of such approaches will be
considered below in connection with an assessment of a proposed new world
space law conference.
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ANNEX
"Microwave effects - Microwave radiation is non-
ionizing, so it does not affect biological
materials in the way that ultraviolet, X-ray or
nuclear radiation does. Its major effect on
living tissue is heating caused by microwave
absorption. If tissue is heated beyond certain
limits, damage will result .... The peak
intensity of the microwave beam reaching the
Earth from a _eosynchronous power plant is less
than I000 W/mZ, and the intensity drops to less
than I00 W/m2 at the edge of the antenna. Beneath
the antenna the intensity is less than I0 Wm2,
so microwave intensities around and beneath the
receiving antenna are completely safe for humans
and wildlife. Occupants of metal-skinned, light
aircraft flying through the beam would experience
microwave intensities of 20-40 W/m2 at the center,
equal to the intensity of sunlight. Since the
total exposure time is less than 5 minutes, it is
doubtful that any damage would result. Birds will
find that above the central region of the antenna
they become uncomfortably warm, so they are
expected to avoid that area. The animal experiments
showed that the irradiated animals made every
possible effort to remove themselves from the
microwave field. Thus, although considerable
specific investigation is required, particularly
with respect to birds, the microwave beam should
be safe both with respect to people and other
forms of life. The environmental impacts
of geosynchronous power plants would be limited
to the atmospheric effects of the space transpor-
tation system that raised the plant to orbit,
atmospheric effects from the microwave power
transmission system, and possibly a slight increase
in local rainfall in the vicinity of the receiver/
converter on Earth, similar to the heat-island
effects of cities." J. Richard Williams,
"Geosynchronous Satellite Solar Power," in H. J.
Killian, G. L. Dugger, and J. Grey, eds., Solar
Energy for Earth, an AIAA Assessment, pp. 69-70,
April 21, 1975.
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Chapter Six
LIABILITY FORTHEOPERATIONOFTHESPS
ANDITS COMPONENTPARTS
6.1 Genesis of Liability Concepts in Space Law
Man's ingenuous use of the space environment is unquestionably still
at an infant stage. Uses, both old and new, will unquestionably result
in misuses. International space law has been constructed on the basis
that lawful uses are those that are peaceful and which are beneficial to
mankind. Thus, international space law has been designed not so much to
condemn misuse in general, but rather to prohibit particular conduct
that is so unacceptable to the world community that it must be considered
to be unlawful. In the absence of prohibition conduct is presumed to be
lawful.
The first steps to establish an international legal regime for the
space environment were taken by the UN General Assembly when it adopted
Resolution 1348 (XlII) on December 13, 1958. The Ad Hoc Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was asked to prepare a report on the
legal problems to be foreseen. With regard to international responsibility
and liability for damages formal culmination occurred with the inclusion
in the 1967 Principles Treaty of Articles 7 and 9. Article 7 principles
were confirmed and extended in the Convention on the International
1Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of March 29, 1972.
1
24 UST 2389, TIAS 7762. The Agreement entered into force for the
United States on October 9, 1973. See Appendix C.
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The Liability Convention has been characterized as "victim oriented."
It was constructed to serve the needs of mankind. Space dangers may
indeed be on the increase. More States and other users of the space
environment are participating in space activities. Further, there is
an ever enlarging and increasingly novel type of activity practiced or
planned for man's newest exploitable environment. States are free, in
general, to write their own laws for their own citizens. Weare dealing
here with the situation where international law requires a State to pay
heed to the rights of foreign States and their nationals. The treaties
dealing with liability for damageshave created new dimensions of
international tort law, i.e., the law that requires that unnecessary
harmsor wrongs not be imposed on juridical or natural persons, and if
such were to eventuate that the wrongdoer be held accountable. Interna-
tional tort law, like the municipal variety, measures accountability in
moneydamages.
Applying the foregoing to the SPSand its componentparts there are
three questions to be asked. First, does international tort law impose
any liability upon those who place a space object into a geostationary
orbital position? To date no authoritative world institution has the
power to allocate orbital slots to space objects. So long as the res
communis principle is in effect it is not wrong, nor is it unlawful, for
a space object to use an orbital position, despite claims made by eight
2
equatorial States to the contrary. However, if there were a collision
between such orbiting space objects, a fairly unlikely possibility, then
2This position has been accepted by Soviet writers. See, for example,
B. G. Dudakov, "International Legal Problems on the Use of Geostationary
Orbit," Proceedings of the 19th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space,
pp. 407-409 (1977).
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it would be possible to invoke the Liability Convention, as will be
explained below.
Second, turning from the space object to its capture and transmission
of solar energy, would there be liability for damageon the part of the
owners or operators of the space object if harms were produced through
causing exposure to the object's microwave transmissions? To this two
answers can be given. As stated in a preceding chapter, at the present
there are no internationally agreed on standards relating to the amount
of microwave radiation that animals, plants, and inanimate objects can
safely receive. In the absenceof such international standards it could
be argued that there could be no international legal liability. There
could be no liability if there were no measurable standard of harm. On
the other hand, there is a general expectation of prudence on the part of
those who use possibly dangerous substances or instrumentalities. To
understand the present state of the law on this matter will require an
assessment of the two treaties mentioned above.
Third, again with reference to the transmission of energy in the
form of radio broadcasts on assigned gigahertz frequencies, the question
to be asked relates to tort liability for harmful interference with other
broadcasts on the samefrequencies, or, more generally, to the adverse
effects of potentially harmful space activities. As in the preceding
question the assumption is that the space object, which has been defined
to include componentparts, thereby includes the broadcasting equipment
situated on or within the object. This, also, will require an assessment
of the two treaties. In this case a sub-issue exists. Are moneydamages
the proper remedy for harmful interference, or is the offended State
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entitled to engage in the response of "jamming" in order to indicate its
displeasure? Such action could induce responsive remedial conduct.
Generic to all three situations is the formal or treaty base for
liability, which, pursuant especially to the Liability Treaty, varies
depending on the spatial area in which the harm occurs. Despite different
theories relating to proof of fault for different spatial areas, the 1972
Convention has an unlimited spatial application, for it encompasses the
surface of the earth, airspace, and space objects that have left the
surface of the earth or airspace. Also generic to the three situations
is the measure of damages to be awarded in the event of a proven violation
of the treaty expectations.
In seeking to respond to these three issues, and particularly the
second and third, it will be sensible to enter a caveat. To the present
no world tribunal has written an opinion in which answers have been
provided. This means that reliance must be placed on the historic
developments of this phase of space law including the language found in
the agreements, the practices of the space-resource States and their
nationals, the commentaries of scholars, and in particular the records
of the negotiations including formal statements made by negotiators both
during and after the conclusion of such negotiations.
The point was made in a preceding chapter that it can take a long
time for a space law principle and more detailed rules to come into being.
Under the heading "Legal Problems Susceptible of Priority Treatment" the
Ad Hoc Committee on July 14, 1959 included the following in a report to
the General Assembly:
Since injury or damage might result from the launching,
flight and return to earth of various kinds of space
vehicles or parts thereof, a number of problems exist
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with respect to defining and delimiting liability of
the launching State and other States associated with
it in the space activity causing injury or damage.
First of all there is the question of the type of
interest protected; that is, the kind of injury
for which recovery may be had. Second, there is
the q_estion of the type of conduct giving rise to
liability: should liability be without regard to
fault for some or all activities, or should it be
based upon fault? Third, should a different
principle govern, depending on whether the place
of injury is on the surface of the earth, in the
air space or in outer space? Fourth, should
liability of the launching State be unlimited in
amount? Finally, where more than one State
participates in a particular activity, is the
liability joint or several?3
This assessment of the liability issue was influenced by two considera-
tions. The delegates to the UN in 1958 at the time of the adoption of
General Assembly Resolution 1348 wished to cooperate internationally to
reserve the space environment for peaceful uses and for the betterment
of mankind. Also, they perceived that the liability of States for the
uses of space objects would result from malfunctionings of space objects,
per se, such as falling debris, or collisions with air or space-borne
vuh icles.
Between 1958 and the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2777
(XXVI) on November 29, 1971, being the Liability Convention, 4 the UN had
periodically given attention to the writing of a treaty dealing with
international tort law for the space environment. Thus, in General
Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) of December 20, 1961, provision was made
that international law including the UN Charter, was to apply to outer
space and celestial bodies.
3U.N. Doc. A/4141, July 14, 1959.
4U.N. Doc. A/8528. The resolution received 93 votes in favor, none
opposed, and four abstentions, e.g., Canada, Iran, Japan, and Sweden.
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In General Assembly Resolution 1802 (XVll) of December 14, 1962 it
was indicated that there should be liability for space vehicle accidents.
Leading up to this determination were two draft conventions submitted to
COPUOS by the United States. On September II, 1962, COPUOS received
"Draft Proposals on Liability for Space Vehicle Accidents," in which a
launcher was to be accountable for "personal injury, loss of life, or
property damage .... ,,5 On December 8, 1962, the United States also
submitted to COPUOS a "Draft Declaration of Principles Relating to the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space," which stipulated that a launcher
would "bear international responsibility for the launching, and is
internationally liable for personal injury, loss of life, or property
damage caused by such vehicle on the earth or in air space. ,,6 It
will be noted that the spatial area excluded space, per se.
The Soviet Union also put forward a "Draft Declaration of the Basic
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space" in which reference was made to liability. It suggested
on April 16, 1963 that "II. A State undertaking activities in outer
space bears international responsibility for damage done to a foreign
State or to its physical or juridical persons as a result of such
activities. ''7 The Soviet draft did not impose the spatial limits suggested
by the United States.
On December i3, 1963, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1962
(XVIII) "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
5U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/L,5; U.N. Doc. A/5181, Annex III.
6U.N. Doc. A/C.I/881, p. 23.
7U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.2/L.6.
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States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space." In paragraph 5
it was provided that States bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space. In paragraph 8 it was agreed:
Each State which launches or procures the launching
of an object into outer space, and each State from
whose territory or facility an object is launched,
is internationally liable for damage to a foreign
State or to its natural or juridical persons by such
object or its component parts on earth, in air
space, or in outer space.
On the same date the General Assembly requested COPUOS to prepare promptly
a draft convention on liability for damage.
6.2 Liability Provisions in the 1967 Treaty: Article 7
However, COPUOS proceeded to draft the 1967 Principles Treaty, which
made general provisions for liability along the lines illustrated in the
8
foregoing documentation. On January 25, 1967, the General Assembly
adopted Resolution 2222 (XXl) which carried as an annex the Principles
Treaty. Pursuant to Article 7 of this agreement, which entered into
fnrcp nn October I_. Ig67. th_ principle was established that a launchinq
State "is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the
Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies." Related to the principle of
liability so established is the provision in Article 9 whereby States
are required to conduct their activities in the space environment "with
due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to
the Treaty." They are required to avoid "harmful contamination" of the
8paul G. Dembling and Daniel M. Arons, "The Evolution of the Outer
Space Treaty," 33 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 419 (1967).
t4t
space environment and to avoid "adverse changes in the environment of the
Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter .... "
Moreover, States are obliged to avoid activities or experiments in the
space environment "that would cause potentially harmful interference
with activities . " of other States in the peaceful use and exploration
of the space environment.
6.3 Relationship Between Articles 7 and 9
Tke meaning accorded to these treaty terms and the relationship
between Articles 7 and 9 was clarified in the testimony of Ambassador
Goldberg in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. 9 He stated that Article 7 was "designed to cover damage,
physical, physical damage, from the consequences of launching a satellite. ''lO
This statement was a response to questioning by Senator Gore who had asked
a hypothetical question as to the scope of the agreement. Senator Gore
assumed that over time space objects would be employed in telecommunications
with the possibility that jamming of broadcasts would occur. He noted
that the treaty did not exclude such conduct, which he regarded as an
international tort, and observed "The language of the treaty is clearly
broad enough to cover such tort action as that to which I have hypothetically
referred. ''ll Ambassador Goldberg's response was that those who launch
space objects are "internationally liable for damage to another state
party by such object or its component parts on the earth, in air space,
9Treaty on Outer Space r Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations_ United States Senate_ Executive D, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 1967.
lOIbid., p. 39.
II
Ibid.
142
or in outer space. I think any reasonable interpretation of that clause
would meanphysical damage. It was not intended to cover what you have
talked about. ''12
The dialogue contained the following. Senator Gore stated that the
agreement did not use the term "physical damage," but that "as a matter
of fact, electronic damageis physical in nature. The jamming of a
communications system is accomplished by physical phenomena.... If
we are committing ourselves to liability for damagesof an electronic
nature in outer space with respect to radio and ray and various electronic
,,13
communications, then this is a question, and I think a serious one.
Ambassador Goldberg agreed with the seriousness of the issue. He
then stated that the jamming situation was covered by Article 9. With
respect to the meaning of this Article he stated:
We did not establish a principle of liability
which would become part of international law. We
provided that if such interference may occur it
should be the subject of appropriate international
involved ought to take this matter up through
diplomatic channels, that is what we provided,
and that is the article of the treaty that relates
to this type of interference, jamming, electrical
interference, trying to stop a satellite by what
measure you might take, and this is the subject
of appropriate international consultation.14
The Committee continued to evidence its concern over Ambassador
Goldberg's indication that Article 7 dealt only with "physical" damage.
Senator Gore particularly wished it to be understood that electronic
damage was not to be construed to be physical damage. Ambassador Goldberg
12
Ibid.
131bid_____:_.,p. 71.
141bid.
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responded that this was his understanding, too. Senator Gore obtained
agreement that Article 7 did "not include this electronic jamming and
intereference which is dealt with in another article. ''16 In the process,
Senator Gore was obliged to accept a modification of his following formu-
lations: "It is the understanding of the Committee that Article 7
pertains only to earthly physical damage that space activities may cause
to the citizens or property of a signatory state. ''17 The attention of
the Committee was called to the fact that Article 7 referred to damages
occurring not only on the earth but also in air space and in outer space,
e.g., that the treaty was not limited to a situation where there was earth
contact. Thus, Senator Gore acknowledged that his formulation, as stated
above, had not been wholly accepted. When the Committee made its report
to the Senate it excluded the "earthly" limitation suggested by Senator
Gore. Thus, in the Committee Report the following language appears:
The committee wishes to record its understanding
that article VII pertains only to physical,
nonelectronic damage that space activities may
cause to the citizens or property of a signatory
state. 18
6.4 The Liability for Damages Convention of 1972
Following the drafting and entry into force of the Principles Treaty
COPUOS resumed its deliberations on what was to become the Convention on
151bid., pp. 75-76.
161bid., p. 76.
171bid., p. 74.
18Treaty on Outer Space, Executive Re pt. No. 8 to Accompany Ex. D,
90th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 5, April 18, 1967. Cited hereafter as Executive
Rept. No. 8.
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International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. 19 With the
entry into force of the Liability Convention in 1973, legal negotiations
that had been before COPUOS since March 1964, were brought to a conclu-
sion. 20
The Liability Convention contained no provisions affecting the
res communis character of outer space at the geostationary orbital level
nor did it deal with the right of States to make use of orbital slots or
to capture and transmit solar energy. It covered the possibility of
collisions, malfunctionings, and the consequences of such situations,
including an assessment of the kinds of damages that might be recovered.
Moreover, this agreement did contain important provisions relating
to a definition of a space object, including component parts, and the
kinds of damage that could be caused. Unlike the Principles Treaty,
this agreement identified spatial areas in which varying standards of
proof of harm were applicable, clarified the nature of damages, identified
principles of liability, made precise the parties who could be held
responsible, defined who could be claimant, established claims procedures,
fixed the rule of law to be applied to damages, and formalized the
dispute resolving process.
Although relevant terms of Article l will be analyzed below, it
will be helpful to identify briefly the articles that have relevance to
the issues of collisions, malfunctionings, microwave exposures, and
1924 UST 2389, TIAS 7762. The agreement entered into force for the
United States on October 9, 1973. It is set forth in Appendix B.
2ON. M. Matte, Aerospace Law, pp. 153-174 (1977); Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Analysis
and Background Data, Staff Report, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, United States Senate, Committee Print, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1972). Cited hereafter as Staff Report.
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harmful interference with broadcasts. Article 1 (a) defines the term
"damage." Article 1 (d) defines the term "space object."
Articles 2and 3 identify the spatial areas in which activity by a
space object can produce liability. These articles provide that the
treaty has no spatial limitations, although a number were proposed during
the negotiations. The spatial contours of these two articles have been
summarized: "Provided that both the launching state and the state whose
territory, nationals or property suffer damage are parties to the
convention, the place where the damage occurs is immaterial notwithstanding
that the damage may occur wholly within the territory of the launching
state itself or within the territory of a non-contracting state. Nor is
the nature of the property damaged material where the damage occurs on
the surface of the earth. Elsewhere than on the surface of the earth,
however, the Convention will only apply where damage is caused by a space
object either to an aircraft in flight, or to another space object or to
persons or property on board such a space object. ''21
Article 6 specifies circumstances in which the launcher will be
exonerated from liability. Thus, where the event occurs on the surface
of the earth or to aircraft in flight--carrying with it the rules of
absolute liability--the launcher is exonerated if it can "establish that
the damage has resulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence
or from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part
of a claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it represents."
21
W. F. Foster, "The Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects," I0 The Canadian Yearbook of International
Law, pp. 143-144 (1972). Foster's conclusions are based on a careful
assessment of the negotiations as reflected in relevant United Nations
documents.
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However, no exoneration may be granted in cases where "the damage has
resulted from activities conducted by a launching State which are not in
conformity with international law . ." including the UN Charter and
the Principles. Treaty.
Article lO contains provisions fixing time limits within which a
claim must be made. Paragraph 2 allows a State, which does not know of
the damage-causing occurrence, one year following the date of the discovery
of the damage to make the claim. The claimant must exercise due diligence
to learn the facts in order to take advantage of the delayed claim
procedure. Paragraph 3 permits the filing of revised claims "until one
year after the full extent of the damage is known."
The 1972 Liability Convention has been characterized as having two
central premises. As noted above, it is considered to be "victim oriented."
Second, the agreement seeks to facilitate the effective use of the space
environment, including resources situated there. Although the agreement
has cast a wide cautionary net over space activities, nonetheless, it
seeks to maintain a balance between use and liability for misuse. This
perspective will influence the interpretations of the quoted treaty
language.
6.4.1 Non-Violation by Placin 9 SPS into Geostationary Orbit
The first issue in need of an answer is: Does a State have a right
to introduce a space object into a geostationary orbital position, and
if it does and this should lead to a collision or other malfunctioning of
the satellite, is there a duty on the part of the launching State to pay
damages? From the cited treaty terms it is clear that the Liability
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Convention is based on the proposition that space objects can be placed
legally into the space environment, including geostationary orbital level,
and in order to support this principle the Convention contains substantive
rules of international tort law applicable to the use of space objects.
Article 1 in the definition of the term "damage" sought to bring clarity
and greater precision to this concept than had been present in Article 7
of the Principles Treaty.
Article 1 (a) defined the term "damage" to mean "loss of life, personal
injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property .... "
The foregoing definition of damage follows the suggestions made by the
United States in its September II, 1962 "Draft Proposals on Liability for
Space Vehicle Accidents," in its December 8, 1962 "Draft Declaration on
Principles Relating to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space," and also
drafts submitted to COPUOS in 1964 and in 1965. 22 The 1965 draft provided
in Article 2 that damage occurring on earth, in air space, or in outer
space may be "caused by the launching of an object into outer space,
regardless of whether such damage occurs during launching, after the
object has gone into orbit, or during the process of re-entry, including
damage caused by apparatus or equipment used in such launching." In
Article 1 of the draft damage was identified as meaning "loss of life,
personal injury, or destruction or loss of, or damage to property. ''23
During the negotiations an effort was made to ascertain whether the
expression "loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health"
22U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.2/L.8/Rev. 3, September 24, 1965, Staff Report,
op. cit., p. 69.
231bid.
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would cover what has been referred to in Western legal systems as "moral
damage." Examplesof moral damageare pain, suffering, and humiliation.
The United States Department of State has taken the position that the
Liability agreement "makessuch claims possible by providing that
compensation shall be determined 'in accordance with international law
and the principles of justice and equity. '''24 The quoted phrase is
taken from Article 12 of the Convention. The State Department opinion
mayassist in resolving a problem area set forth in the 1972 Staff Report
prepared for the use of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences. The Report suggested that there could be certain "problems"
in determining if the following would be compensible under the agreement:
"interest from the time of the accident, consequential damagessuch as
loss of future earnings or loss of profits, loss of use of property,
costs of prosecuting the claim, pain and suffering, invasion of privacy,
and loss of consortium. ''25
The amb!o_zous it_!_ion rel_ting tn mnral damag_ ha_ bern noted by
several commentators. Matte had written:
precisely what kind of damageis covered:
sentimental value, pain and suffering? ''26
"It is difficult to say
loss of profits, interest,
Further, "It is left open, to
be decided in each case by the parties concerned, or, failing their
agreement, by a claims commission. The samegoes for what was called
'indirect' damageor damagewhich is not the direct result of the activity
in question. Basically, this is a question of what relationship of cause
24Executive Rept. No. 92-38, op. cit., p. 7.
25Staff Report, op. cit., p. 33.
26Matte, op. cit., p. 157 (1977).
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and effect or what degree of causality is required to bring out liability.
Foster attributes the ambiguity relating to moral damages to the
diversity of national laws on this subject. He calls attention to the
lack of a detailed consideration of this matter by COPUOS, and correctly
notes that the 1972 Convention does not deal specifically with the
subject. Nonetheless, he concludes that "despite the problems involved
in placing money values on pain and suffering, and loss of capacity to
enjoy life, compensation may be awarded for such losses. ''28 On the whole,
it is believed that the terms of the agreement, as viewed in the light
of all of the negotiations, do support the view that remuneration for
general damages, including pain, suffering, humiliation, and loss of
capacity to enjoy life would be properly allowable if they should result
from the unlawful use of the space environment. Such misuse, of course,
would include the harms produced by collisions or other malfunctionings.
Article l in defining damage to include "loss or damage to property"
clearly encompasses harms produced by the collision or malfunctioning of
a space object or a component part with some other tangible entity. Such
harm serves as an illustration of what has been described as "direct"
damage within the coverage of the agreement. It has been observed that
"undoubtedly, the definition covers direct damage, i.e., an injury, loss
or damage flowing directly or immediately from, and as the probable and
natural result, of the launching State's space object. In other words,
it clearly covers instances where the space object is the proximate cause
271bid.
28Foster, op. cit., p. 173.
,,27
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of the injury, loss or damage. ''29 Direct damage as the result of collision
or malfunctioning resulting in space object debris falling back to earth
is compensable under the terms of the agreement.
During the negotiations the issue was raised as to indirect or
consequential damage. As opposed to direct damage, namely, an "injury,
loss or damage flowing directly or immediately from, and as the probable
and natural result, of the launching State's space object, ''30 a conse-
quential damage would be that which did not result directly or immediately
from the act, but only from some of the consequences or results of the
act. 31 lllustrative of this form of damage might be the loss of consortium
resulting from injury to a spouse or to the need for a replacement
employee in the event of harm to an injured employee. The United States
urged that the agreement did not include consequential damage. In its
view the agreement "holds a launching State liable for damage traceable
directly to the launching, flight and re-entry of a space object or
associated launch vehicle but does not cover what some delegations earlier
b_i I_u I _lllUb_ U! IIIUll_bb uQIIIQ_ OIIU IUI _lll_ll bll_l_ I_ UIII# II_UbllCblbol
causal connection with a particular space activity. ''32 The basis for
such consequential damage depends on an earlier physical harm to a person
other than the person assertingconsequential damage. The line between
a physical and nonphysical damage is often blurred. In the United States,
for example, nonphysical harm may be produced via psychic injury where
there has been no physical contact between the harmed person and the
29Staff Report, p. 23.
30Staff Report, p. 23.
31 Ibid.
321bid., p. 24.
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injury producing event. Our law allows for recovery for trespass even
when there has not been a physical harm.
In summary,direct damageand moral damageresulting from a
collision or malfunctioning of space objects, are recoverable under the
terms of the agreement. To the extent that indirect damagesfall under
the heading of moral damagesthey would be included. Use of the space
environment for peaceful and beneficial purposes is not an international
tort. Damagescannot be recovered for the use of an orbital slot,
although misuse of a geostationary orbital position could produce
conditions under which damagemight occur. Article l by defining damages
and also identifying who engages in the launching of a space object
confirms the right to use space objects. The definitional process in
specifying conditions of liability for misuse confirmed the right to use.
6.4.2 Incurrence of Liability from Microwave Radiation
The second issue relates to harm caused by the transmission to
Earth of microwaves that may have harmful non-ionizing effects on plants,
animals, and the environment in general. Article l of the Liability
Convention defines damage to include loss of life, personal injury or
other impairment of health as well as loss of or damage to property
belonging to identifiable natural or juridical persons. Claimants are
narrowly defined. Thu_, only natural or juridical persons can experience
the stated harms. The agreement does not accord to the world community
in a general sense any right to put forward environmental claims.
Nonetheless, by extending tort rights to natural and juridical
persons it may be expected that their immediate self-interests will also
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offer some protection to general environmental needs. Comment has been
made as to the wide scope of the protection accorded to human beings
under Article I.
From the broad terminology used in this definition
it is clear that all injuries to persons are
covered whether or not they are accompanied by
objective or substantially harmful physical or
psychopathological consequences provided they
at least result in an "impairment of health."
Moreover, it is immaterial whether the injuries
are suffered through physical impact with a space
object or result from biological, chemical or
radiological contamination emanating from a space
object.33
During the negotiations of the Liability Convention much concern
was expressed over radiological contamination emanating from a space
object. Nuclear damages are covered by the agreement. It has been
suggested that the inclusion of this area of potential harm was an effort
on the part of the negotiators "to cover by its provisions the widest
possible scope of harmful effects of space activities. ''34 An assessment
of these discussions is relevant to the issue of damages caused by
nuclear harm and that produced by microwave transmissions are produced
by radiating sources. Both result from man-made activities. Differences
are based on the amount of detriment that could be caused and by the
geographical range in which the detriment would occur.
Since, as noted above, it is immaterial whether harm is produced by
biological, chemical, or radiological contamination, it would equally
33Foster, op. cit., p. 155. See Chapter Five and the Annex thereto.
34jerzy Rajski, "Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects--An Important Step in the Development of the
International Space Law," Proceedings of the 17th Colloquium on the Law
of Outer Space 245 (1975).
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appear to be immaterial as to the extent or immediate source of such
contamination. Thus, to the extent that radiological contamination falls
within the scope of the Liability Convention it would be expected that
harms produced by microwaves would also be covered by the agreement. It
has been reported that an Argentinian symposiumhas cometo the conclusion
that "any damagecaused by the use of solar energy by meansof space
technology is damagein the terms of paragraph (a) of Article 1 of the
1972 Convention on international liability for damagecaused by space
objects. ''35 Since solar energy is, in effect, "used" when it is forwarded
to Earth via microwave transmissions, it is at least possible that the
Argentinian position is consistent with the conclusion dealing solely
with microwave broadcasts.
Foster has analyzed the difficulties presented by the issue of
nuclear damagein the drafting of the Liability Convention. He has
reported that three alternatives faced the negotiators. Onewas to
exclude nuclear damagefrom the agreement and to provide a separate
treaty specifically dealing with the subject. The second was to exclude
the subject from the Liability Convention but to seek a revision of the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damageto cover
the problem. The third was to include nuclear damagein the Liability
36Convention. After reviewing six proposals on this subject submitted
to COPUOS,he concluded that the majority of the negotiators held the
opinion that the Liability Convention would extend to nuclear damage. He
supported his conclusion with the following reasons advanced by COPUOS:
35U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/PV.177, p. 3, July 27, 1977.
36Foster, op. cit., p. 155, fn. 63.
1 54
(a) the Outer Space Treaty did not provide for the
exclusion of such damage;
(b) a claimant state would face serious difficulties
in distinguishing betweennuclear damageand
damagecaused by the impact, or the exploding of
a space object;
(c) nuclear damagedoes not arise solely through the
effects of radiation but also from heat, light and
explosions and it is thus very similar in many
respects to non-nuclear damage;
(d) unlike other types of nuclear hazards where the
risks could be assessed and which were accepted
by potential victims, nuclear damagecaused by a
space object was impossible to foresee and even
more impossible to assess in advance;
(e) the compensation being sought by the claimant
state would be no different to that payable for
other types of damage.37
All delegates finally concluded that nuclear damageshould be included
within the coverage of the agreement. Further, despite the arguements
presented by the United States which wished to fix the maximumamount
that could be recovered from this source of injury, it was agreed that
there should be no monetary limitation on nuclear damage.
Nuclear damagewould result from the malfunctioning of a component
part of a space object, such as a nuclear-powered motor on board and a
part of the payload of the satellite. The launching State would be
legally accountable for the damagesthat resulted. The Soviet Union
as a party to the Liability Convention has acknowledgedthe applicability
of the foregoing interpretation in accepting the validity of the Canadian
claim for damagesgrowing out of the Cosmos954 event. It would seem
that States employing microwave frequencies for the transmission of
energy, which could have adverse effects and consequential damagesby
371bid_, pp. 156-157.
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way of loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health, as
well as damageto property, would be equally liable under the 1972
Convention.
A further reason for assessing liability against a State using a
microwave transmission, which produces harm, has been advanced. This
arises from the fact that biological, chemical, and radiological contamin-
ation mayproduce harms that are not observable immediately or even within
an extended time period. This possibility was contemplated by the
negotiators. They solved it by providing in Article I0 (2) that claims
might be filed within a fixed time after the fact of harm had been
discovered. This provision was designed for harms resulting from nuclear
radiation but would also appear to be applicable to harms produced by
microwaves.
Fromwhat has been said above it would appear that both microwave
radiation directed toward the Earth and also at geostationary orbital
level, as well as harms produced in the collection of solar energy at
high atmospheric levels would be governed by the terms of the 1972
agreement. It will be recalled that it operates without regard to
geographic and spatial constraints. Persons and property situated on
the Earth, in airspace, or on board a space object are entitled to the
protection of the agreement, even though the meansfor ascertaining
38liability are different.
The fact that such harm, if any, resulting from the collection of
solar energy and its transmission via microwave, would be the product of
38Absolute liability is the test for the payment of compensation
for harmscaused on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.
In other areas the test is fault.
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a componentpart of the space object, rather than the space object per se,
would not relieve the launching State from liability.
Article 1 (d) defined the term "space object" to include "component
parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof."
COPUOShas been consistent in its efforts to define or to describe a
space object. Thus, pursuant to Article 1 (b) of the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launchedinto Outer Space, November12, 1974, "The
term 'space object' includes componentparts of a space object as well as
its launch vehicle and parts thereof. ''39 Thus, for definitional purposes,
the concept of a "space object" has a wide meaning.
Doubt has been expressed as to adequacy of the definition of a space
object. 40 This was troublesome to the Senate Committeeon Foreign
Relations in 1972. It obtained a memorandumfrom the Department of State
which indicated that "space object" would include "the payload and fuel. ''41
The memocontinued: "It appears to be the view of most international
for the purpose of orbiting or escaping the celestial body from which
it is launched. The test is not only whether the object does go
into orbit or beyond, but also whether any object which is launched by
rocket propulsion is intended to go into orbit or beyond. It should
39U.N. Doc. A/9812. This agreemententered into force on September 15,
1976. The United States is a party to the agreement.
40Staff Report, p. 25.
41Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Report
92-38 to Accompany Ex M, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 9, The Executive
Report refers to public hearings conducted on August 3, 1972. These were
not printed, but much of the testimony received by the Committee appears
in the Executive Report.
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be noted that in practice no difficulties have so far arisen from the
lack of precise definition of a space object, and we do not foresee
the emergenceof serious problems for sometime in the future. ''42 No
definition wasgiven to "componentparts." It has been suggested that
,,43the definition of a space object is, in effect, a "non-definition.
This outcome resulted from the opinion of the COPUOSLegal Sub-committee
that the term "space object" had a reasonably understood and clear meaning
and that it was only necessary to include in a definition all the component
parts and equipment of a space object which could cause damage.''44 The
"payload" of a space object, as an aspect of its componentparts, must
be conceived of in a practical sense. Such a payload will include
everything associated with the operating space object, both inside of it
and attached to it on the outside. For example, the sensing and communi-
cations systems directed to observing and maintaining contact with the
Earth and other objects in orbit, as well as the life support systems of
the object, are encompassedin the term componentparts and are a part of
the "payload." It can be assumedthat the componentpart would also
include the hardware involved in the collection and transmission of high
altitude solar energy from a geostationary orbiting space object to
earth via microwave frequencies. To the present there has been no
disposition to prohibit the installation of such sensing, transmitting,
and other electronic equipment on space objects. Nor is it anticipated
that such a prohibition claim could ever be madeor justified, since
42Ibid., pp. 9-10.
43Foster, op. cit., p. 145.
441bid.
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without such equipment the legitimate uses of the space environment could
not take place.
The conclusion can be drawn that the commonplace term "payload" is
intended to include the totality of the space object, including its
component parts, and of necessity the property on board. Without equating
the payload to the space object and component parts it has, nonetheless,
been suggested "that not only damage caused by the object itself, but
also that caused by the payload, by the functioning of scientific
instruments on board, and by anything that has become detached from or
thrown out of the space object, will be covered by the Convention. ''45
However, Foster has asserted that "persons and property on board a
space object are not encompassed by the term 'space object. '''46 It
appears to be his position that only if such property became detached
from the space object would the 1972 Convention not govern liability
caused by the detached property. Even that position is subject to a
rnnHitinn onl,_e_naA k_ 6_m UA ._^_.
Of course, in some instances, the property on
board a space object may be other space objects
which are to be placed in orbit or deposited in
outer space and are designed for movement in
outer space. Where this occurs, damage caused
by these latter objects, after they become
detached from the original space object would
be covered by the Convention. 47
It can be assumed that the broadcasting equipment used by a geostationary
space object for transmitting microwaves to Earth would not be voluntarily
45Matte, op. cit., p. 157 (1977). U.N. Doc. A/AC.lO5/C.2/SR.94, 95, 97.
46Foster, op. cit., p. 158.
47Foster, op. cit., p. 159.
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detached from the space object within or upon which it has been installed.
Although it is certainly property on board the space object, it is also
equally certainly a component part of the object. In support of the
view that the transmitting equipment is a part of the space object, it
can be asserted that such parts include all of the mechanisms actively
used to further the functions and objects of the space object. On the
other hand, it would be possible for "property on board" not to have
utility in furthering such functions, especially those not having a
relationship to the external contacts or activities of the space object.
Thus, it is possible to maintain that component parts include those needed
to allow the space object to achieve its assigned mission, including
obtaining an orbital position, and having arrived there to facilitate the
successful functioning of the orbital goal. That such goal was sensing,
or broadcasting of words or images, or forwarding energy via microwave
emissions to Earth would all seem to be equally supportable. Misuse of
space objects, including component parts, in the furtherance of such
objectives would result in liability under the 1972 Convention if damage
had been produced thereby. In view of the foregoing it is clear that a
launching State would be internationally liable for harm produced by
microwaves emanating from a space object, including its component parts.
6.4.3 Harmful Interference and the Matter of Damaqes
The third issue involving national liability for the use of the
space environment relates to microwave transmissions that may constitute
a harmful interference with other radio broadcasts or electronic trans-
missions. As a sub-issue is the question of whether a country so interfered
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with could have resort to jamming in the event that monetary damages were
not available as compensation for the harmful intereference.
At the time that the 1967 Principles Treaty was being considered by
the United States Senate much concern was expressed that electronic
signals could be interefered with so as to produce nonphysical but
nonetheless very real detriment. It will be recalled that the Senate
attached an understanding to the meaning of Article 7 of the Principles
Treaty whereby it recorded its view that the Article pertained only to
physical, nonelectronic damage that might be caused by space activities
to the citizens or property of a signatory State. 48
Considering the attention given to this issue by the Senate in 1967,
as described above, it is quite remarkable that the printed documentation
of the Committee on Foreign Relations referring to its hearings on the
Liability Convention indicates that the matter went unnoticed. Before
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the Liability Convention the
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences had prepared an
analysis in which attention was called to the 1967 Senate position. 49 It
may be assumed that insofar as the Senate did not affirmatively modify
its 1967 stand with regard to the exclusion of electronic jamming from the
1972 Convention, since it made no specific references to Article 9 of the
Principles Treaty, the United States has kept the obligation of Article 9
securely in place. In specific terms this would mean that if the launching
and use of a SPS, as an activity or experiment, were considered to be a
potentially harmful interference with the activities of another State
48Executive Report No. 8, op. cit., p. 5.
49Staff Report, op. cit., p. 24.
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which produced damages, that recourse could be had to the diplomatic
consulations required by Article 9 of the 1967 Principles Treaty but not
to the terms of the 1972 Liability Convention.
Article 9 contains two major concerns. First, it draws attention
to the need to protect the global environment. Second, and more
specifically, it endeavors to protect the competing activities in the
space environment of the space-resource States. The spatial applicability
of Article 9 has been raised in connection with sensing by space objects
and the prospective use of the DBS. It has been suggested that "insofar
as the interpretation of consultation clauses in this context is concerned,
it is submitted that potentially harmful interference with the functioning
of foreign broadcasting satellites (a peaceful use of outer space) is
,,50
covered by the consultation clauses.
While it is clear that Article 9 establishes a firm duty to engage
in consultations in the event of threatened harms, the Article does not
constitute a veto over space uses or activities on the part of States.
But, if a State were to refuse to carry out the obligation to consult
this would undoubtedly open the door to the dispute resolving procedures
contained in the Charter of the United Nations, which pursuant to
Article 3 of the Principles Treaty govern the relationships of the parties
to the 1967 agreement. Despite the firm duty to consult, "the formal
scope of obligations under the consultation clauses of the Space Treaty
50jerzy Sztucki, "International Consultations and Space Treaties,"
Proceedings of the 17th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, p. 159
_1975). Compare, Istvan Herczeg, "Introductory Report, Provisions of the
Space Treaties on Consultation," op. cit., p. 141. He observed that the
Article 9 consultations are "extraordinary," e.g., they "are convened
dependent upon definite events or contingencies."
162
is extremely limited. Their effectiveness is still more limited. If
interpreted formally, they leave ample room for States to obstruct
international cooperation in space and to take arbitrary decisions in
disregard for 'corresponding interests' of other states. ''51 The
Liability Convention makesno direct reference to consultation in the
event of potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful
exploration and use of the space environment, although Article 21 dealing
with multinational assistance to areas threatened by large-scale
detriment implies the need for somekind of consultation in order to
makesuch assistance effective.
Whether international agreementsdo or do not require wide-ranging
international consultations prior to a State's embarking on a course of
action that mayhave potentially harmful effects on the environment
generally or on the space-activity interests of another State, there is
a need to take into account elementary considerations of humanity. Thus,
the World Court in the Corfu Channel case stated that the foregoing
standard was both general and well-recognized and imposed an international
52
responsibility on States not to expose lives to unnecessary danger.
Jamming of electronic transmissions has been reserved to denying
the reception of ideologically objectionable materials intentionally
broadcast across international boundaries. General principles of inter-
national cooperation, as well as the Article 9 duty to consult, suggest
that jamming of microwave transmissions of solar energy would be unlawful.
No State has a lawful right to deny the capture and transmission of solar
51
Sztucki, op. cit., p. 167.
521CJ, 1949, p. 22.
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energy by another State, since the solar energy resource is a free and
unlimited resource and is available to those who possess the scientific
and technical capabilities to use it. Just as the vessels of one State
on the high seas are not to be disturbed in their peaceful use of the
hiqh seas by the vessels of another State, so must the SPS of one State
be allowed to freely gather and transmit such energy via microwaves. If
in the course of such an event some harm befalls another State, the
appropriate remedy is consultation with the prospect of monetary compen-
station for provable harm or a termination of the harm-producing activities.
In the process of identifying the facts relatin9 to a case of alleged
harmful interference there could be recourse to the ITU or private
scientific organizations, such as COSPAR.
6.5 International Law Applies to Harms Caused to SPS
In the preceding pages emphasis has been placed on the possibility
that compensable harms might in some manner result from the operation
of a SPS. It should be kept in mind that it might also be possible to
cause harm to a SPS. The foregoing rules of law and attendant political
conditions would protect the one as well as the other as a general
proposition, although in some situations the detailed provisions of the
1972 Liability Convention would make distinctions, for example, a
different standard of proof would apply to harms occurring on the Earth
or to aircraft in flight as opposed to all other areas.
In conclusion, it should be remembered that both of the treaties
received the measured approval of the space-resource States. They perceived
that their respective interests would be well served. It is to be expected
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that they will seek the effective implementation of the agreements in
order to serve their perceived interests.
More specifically, answers have been provided for the three questions
that were posed. First, under international law it is permissible for a
State to place a space object, including a SPS, into geostationary orbit.
International law imposes liability for collisions and malfunctionings
while in orbit. Second, where direct harm, including physical and non-
physical or moral harm resulting from such direct harm, has been produced
as a result of microwave transmissions, international law allows those
harmed to recovery monetary compensation. The standard of compensation
is set forth in Article 12 of the Liability Convention. The standard is
a uniform one. This means that there cannot be divergent views as to the
monetary value of harm resulting from different and competing legal systems.
Recovery can be based on the malfunctioning of the space object, including
its component parts. An injured person does not have to show intent to
harm in order to recover. Such parts include transmitting equipment able
to broadcast microwaves carrying the solar energy gathered at geostationary
orbital level. Third, in the event that such radio transmissions were to
constitute a harmful interference with other activities or experiments
involving the peaceful uses of the space environment there is a duty to
engage in diplomatic consultations with States asserting the possibility
of harm. Scientific bodies exist that could assist in ascertaining the
factuality of such claims of harmful interference. The duty to consult
does not accord to the State seeking such consultation the right to veto
the proposed use of or activity in the space environment. Jamming is not
an allowable means to express disapproval of the potentially harmful
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conduct of the space-resource State. The efforts to protect individual
claimants also serve to protect more general environmental needs. This
means, of course, that no unusual legal prohibitions confront the
possible employment of a SPS. The scope and quality of international tort
law should offer encouragement to those who may wish to embark on SPS
programs.
166
Chapter Seven
PROSPECTS FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL CO_JFERENCE
ON SPACE ENVIRONMENT LAW
7.1 Proposals for a Space Law Conference
Not all States consider a full review of the current state of the
international law of the space environment to be premature. Beginning
in 1974 there have been proposals by a number of States for a conference
on either space applications or outer space matters.
A number of forums conceivably exist for the development of space
law. Attention has previously been called to the role of the UN through
COPUOS and the ITU. in 1968 the UN sponsored a Conference on the
Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna.
Although some States have actively urged a new conference along the
1968 lines, other States have resisted the suggestions. In arriving at
a decision to convene such a conference there are policy issues relating
to possible outcomes as well as timing to be considered. Important
national wants and needs would undoubtedly be placed on the agenda
including issues affecting the effective operation of a SPS and the
possible formation of a formal regulatory regime affecting peaceful uses
of and activities taking place in the space environment.
The Scientific and Technical Sub-committee of COPUOS in 1974
recommended that the views of UN members be obtained regarding the
convening of a UN conference on space applications. This was endorsed
by COPUOS. This resulted in an inquiry by the Secretary-General to members
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seeking advice on (I) whether they favored the convening of such a
conference on space applications "in the next few years, ''I (2) what
should be the principal objectives to be obtained, (3) considering the
.... -I gO WU rl_ , " "l-'t _IflVU IU L)I_ b | I_:_ a }.)lJ T ul.l | i a t._:: i. i i_ii_ OllU
._u r preparatory ..... " w,,a L_._ _L .......... :.=_ _- ....
location, and (4) whether the members would be interested in participat-
ing if such a meeting were to be held.
7.2 Different Assessments Regarding the Worth of a Conference
Responses have been varied. As an alternative, a number of States
called attention to plans under way for a UN-sponsored Conference on
Science and Technology for Development.
Representative views indicate a need for a clear demonstration of
the need and usefulness of such a conference, the need be satisfied that
the preparations for the conference would produce reasonable hopes that
the meeting would be useful, the need to avoid competition with other
scheduled UN conferences, the need to consider a future date--such as
1980 or later--, the need to know the precise aims of the proposed
conference, the need for an agenda item on the assistance likely to be
received by the LDCs from space applications, the need not to duplicate
the functions successfully being performed by COPUOS, the need to
determine if such a conference were really necessary following an assess-
_^_,,,=,,_of the accompl _rk_÷_,_,,,,,_,,__, the Conference on _'_len_e_ and Technology
for Development, and the fact that the machinery of COPUOS adequately
would serve all aspects of the outer space debate during the decade of
IQuestion of Convening a United Nations Conference on Space Appli-
cations, U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/142, p. I, January 16, 1975.
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2
the 1970s.
Although the space-resource States did not specifically associate
their rather luke-warm approval of a new conference to any substantive
issue that might be raised, it is possible to conjecture that they
wished to have an adequate amount of time to plan their positions relat-
ing to solar energy and geostationary level orbits prior to giving full
support to the conference. They were aware of the positions that had
been taken in COPUOS and at the WARC BS by the equatorial countries
relating to sovereignty over spatial areas and the natural resources
situated in such areas.
Thus, Colombia gave notice that these issues wouldcome before the
proposed conference. It stated in 1977 that it had on numerous occasions
called attention to the "sovereignty which it exercises over its segment
of the geostationary orbit and has expressed its interest in and its
position on the possibility of States reaching agreement through joint
efforts in a fair and equitable definition of outer space, respecting
the rights of sovereignty possessed and exercised by equatorial countries. ''3
That the equatorial countries would not be able to count on the
support of some of the LDCs was indicated by the position of Papua New
Guinea. After noting that the Republic of Indonesia had advised the
1977 WARC BS of its intent to follow the Bogot_ Declaration and "other
principles of international law," Papua New Guinea stated in the event
2The foregoing positions were advanced by Canada, the United Kingdom,
the United States, and the Soviet Union. U.N. Docs. A/AC.lO5/142/Add. l
through Add. 14, April 9, 1975 to February 27, 1978. For more specific
positions of the United States and the Soviet Union see U.N. Docs.
A/AC.lO5/PV.176, pp. 46 and 56, July 27, 1977, and A/AC.lO5/PV.178, p. 16,
July 28, 1977.
3U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/Add. 9, p. 3, December 19, 1977.
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that it should acquire a television broadcasting satellite of its own
that it would be necessary to put it into an orbit over the equator above
Indonesia. Therefore, Papua New Guinea, consistent with its own position
_,,_,_=,=_ _,,= u_ of _L ....... onary
.................. _ _,,_ LII_ _U_Cd£]
orbit is not subject to sovereignty rights of any country and should be
used to benefit all mankind. ''4 Papua New Guinea expressed its willingness
for a task force to be set up within COPUOS preparatory to the proposed
conference. But when recommendations were made relating to the Bogot_
Declaration, such recommendations would have to be "studied carefully
before any consent is given of its final recommendation to the United
Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. ''5
Israel forthrightly acknowledged some skepticism as to the utility
of such a conference because of the limited performances of some of the
UN-sponsored conferences and because of the political pitfalls associated
with them. Nonetheless, assuming adequate preparation, it was considered
that the conference might have "as one of its major subject areas the
possible implementation of an international project designed to facilitate
the utilization of outer space for the transmission to earth of unharnessed
energy from the sun. ''6 Support for the proposed conference was in part
based on the view that the benefits to be derived from solar energy
should be equally distributed. This "could be better met by an interna-
tional effort rather than by separat_ national projects. ''7
41bid., p. 8.
51bid.
6U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/142/Add. 14, po 2, February 27, 1978.
71bid.
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In August 1978, it was reported that the United States and the Soviet
Union had given their approval to a new conference on outer space, but
had sought to limit the scope of such a conference. The conference, when
held, according to the report would take place no sooner than 1983, no
sooner than 2-3 years after the General Assembly had given its approval
to the conference, and only after the results of the Conference on
Science and Technology for Development were in. Further, the space-resource
States wished to focus the work of the conference on scientific and
technical considerations rather than on legal-political issues. The
equatorial States and some of the LDCs have favored wide-ranging legal
and political discussions. The United States appears to oppose negotiating
on the claims of the equatorial States to sovereignty in the areas
superjacent to them. The United States also does not consider the
problem of the definition/delimitation of airspace and outer space to be
8
a pressing one.
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to assess all of the
problems attendant upon the convening of a UN-sponsored international
space conference. However, it is in order to mention several considera-
tions that would contribute to the ultimate success of the work of such
a meeting.
In the first place, as suggested above, there is an absolute need
to be assured that all of the participants have a relatively similar
understanding of the basic scientific and technological facts involved
8Craig Covault, "Nuclear-Powered Spacecraft Study Set," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, p. 45, August 7, 1978.
171
in the exploration and use of the space environment. Only after there
is relatively common agreement as to the validity of given facts will it
be possible for the participants to move toward the legal and political
considerations that will come before them. Every attempt will have to
be made to avoid the early politicization of the conference. In this
regard, important lessons can be learned from the lack of agreement and
for the moment, at least, the lack of success of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea. By comparison, the preparation that
was obtained at the time of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference could be
emulated. In that situation the International Law Commission was
responsible for the preliminary studies and drafts of the treaties that
were agreed to in 1958. For the proposed space law conference the
preliminary work could be undertaken by working groups within COPUOS,
and such bodies would be expected to have very substantial technical
assistance from such public institutions as ITU, WHO, ICAO, IMCO, IAEA,
and ESA, among others. It would also require advice and guidance from
such private international bodies as COSPAR and IAF, among others. Only
after such groundwork had been done would it be permissible for the
national-interest positions of States to be advanced so that suitable
decisions of a legal-political character might be arrived at. Since
many members of the United Nations do not have a sophisticated under-
standing of the science and technology of the space environment, and
since in many cases the LDCs are woefully understaffed when confronted
by contemporaneous conferences at the UN, the use of working groups could
provide a suitable educational opportunity.
In the second place, it should be understood at_ the outset that,
even assuming a firm grasp of the facts and a common political will, that
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the final product of the_ference will cost and consume an enormous
amount of time. This point must be understood lest false hopes be built
up only to be destroyed. In the most general terms it should be recalled
T-
that all of the important, formal, political-legal decisions taken
regarding the space environment have taken a very long time. Moreover,
a number of important issues that have attracted the attention of COPUOS
for many years have not been, as yet, resolved.
7.3.1 Negotiation of the 1967 Principles Treaty: Lessons
So that this point will not be lost sight of, a brief historical
account will be given of the steps leading to the entry into force of
the 1967 Principles Treaty. This will be supplemented by additional
illustrations, which, in the interest of brevity will simply identify
the time when formal discussions began with an account of where such
negotiations have been brought as of the present. Illustrations will be
provided for treaties and for agreements involving the establishment of
international organizations.
It is possible to trace the genesis of the Principles Treaty back
to the 12th session of the General Assembly's disarmament committee.
On August 29, 1957, a proposal was made by the United Kingdom and supported
by other western powers for the control of weapons in outer space.
Discussions took place in October and November 1957, which led to a call
for the establishment of a technical committee to work out an inspection
system. Its purpose was to insure that the space environment would be
used exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.
On December 13, 1958, the General Assembly established an 18-member
Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. On December 12,
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1959, the Committeewas madepermanent. BetweenSeptember I0, 1962 and
April 16, 1963 five draft proposals were received by COPUOSfrom four
States. All of the proposals contained principles to be incorporated into
9
a UNdeclaration relating to the exploration and use of outer space.
Following lengthy negotiations the Committee submitted a resolution
entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space" to the General Assembly.
lOThis was adopted in December1963.
During the following two years COPUOSfocused on writing a liability
convention and on the needs of astronauts and space objects in distress.
On December21, 1965, the General Assembly asked COPUOSto give considera-
tion to the drafting of an international agreement setting forth the legal
principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use
of the space environment. Following careful negotiations in COPUOS,and
at its recommendation, the General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution
2222 (XXI) on December19, 1966. This resolution contained the Principles
Treaty, and the General Assembly invited all States to sign and ratify it.
Uponhaving received the requisite numberof ratifications the treaty
entered into force in October 1967. If it is accepted that the serious
negotiations for the treaty began only in 1962, it took about five years
for an existing and structured international organization to produce
this Treaty. Had it not been for the willingness of the United States
and the Soviet Union to press for the acceptance of the agreement it could
have taken longer. Moreover, within the United States propitious political
9Carl Q. Christol, The International Law of Outer Space, pp. 459-482,
1966.
lOGeneral Assembly Resolution 1963 (XVIII).
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considerations assisted in moving the proposed treaty from a talk stage
into reality. Success also had been dependent on encouraging the Soviet
Union to forego the essentially negative position that it had taken at
least down to 1965.
7.3.2 Difficulties in the Neqotiations of Agreements: Other Illustrations
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, which entered into force in 1972, had its genesis in a proposal
submitted by the United States to COPUOS on June 8, 1962. In the inter-
vening years COPUOS had incorporated into the 1967 Principles Treaty an
article on liability for damage.
The International Agreement on Assistance to and Return of Astronauts
and Objects Launched into Outer Space resulted from a draft proposal
submitted by the United States to COPUOS on October 24, 1964. Following
negotiations it entered into force in 1968. General provisions on this
subject were contained in the 1967 Principles Treaty.
The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
had its genesis at least as early as 1961. By a General Assembly
Resolution States were requested to submit to COPUOS, through the UN
Secretary-General, information related to launchings. Following negotia-
tions the treaty entered into force in September 1976. General
provisions on this subject were also contained in the 1967 Principles Treaty.
The foregoing international agreements are those that have been
negotiated at the United Nations and are presently in force. There have
been serious and extended efforts to obtain international consent on
other important subjects.
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In 1959, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
took into account the need to effect a definition of outer space. By
1978, this subject was still before COPUOS, but under the title "Questions
relating to the definition and/or delimitation of outer space and outer
space activities, also bearing in mind questions relating to the
geostationary orbit." As seen above, this is an exceedingly complex and
highly charged legal-political issue. An immediate resolution of this
issue is not predicted.
In 1961, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1721 (XVI) in
which it was observed that "communications by means of satellites should
be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a
global and non-discriminatory basis," and that "there is a need to prepare
the way for the establishment of effective operation satellite communica-
tions." However, it was not until December 1966, that the General Assembly
gave its approval to the formation of a Working Group to inquire into
direct broadcasting by satellite. At the present time, the Legal Sub-
committee of COPUOS is engaged in elaborating a set of draft principles
governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct
television broadcasting. Some States have taken the position that the
agreement should provide that States may impose restraints--in effect,
requiring State consent prior to broadcasting--upon broadcasts. This
has resulted in an impasse, in part, because of the commitment of the
United States to freedom of expression.
In 1968, the General Assembly in adopting Resolution 2453B (XXIIi)
made formal reference to remote sensing. At the present time, the Legal
Sub-committee of COPUOS is endeavoring to produce a treaty dealing with
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the legal implications of remote sensing of the earth from space, which
would consist of a set of principles. Again, there are major differences
amongcommittee members. An early resolution is not likely.
In 1970, Argentina submitted a draft to COPUOSfor a treaty on the
IIMoon. An alternate draft was submitted by the Soviet Union in June of
1971.12 Negotiations have disclosed varying opinions on several aspects
of the proposed agreement. From 1972 through April 1978, almost thirty
drafts were considered relating to provisions dealing with the natural
resources of the Moon. During the sameperiod about fifteen drafts were
considered relating to the scope of the treaty. Adding to the complexity
of the situation were about twenty other drafts relating either to the
question of timing or to the issue of information relating to activities
in the space environment and to the submission of other information
concerning Moonmissions. 13 A resolving of the legal issues involving
the acquisition of Moonresources has proven most intractable. Rights to
ocean resources, incltJdina in particular the manganesenodules lying on
the deep seabed, have also plagued the United Nations Third Conference
on the Law of the Sea. By September1978, there had not been agreement
on the disposition of such deep seabed resources, even though the issue
had been raised as early as 1967whenthe UN placed on its agenda the
subject of Principles Governing the Sea-bedand the OceanFloor, and the
14Subsoil Thereof, Beyondthe Limits of National Jurisdiction.
II U.N. Doc. A/AC.IO5/C.2/L 71 and Corr. I.
12U.N. Doc. A/8391 and Corr. I.
13U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/196, Annex I, pp. 2-3, 26, 34-35, April II, 1977.
14U.N. Doc. A/6695, p. I, August 18, 1967.
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In passing it should be noted that there are very similar legal
problems confronting negotiations on both outer space and ocean problems.
On December 17, 1970, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration of
Principles on the ocean which provided in part:
I. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter
referred to as the area), as well as the resources of
the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any
means by States or persons, natural or juridical, and
no State shall claim or exercise soverei nty
sovereign rights over any part thereof.l_ or
The first paragraph of Resolution 2749 is for all intents and purposes
identical with the most recent Austrian Moon draft Article II, paragraph I.
The second paragraph of Resolution 2749, although somewhat different in
wording than Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty, conveys essentially
the same restrictions upon the claim or exercise of sovereignty.
Not only is the language of the two documents essentially identical,
but the competing interests on the part of States for the exploration and
use of the areas, including their resources, are essentially parallel.
Hence, the discussions in COPUOS have been carefully observed by the law
of the sea negotiators, and vice versa. Such negotiations at the law of
the sea conference have been very materially influenced by positions taken
by representatives of the LDCs. They also perceive that they have or may
have much to gain from the final agreement relating to the use and
distribution of Moon resources. Difficulties in each of the forums have
proven to be self-reinforcing. It should also be noted that COPUOS
negotiations on Moon resources have affected discussions of the boundary
15General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV).
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definition/delimitation, to direct broadcast satellites, and sensing.
COPUOSmeets annually for several weeks, as do its two sub-committees.
Under such time constraints it has been impossible to obtain final drafts
on the foregoing four subjects for submission to the General Assembly in
treaty form.
Becauseof competing national interests and the foregoing time
constraints, the proposal to hold a second international conference on
space activities has appealed to someStates. Other States, being aware
of the slowness of past negotiations, have urged the critical importance
of adequate preparation prior to the convening of such a new conference.
The ITU possesses an interest in spectrum/orbit issues. Unlike
COPUOS,the ITU can be described as an ongoing legislative conference
engaged in essentially, but certainly not exclusively, technical matters.
It is a fact that by linking radio frequencies to orbital slots that ITU
has interjected itself more into the political arena than at a time when
it wa_ primarily invnlvpd with the regis_r@_ion and _l!oc_tio_ of radio
16
frequencies and in efforts to prevent against harmful interference.
The periodic World Administrative Radio Conferences of the ITU are
normal and regular meetings. Unlike problems of the UN that may require
an international conference, it is not necessary for the ITU to determine
if such conferences should be scheduled. It is expected that they will
be held. For the ITU there is only the problem of arranging a suitable
date for such meetings.
16The institutional involvement of the ITU in outer space activities
has been set out in its "Seventeenth Report by the International
Telecommunication Union on Telecommunication and the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space." U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/213, December 22, 1977.
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Further, the ITU can determine that periodic regional conferences
will be held. The 1977 WARC BS determined that a conference for Region 2
would be held prior to 1982. With this kind of structure, including its
non-stop bureaucracy consisting of the IFRB, and the International Radio
Consultative Committee, the ITU possesses characteristics that may allow
for a more effective decisional process, in its limited technical area,
than presently at the disposition of the UN, including COPUOS. This is
not to say that the ITU necessarily possesses all of the skills and
attributes required for an early resolution of pressing political-legal
matters. The ITU possesses a current record of success in technical
matters. The most recent major success of the UN was the conclusion of
the Liability Convention in 1972.
7.4 Characteristics of a Possible New International Space Organization
If the UN were to convene a Conference on Space Applications during
the mid-1980s, if not before, it is possible that the agenda would call
for the establishment of an outer space regime to facilitate the
exploration and use of space environment resources. Attention could be
directed to the nature and functions of a new or a modified international
institution in order to serve the needs of such a regime.
Again, political-legal considerations would have to be taken into
account. It is to be expected a considerable amount of time would be
expended in arriving at the characteristics of such an instrumentality.
It would be probable that the international agreement making provision
for substantive legal principles, standards, and rules would also contain
the structure of the organization. Consequently, with both substance
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and structure as a part of the undertaking, even though the preparatory
work for the conference were to have been organized in detail, it is not
likely that such a body will emergein even the near future.
Evidence supporting the slow gestative periods for such new or
modified international organizations is readily available. As in the case
of the examples of the amountof time consumedin the realization of
international agreementswith a substantive focus, so here, one large
membershipbody will be treated in detail. Oneregional body will be
treated in detail. In the other cases brief mention will be madeof the
structure, including voting procedures. The dates between the inception
of the proposal and its fruition will be identified. In all of the
illustrations an effort has been madeto select organizations combining
a legal-political and a scientific and technical focus.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has been selected to reflect
an institution having both scientific and political-legal concerns. Its
membershipexceeds I00 countries. The membershipis drawn from the
advanced States, from the Soviet bloc, and from the LDCs.
The genesis of the organization was President Eisenhower's address
to the UN General Assembly on December8, 1953. Serious negotiations
resulted in the Statute of the Agency. The agreementwas signed on
October 26, 1956. The original agreement, nowmodified in somerespects,
entered into force on July 29, 1957.
The IAEAwas forecast as an international broker to facilitate the
development of atomic power plants. Nuclear materials and equipment
were to be supplied to nations with the understanding that such materials
were to allow for the application or development of atomic energy for
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peaceful purposes.
When it was recognized that the world's supply of fissionable
materials was greater than first estimated, such materials became
commodities on international markets. Thus, the IAEA has not become the
principal international supplier that had been contemplated. The IAEA
has coordinated its activities with the UN, and has rendered technical
assistance to the LDCs in the use of atomic energy. Member States are
not obliged to satisfy their requirements for atomic materials only from
the IAEA.
From the structural point of view, the IAEA operates through a
General Conference, a Board of Governors, and a large, technically
qualified Secretariat. The chief administrative officer is titled Director
General. There are presently 32 members on the Board of Governors.
Their selection is based on a complex formula designed to assure that
18
countries with differing needs and wants will be equitably represented.
Unlike many international organizations, the Board of Governors possesses
important operating authority. The Board is responsible to the General
Conference.
Despite the need for the conference that wrote the Statute to deal
with technical matters, and despite the rather novel authority conferred
on the Board of Governors, it took less than four years to move this
organization from the drawing board into reality.
17Article 3, paragraph I. 8 UST I093, TIAS 3833.
18The 1956 Statute provided for a Council of 25 members. This was
modified in 1961 (8 UST 1095, TIAS 5284), and again in 1970 (24 UST 1637,
TIAS 7668). With the 1970 change the Board of Governors is to consist of
32 members drawn from eight regions of the world. It should be noted that
regional representation on the governing councils of international organiza-
tions is now regarded as a fair way to effect allocations ofmemberships.
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A second illustration is the European Space Agency (ESA). Unlike
many international organizations, ESA came into being through the
consolidation of two preexisting bodies, namely, the European Space Research
Organization (ESRO) and the European Launcher Development Organization
(ELDO). ESA, which is essentially a technical management organization,
has larger powers than its progenitors.
ESA was the result of a resolution adopted by the European Space
Agency in November 1968. On May 30, 1975, the ESA convention was signed
in Paris, and it came into existence as a de facto international organiza-
tion. The de jure status of ESA was made dependent on the ratification
of the agreement by the I0 States composing ELDO.
The ESA treaty made provision for mandatory and optical programs.
Those identified as mandatory were scientific and research oriented, while
the optional programs were concerned more with the operation of space
objects. ESA has been charged with the production of Spacelab for use in
the Space Shuttle.
The Agency is engaged in specific activities on behalf of its members.
Such activities include general studies, education, and documentation.
Its programs involve scientific satellites, communications satellites,
and space transport systems and can involve cooperation with non-member
States. "For all these activities and programs, the Agency had a budget
amounting to $374 million U.S. dollars in 1975, and $491 in 1976. For
1977, the budget forecast was approximately $557 million. The level of
resources proposed for the period 1978-1979-1980 amounts to a total of
$1,491 million U.S. dollars. ''19
19M. Bour_ly, "The European Space Agency's Contribution to the
Development of Space Law," Proceedings of the 19th ColloQuium on the Law
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The principal decision-making authority of ESAis the Council.
Depending on the nature of the decision to be taken, the majority ranges
from a simple majority to unanimity, with the agency's budget requiring
unanimous approval. The daily operations are under the supervision of a
Director General. He is supported by a scientific, technical, administra-
tive and clerical staff.
In making decisions, the Council creates rules of international law
binding on its members. Such rules can also bind non-memberStates, if
they so agree, and other international organizations. ESAhas also been
described as a subject of space law, since "in executing its programs
and activities, it must comply with the international rules governing
space, someof which apply specifically to international organizations. ''20
By comparison the socialist bloc space organization, INTERSPUTNIK,
was first proposed in 1968. The international agreement creating it was
signed on November15, 1971. The agreement entered into force on July 12,
1972. The formation of INTELSATalso took little time. Following the
21
adoption by Congress in 1962 of the CommunicationsSatellite Act, an
International Plenipotentiary Conference on Interim Arrangements for a
Global CommercialCommunicationsSatellite Systemwas convened on
July 21, 1964. By August 20, 1964, the Agreement on Interim Arrangements
had been concluded and signed by II States. Within the next few months
of Outer Space 21 (1977). See also, N. M. Matte, Aerospace Law, pp. 62-65
(1977). A brief summary of ESRO and ELDO is contained in International
Cooperation and Organization for Outer Space, Staff Report, Committee on
Aeronatuical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, Doc. No. 56, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 505-542 (1965).
20Bour_ly, op. cit., p. 22.
21
47 UST 701 et. seq.
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eight more States signed. 22 Both INTERSPUTNIKand INTELSATbrought with
them their own institutional arrangements.
The International Maritime Satellite System (INMARSAT)is the newest
international organization dealing with outer space matters. INMARSAT
was first suggested at the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) in the early 1970s. A draft convention was negotiated
between 1972 and 1974 by IMCO'sPanel of Experts on Maritime Satellites.
A formal conference was convened in 1975. Efforts failed to work out
differing viewpoints amongthe membersof IMCO. However, a second session
of the Conference met between February 9 and February 28, 1976. With the
benefit of documentsprepared by an intersessional Working Group, and
following comprehensive discussions, the major terms of the agreement
were finalized on February 27, 1976. However, several issues were not
resolved. Onerelated to voting rights. Others were more technical and
included the possibility of declaring reservations and the languages to
be employed in the working sessions of the new institutions. A third
session of the Conference finally reached agreement on September3, 1976.
The Council of INMARSATserves as the principal administrative arm
of the organization. Membershipon the Council is to be based on the
principle of equal geographical representation with due regard for the
interests of the LDCs. Someof the seats on the Council are reserved
23to States on the basis of their investment shares in the undertaking.
22
International Cooperation in Outer Space: A Symposium, Committee
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, Document No.
92-57, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess., pp. 437-441 (1971).
23The Council is to consist of 18 representatives of signatories
having the largest investment shares in INMARSAT. Additionally, there
will be four members elected by the Assembly, which is to be composed of
all of the parties. The four are to be elected without reqard to their
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The Director-General is appointed by the Council upon the nomination
of members. Issues to come before INMARSAT have been identified as
procedural and substantive. Procedural matters must obtain the approval
of a majority of members present and voting. Substantive matters can
also be approved by a majority of votes cast by the members present and
voting, but in this situation it will be necessary for the majority to
include at least two-thirds of the weighted votes of the qualified voting
constituencies.
The common structural characteristics of INTELSAT, INTERSPUTNIK, and
INMARSAT have been found to be influenced by their economic goals. Thus,
these three enterprises are "structured as traditional administrative or
regulatory intergovernmental organizations. ''24 It has been suggested that
the structure of these operating entities should not follow political or
bureaucratic models but rather should be based on a corporate model. This
was explained as following the "investment/use" principle, thereby
representing "when translated into the form of an investment share, the
fundamental determinant of the extent of each participant's financial
rights and obligations as well as of his voting and management rights. ''25
When the world community has endeavored to establish a new interna-
tional organization to deal with the resources of the ocean, the process
investment shares. By this procedure it was hoped to honor the principle
of just geographical representation taking into account the interests of
the LDCs. U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05, 169, p. 2, March 16, 1976. See also
Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, "The Establishment of an International Maritime
Satellite System," 2 Annals of Air and Space Law 323 (1977).
24Wulf von Kries, "Key Features of International Satellite Enter-
prises," Proceedings of the 19th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space,
p. 310 (1977).
251bid.
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of obtaining a treaty has been as slow as, if not slower than, the arrange-
ments dealing with the space environment. Thus, at the close of the sixth
session of the UNThird Lawof the SeaConference on July 15, 1977, final
agreement had not been reached on the governing structures for the deep
seabed and ocean floor area. This issue first cameto the attention of
the UNin 1967. However, full-scale negotiations had begunonly in 1970,
and had been institutionalized in the form of the conference only in 1974.
Since the law of the sea conference has accepted basic legal principles
very similar to those set out in Articles 1 through 3 of the 1967 Principles
Treaty, the plan for institutions to manageocean resources is relevant. 26
The 1977 ocean text calls for the formation of a governing instrumentality
to be knownas the Authority, and it will function through an assembly, a
council, a secretariat: an enterprise, and will be assisted in the
resolution of legal disputes by a Sea-bedDisputes Chamberof the Law of
the Sea Tribunal.27 A principal reason for the inability of the law of
......... _ .... g_t_t_nn_ _n an _nd with an acceptableLh_ s_a _onf_,_,,_= tv ... _ its ...............
treaty relates specifically to the exploitation of the mineral resources
on the deep seabed and ocean floor. The approach taken by this conference
maywell provide someimportant instruction to those who may, at some
future time, wish to form an international institution to deal with the
natural resources of the space environment.
26Article 136 of the 1977 text provides that "The Area and its
resources are the commonheritage of mankind," thus not employing the
comparable expression "province of mankind" found in Article I, paragraph
I, of the Principles Treaty. Article 137 of the 1977 text follow Article
2 of the Principles Treaty in excluding sovereignty in the Area.
27Articles 154-192.
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If a Conference on SpaceApplications is to be convened in the
not-too-distant future, and if it is to suggest the formation of a new
international space agency, someattention should be given to the research
and conclusions of students of international organization. Writing in
1973 on the assumption that there was a need for a regime for earth
resources experiments, two scholars have provided a mixed prototype
somewhatfashioned on the technical experience of the ITU, but also
blending in experience and insights obtained from organizations having
28major political-legal ramifications.
7.5 A Final Comment on Conference Strategies
At the beginning of this Chapter it was indicated that if a United
Nations Conference on Space Applications or Outer Space Matters were to
be held that it would be necessary that the Participants come into
possession of essentially the same set of scientific and technological
facts. It was also stated that the final product of the conference would
consume an enormous amount of time and effort. The foregoing assessment
would seem to offer abundant proof of this fact.
Thirdly, it should be noted that such a United Nations Conference
would be costly in terms of money. At the request of COPUOS the
28George A. Codding, Jr. and M. Beheshti, "An International Agency
for Earth Resources. Experiments," ! Journal of Space Law 1 (Spring, 1973),
p. 40. A somewhat more modest formulation is set forth in an "Outline
Swedish Proposal for an International Organization to Govern the Operation
of Earth Surveying Satellites," in Valerie Hood, Mary E. Kimball, David A.
Kay, A Global Satellite Observation System for Earth Resources: Problems
and Prospects, p. 155 (1977). For a more general assessment of interna-
tional institutional problems see D. W. Bowett, The Law of International
Institutions, pp. 273-340 (1967); Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., International
Organizations in their Legal Setting, Documents, Comments and Questions
(1977).
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Secretariat conducted an inquiry in 1974 and 1975 to determine the
financial implications of such a conference. On the assumption that the
conference would be held in NewYork City and that it would last for ten
days, the Secretariat provided as an estimated cost the sumof $422,700.29
This represents out-of-pocket costs to the UN. The total costs to
participating States and international organizations can only be estimated,
but would undoubtedly run into manymillions of dollars.
In addressing the issue of whether it will be possible to construct
an adequate international regime, based on sound principles of interna-
tional law, that would allow for the effective, equitable, and economic
gathering and transmitting of solar energy from geostationary orbital level
to Earth, the foregoing three considerations will have to be weighed.
There are manyother considerations that cannot be treated here. Among
the strategies that would have to be considered would be whether the
suggested multilateral approach through a United Nations Conference would
be the best way to proceed. Arguments can be madethat the subject matter
involved in the gathering and transmission of solar energy might be
treated on a bilateral basis, with the knowledge that it is mucheasier
for two like-minded persons to arrive at an agreement than for manyhaving
disparate points of view.
Other strategies that might be taken into account have to do with
the independenceof the proposed regime or entity. Since the UNhas been
perceived by someas a highly politicized institution, it has been suggested
that a new body should keep a suitable distance from the UN, lest the
misadventures of the latter have an adverse impact on the new institution.
29U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/179, p. I0, October I, 1976.
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It would, of course, be possible for the new regime to be brought into
existence by a resolution of the General Assembly rather than through
the treaty process. For example, following a resolution adopted at the
1972 UN Conference on the HumanEnvironment the General Assembly on
December15, 197230 created the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).
Like the institutions formed via the treaty process the UNEPpossesses
a well-considered organizational structure. In this instance it consists
of a governing council of 58 members,a secretariat, an Environmental Fund,
an Environment Co-ordination Board, and an Executive Director. In this
case, as in the others, one of the more difficult problems to be resolved
was the size and basis for representation on the Governing Council.
From the foregoing certain conclusions, involving political and legal
policy matters, can be suggested. For the foreseeable future only those
countries that have been described as space-resource States have the
capacity to explore and use high altitude solar energy. Moreover, these
sameStates have the greatest need to obtain and use alternative energy
sources, including solar energy on a "wholesale" basis.
Such States will be obliged to accept the world communityjudgment
that such solar energy as well as the geostationary orbital slots
constitute a natural resource of the world. As such, neither the energy
nor the slots fall under the sovereignty of any State, the claims of
eight of the equatorial States to the contrary notwithstanding. Nonetheless,
it is evident that the space-resource States are anxious to cooperate
with all countries in arriving at decisions relating to the capture and
transmission to Earth of the solar energy of outer space.
30A/RES/2997(XXVlI).
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World institutions are slow to be conceived and brought into effective
operation. As needs for solar energy increase, and if the world community
is overly slow in developing regimes that can take into account the
province of mankind or common heritage of mankind concepts, then it is
quite likely that the resource States will have to proceed alone or with
similarly situated and motivated countries to obtain their energy from
geostationary orbital level. Even though this scenario may be the first
to be placed into effect, nonetheless, it may be anticipated that
ultimately a world regime will have a certain amount of authority regarding
both orbital slots and the resource of solar energy, per se. The kind of
authority to be granted to such a regime can take on many colorations.
This issue is not likely to be resolved in the forthcoming UN Conference
on Space Applications or Outer Space Matters.
When such a regime does come into existence, if it does, a decision
will h_ve to be m_He whpth_r it should be associated with the UN or
whether it would have a more independent status.
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Chapter Eight
CONCLUSION
In formulating a present and future policy for the effective
operation of a SPS it is necessary to place scientific and techno-
logical facts in a political-legal context. The methodology of this
White Paper has been to identify such facts. Building on such facts
there has been a further search for and clarification of existing
political-legal outlooks or values. Only through a combination of
the best of these essentials is it possible to arrive at decisions that
may have some hope of surviving for at least a short time. As new
facts come on line and as new perceptions of man's needs and wants are
identified there will be change. Through the application of the
indicated methodology it is hoped that the change will be orderly and
that it will serve basic human needs.
In the context of this analysis it has become evident that the
nature of the area in which a SPS might function is not perceived the
same way by all observers. Thus, the linked orbit/spectrum resource
has been described as limited world natural resource. While there is
little reason to doubt that it is a world natural resource, there is
evidence that it may not be quite so limited as proclaimed. These who
have accepted the first formulation have also considered the resource to
be unitary, that is, they have treated orbital slots, and the solar
energy located at geostationary orbital level, as essentially one and
the same. Confusions of this sort can make the jobs of authoritative
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decision makers in the political-legal arena more difficult than they
ought to be.
An objective of such decision makers is to obtain international
agreement on the availability of geostationary orbital areas for a SPS,
to obtain microwave frequency allocations to facilitate the purposes of
a SPS, and to establish international microwave exposure standards so
that a SPS will not produce harms from non-ionizing radiation. In both
short- and long-term perspectives such agreement may lead potential users
into areas of conflict, competition, cooperation or coordination, and
compromise. This process involves many actors. Principally involved are
the scientists and technical experts, the legal-political figures--with
their security advisers at their elbows--, representatives of public and
private international organizations, and in the background are those
who rely on the intelligence and training of such personalities, namely,
the general public. In the international space law field such competition
has not excluded cooperation, particularly where common interests have
been perceived. In the formation of the 1967 Principles Treaty and the
1972 Liability Agreement the consensus required at COPUOS necessitated
cooperation and compromise on the part of the United States and the
Soviet Union. Each was able to make concessions and each was able to
bring allies to accept such judgments.
The United States has been a major proponent of an orderly interna-
tional space law regime. This has facilitated use of the space environ-
ment pursuant to the res communis principle. It has also resulted in
formal means to impose liability and consequent damages for misuse.
Although the liability net was widely thrown, it was not cast so
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indiscriminately as to prevent innovative and creative uses of the space
environment. In urging the adoption of the Liability Agreement the United
States did not depart from its obligation under Article 9 of the
Principles Treaty. This requires consultation among States concerned
over activities or experiments in the space environment that could have
potentially harmful consequences. If it were thought that the SPS could
be productive of such harms, it would be the duty of the United States to
seek consultation prior to the use of such a space object. As a firm
proponent of Article 9 there could be no doubt that the United States
would offer such consultation. However, the consultation involves
diplomatic cooperation and compromise. It does not constitute a veto by
another State of a proposed U.S. activity.
The assessment of international rights and duties for a SPS has
produced supportable conclusions. First, since the spatial level at
which a geostationary space object would orbit is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty or by any other means, a nation-state
can use but cannot establish sovereignty in that area. The right to use
the orbital level, in order to avoid charges of a "de facto" or "de jure"
claim of appropriation, would have to be temporary, e.g., non-exclusive.
No preemptive right to the orbital slot would be created by such temporary
or non-exclusive use.
Second, for the same reasons that the orbital slot area issubject
to the res communis principle, the solar energy located at geostationary
orbital levels is ares communis. Even more than the orbital slot the
solar energy is an unlimited and ever-renewing natural resource.
Third, the radio spectrum is a world natural resource. For it to
be used equitably, efficiently, and economically it is necessary that
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frequencies be allocated to specific users. The ITU has been chargea
with this function, and the allocation and registration of frequencies
have been accomplished in a competent manner. The ITU has no enforcement
powers other than seeking cooperation by States in their own best interests.
This has minimized harmful interferences. This appeal to self-interest
in the long run is one of the more effective ways--short of large-scale
violence--for an international agreement to be implemented. Not having
to pay damagesis based on self-interest.
The ITU has the legal authority to allocate microwave frequencies,
although the initial assignment can be madeby States. This meansthat
the State possesses the legal authority to use a frequency and, potentially,
such use could result in conflict with another State. However, the
powerful influence of national self-interest serves to obtain conformity
with the allocations.
The ITU has associated frequency allocations with orbital slot
allocations. At the present time the ITU has no power respecting the
allocation of orbital slots, although in the past several States h_ve
suggested that the ITU might be given such new powers. However, the ITU
in Article 33, paragraph 2, of the 1973 Convention must take account of
the fact that States "in using frequency bands for space radio
services shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geosta-
tionary satellite orbit are limited natural resources .... " This
Article also takes note of the fact that using States shall have radio
frequencies and orbital slots at their disposition "according to their
needs and the technical facilities at their disposal."
Fourth, although international legal standards do not exist on the
amount of non-ionizing radiation that may be received by plants, animals,
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and intangible materials without causing harm, the Liability Convention
takes into account the fact that radiation can produce injury. It was
noted, if nuclear damage,under treaty terms, can be madethe basis for
a recovery of monetary damages, that the samereasoning maybe applied
to the radiation produced by microwaves. While it remains to be seen
what kind of ionizing radiation would be produced in transmitting solar
energy to Earth via microwaves, if any or at all, nonetheless, in the
event that harms were produced a body of legal rules and procedures now
exists which would allow recovery to take place.
Emphasishas been placed throughout on the _,,,,_ of _nt_rnatinnal............
agreements. Treaties serve the purpose of providing clarity respecting
legal rights and duties. While substantial practices of States, which
have ripened into customary international law, produce legal rights and
duties, the rapidly expanding needs of the space-resource States are
better served by the formal treaty process. Customary law maybe slow
to develop, although this need not be the c_. Mo_-eovar,it maybe
variously interpreted depending on ideologies, developmental status, and
the capacity to understand and respond to scientific and technological
facts. Moreover, assumednational interests can be consulted in more
detail and with greater care in the writing of a binding treaty than in
the emergenceof customary law. Both space-resource and non-resource
States presently seemto be in accord that formal agreements are a
preferred route to travel.
The acceptance of the res communis principle in the 1967 Treaty has
given it a firm legal base in the international law of the space environ-
ment. This principle is directly related to the further principle that
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the use of the space environment shall be for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries and shall be the province of mankind.
Responses by the LDCs, who are considered to be the beneficiaries of
this commitment, have been twofold. On the one hand, some States urge
the sharing of such resources. On the other hand, there have been rather
insistent claims on the part of eight equatorial States that the equatorial
portion of the space environment, where space objects can remain in
geostationary orbit, belongs to such claimants. To most observers this
claim is diametrically opposed to the language and purpose of the Treaty.
Whether this difference can be resolved via negotiations, including the
proposed new International Conference on Space Law remains to be seen.
The ultimate success of a SPS will depend in part on the amount of
good will the United States will be able to receive in connection with
the endeavor. If tensions were to develop on the part of either the
LDCs, which would hope to share in the benefits available through the
presence of solar energy, or the equatorial States, which might become
unreconciled because their claims received no attention, full success
might not be obtainable. However, such outlooks would have been imaginary
if the SPS were not able to demonstrate its assumed potential. Thus, a
strategy on the part of the resource States could be to proceed without
consulting the present interests and positions of such States in order to
prove the viability of the concept. This proven, it would then be time
to engage in discussions of specifics. In the process the space States
might take the position that the project was going forward vigorously,
that rewards were expected to be substantial, and that their ongoing
commitment to the 1967 Principles Treaty would allow for the required
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sharing. Such sharing would depend on entering into suitable commercial
relationships. Such States aware of the sharing expectation, and
possibly experiencing present and probably future shortages in energy,
might be induced to cooperate now in the hope of obtaining future benefits.
If, as is believed to be the case, there is a present urgency to develop
reliable sources of solar energy, in order to avoid ongoing or expected
adversity, the members of the world community would be more receptive to
proposals for a SPS.
It is clear, if solar energy in the future is to be obtained on a
"wholesale" basis from the space environment, that there will be a need
to effect ways to distribute such energy to users. Since the resource is
an international resource, it may be anticipated that the distribution
will take place internationally and that the distribution will be the
product of the decision of an international institution. It is possible
that such an organization would be authorized to allocate microwave
frequencies to the most desirable social uses. For example, it mighL
have to determine whether there was a greater need for energy than for
the transmission of words or symbols. That institution will presumably
be more than a set of laws.
It will take the form of an international organization based on a
charter which will allocate legal powers and duties to the organization.
The organization could be a new one, or it could be the product of the
revision of an existing entity. A critical issue before national decision
makers would be the powers of such a body. These could range all the
way from having the power to grant orbital allocations to a simple
coordination of orbital slots planned to be used by member States. It
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could be given the power to distribute solar energy, or it might be
authorized to fix functional standards rather than having distributive
powers.
As noted in Chapter Seven, States have enormous difficulties in
reaching agreement on how to authorize the allocation of resources. At
the present the world community lacks experience with the multinational
management of technologically-based programs on a global scale. Neither
the UN nor the ITU have attempted such activities, and the plan provided
in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea for a
Seabed Authority has not received approval on the part of the more than
150 participants in that meeting. The experience of INTELSAT, based as
its structure is upon a business as opposed to a bureaucratic model,
could be instructive. The precise substantive powers of such an organiza-
tion will have to be fitted to the mission that will be assigned to it.
Agreement on its procedural powers will also pose difficulties. It is
safe to suppose that over time there will be increasing demands for the
formation of an international space agency.
The final success of a SPS will depend on the identification and
resolution of important international political-legal issues. These
will have to make provisions for the availability of geostationary orbital
positions, uninterfered with microwave frequencies, and protection against
the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. It will also be necessary to
allow such an international organization to have power commensurate with
its duty to protect the general well-being of mankind.
2OO
Chapter Nine
RECOMMENDATIONSFORFURTHERSTUDY
Further areas of study can be identified in several ways. There
are areas that are essentially international, while others are national.
Someof these have long-range characteristics, while others are short-
range. Unfortunately, this analytical approach is marred by the fact
that such distinctions are blurred by reality. Welive in an "intermestic"
era. Nonetheless, the foregoing distinctions will be attempted.
Recommendedapproaches will be identified. 1
Assumingthe scientific and technological viability of a SPS, as
well as the legality of its use, there is a long-range and short-range
need--both internationally and nationally--to build a constructive and
supportive attitude towards its use. To this end the fact will have to
be established that a SPSwill be used exclusively for peaceful, that is,
non-aggressive, purposes; that its use would not produce excessive
harms--and in the event that damageswere to occur that they would be
compensable--; and that through international agreement somemeanswould
be provided to share in the benefits derived from the SPSdelivery of
solar energy to Earth. At the world level many international bodies--
both public and private--will be involved in the formation of policies
allowing the realization of the above goals. Domestically it is to be
expected that all elements of our pluralistic society will wish to be
consulted. The national, state, and local governmentswill have important
IThe recommendationsare set out in Appendix K in tabular form.
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roles to play. Within these structures the executive and legislative
branches will fix policies, and they will be aided by administrative
agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission.
In dealing with so large and varied interests--frequently competing--
there will be a need for a comprehensive and ongoing presentation of
scientific-technological and political-legal facts. This can only be
accomplished if a versatile research program is continued. With the
dissemination of the results of studies such as this it will be possible
for authoritative decision makers to arrive at valid decisions. As has
been noted, facts are illusive and they tend to change. Consequently,
continuing research and the publication of findings will be required.
In the United States congressional hearings are useful in calling
attention to wants and needs. At the world level there is a pressing
need to bring facts to the attention of delegates to international
conferences, especially to representatives of the LDCs. However, it is
frequently too late to obtain changes in national policies at the time
of the convening of such conferences. There is a need that such research
findings be supplied to foreign governments and to the secretariats of
international organizations as soon as the findings are available. Mere
dissemination may not be enough.
This White Paper has called attention to the belief on the part of
many that a more substantial world regime than now exists should be
created in order to deal with the uses of and activities in the space
environment. An assessment of such expectations will require a very
substantial effort. The problems encompassed here are numerous and
complex. There is a very considerable urgency to obtain clarification
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on existing issues.
It may be decided, after suitable reflection, that the present regime
is adequate both for the near and the more distant future. On the other
hand, the consistent rendering of the theme for a new instrumentality
makes it imperative to examine its potential function and its prospects.
Among the issues that will have to be examined, and possibly resolved,
are: authority conferred on it in its charter, universality as opposed
to the formation of regional bodies, relationship with existing interna-
tional institutions, and the acceptability of such an agency to States,
including particularly the space-resource countries.
The charter terms of such an entity would include substantive matters
such as whether it was to be a regulatory body or whether it was to serve
more as a consultative instrumentality; whether, for example, it would be
assigned the power to allocate orbital slots to States that might insist
on the right to use and reuse the same orbital position; whether, in the
..... __ a.... A_ #n_ th_ t_an_mi_ion of solar energy byeve,,_ u, co_pet_,, . ...............
microwave as opposed to the transmission on the same frequencies of words
or symbols, the regime could make preferred allocations; whether the
powers of the body should be intentionally quite modest at the outset,
with the assumption being that as it proved its capacity to regulate or
offer wise consultation that its power would be extended; whether its
powers would relate only to the allocation of preferred orbital positions;
whether its powers would be large enough for it to make disposition of
the world solar energy resource; whether in so doing it would be able to
measure the wants and needs of States making special claims, such as the
equatorial States or the LDCs, based on the size of their populations,
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or the needs of the general public, or commerce, and industry for such
energy; whether it would have the same powers in relation to the non-
equatorial States; whether it would possess powers in the air space and
in the space environment so that a single regime would exist for the
area above Earth; whether it should be given dispute-resolving powers,
and others.
From the procedural point of view it would be necessary to determine
whether it would follow a business as opposed to a bureaucratic model.
The former might allocate greater voting rights to States investing the
larger amounts of money and effort in the SPS. The latter might follow
the practices in the UN of one country-one vote. Many procedural
complexities would have to be worked out. The present trend should be
taken into account. This has been for the acceptance of the principle of
sovereign equality and equality of voting. Such a possibility might
make the entity less attractive to the space-resource States, but this
would have to be studied.
Such States might conclude that an essentially universal entity
would not serve their best interests. Thus, they might be willing to
consider a limited-membership institution. Or, presumably, the distribu-
tion of uses of the space environment resources could be effected by a
series of bilateral arrangements. It is probable that the use up to the
present of such bodies as the UN and the ITU would preclude such a
possibility. On the other hand, there is a respectable view that the UN
may become overly politicized in their assessments of the uses of world
resources. This would possibly suggest the consideration of alternative
institutions.
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Assumingthat the UNmay lay claim to the larger governance of the
space environment, it would still be possible for it to serve as an
"umbrella-type" structure over a numberof regional institutions. For
example, in May 1978, five AndeanStates met to consider the feasibility
of a regional space program.2 ESAmaintains contacts with COPUOSat the
present time.
Whether or not the UN takes on larger powers relating to the gover-
nance of the space environment, it will be obliged to maintain contacts
with the specialized agencies, with membersof the UN family, and with
representatives of non-governmental organizations. Any new space regime
would be confronted by the sameneed.
It would be expected that the regime would have as a part of its
structure suitable technical bodies. Their functions could parallel
those now exercised by the ITU's International Frequency Registration
Board and its International Radio Consultative Committee. Whethera new
space regime is established or not, thuru will _till be a very gre_ n_pd
to insure that COPUOSand the ITU are assigned clear-cut responsibilities
in the spectrum/orbit area. With the formation of a new regime this same
problem would be manifest. There is a need for a very careful assessment
of the respective governing powers and interests at the UN, ITU, and a
possible new regime in this precise area.
A new regime would also provide, collect, and distribute a consider-
able amountof factual data. This would include, but not be limited to,
data on the use of orbits, safety requirements, distance requirements,
2These States are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
They were joined by representatives of the world business community and
by special guests from other countries, including governmental spokesmen.
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station-keeping procedures, access to and removal from orbital position,
and the plans of States and other juridical persons to engage in orbital
activities. If manufacturing were to take place in the space environment,
it would be desirable for such an institution to be able to exercise some
control over both lower orbits, transfers from a lower orbit to a higher
orbit, and the managementof traffic patterns employed by such space
objects. Such data would also be maintained concerning the employmentof
radio frequencies by such space objects, with someemphasis being given
to the possibility that a single space object could effectively utilize
a numberof frequencies without causing harmful interference. Not only
the problem of acquiring such data but also the conditions surrounding its
dissemination should be studied. Would, for example, the samepractices
be followed that are now present in the data acquired by Landsat?
In considering the future of the UN, the ITU, and a possible new
space entity it will be necessary to continue to observe the plans and
activities of the UNand the ITU in particular. Thus, the UN is presently
committee to a Conference on Technical Cooperation amongDeveloping
Nations and another on Science and Technology for Development. As has
been noted, there is also a discussion going on at COPUOSon whether there
should be a Conference on Space Lawor Applications. The last mentioned
may be convenedas early as 1983. While the first two may have only a
general interest to the gathering and transmission of solar energy from
orbital level to Earth, the last conference will certainly be faced with
the views of the eight equatorial States that they can exercise national
sovereignty at geostationary orbital level above the equator. The presen-
tation of such claims at any of these conferences will have an enormous
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impact on the positions and strategies of the space-resource States. An
assessment of the support likely to be gathered for such claims from
other States, and the political costs to the space-resource States in
responding to such claims will have to be investigated. In this
connection, the lack of present success on Moon treaty negotiations and
law of the sea negotiations hinges in a very substantial degree on varying
viewpoints relating to the use of natural resources. A careful study
ought to be undertaken in which common perspectives and policies are
identified. A good bit of attention has been given to the respective
pos}tions of States participating in the law of the sea negotiations,
and there is an abundance of literature. The same amount of attention
has not been given to the COPUOS-based discussions on Moon resources. It
would be a worthwhile undertaking to determine if consistent positions
have been taken in both forums. In weighing the capacity of COPUOS to
deal with the problem of the spectrum/orbit it must be recalled that
COPUOS is currently engaged in long-continuing discussions on sensing,
direct broadcast satellites, the Moon treaty, and the issue of the defini-
tion or delimitation of the space environment. The last two mentioned
issues would certainly be a major factor in the success of the projected
Conference on Space Law or Applications. It would seem to be prudent
to examine the bearing of these issues on the proposed conference in
order to forecast possible positions of States and the likelihood of
success in such a conference. As previously noted, some of the UN-sponsored
conferences have become heavily enmeshed in political discussions having
no relationship to the purpose of the conference. The possibility that
this might have an impact on the proposed conferences should cause some
207
concern. Substantive expectations need to be analyzed with this in mind.
One way to allow the proposed conference to focus on space law or
application would be to induce the private scientific community to
support the objective of supplying the Earth with solar energy. One of
the great attributes of the International Geophysical Year was the
initiative and leadership evidenced by scientists acting as individuals
and without direction from national governments. As individuals, and
through their respective scientific societies, all collected together in
the International Council of Scientific Unions, they were able to advance
human knowledge and the cause of international understanding. Will it be
possible to mobilize this worldwide community in support of the gathering
and bringing to Earth of solar energy in "wholesale" amounts? The
Council's Committee on Space Research has provided technical information
to COPUOS, but what is now suggested is a greater involvement on the
part of such private individuals in the national and international
political process. Ultimately, their influence will be felt in the
issues here under consideration. What role might they be willing to
play, and how soon? What can governments do to encourage such voluntary
involvements?
One of the functions of the world scientific community will be to
supply facts as to whether the spectrum/orbit is in reality a limited
resource. Since the ITU has defined the resource as a limited natural
resource, States have expressed the fear that the advanced States will
establish monopolies. The concerns of the non-resource States are very
real that the advanced States will make use of their scientific and
technological capabilities in order to reserve such energy resources
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exclusively to their own use. As a result of this manynon-resource-
States have advanced the view that there should be a sharing of such
solar energy. Howshould such sharing be arranged?
The legal-political arena will ultimately dispose of the claims
over the use, including the sharing, of the solar energy resource. All
of the institutions that have been mentioned above, and others, will be
involved in effecting the communitydecisions relating to such sharing.
The product of both the claims of States and the decisions of such
institutions, especially when the latter are clothed in legal form, such
as an international treaty or convention, will govern the use of such
resources.
What has just been suggested indicates that there are several ways
for the international law of the space environment to comeinto being.
One is through the acceptance of peaceful and beneficial practices.
This is knownas customary international law. The other is the more
formal international agreement pru_ess ,L.+_,,_ r_su_ts from det_ilPd
negotiations. Both can be aided by duly considered resolutions of the
UN General Assembly, especially when the adoption has been by unanimous
vote. With respect to space resources the preferred approach up to the
present has been that of formal agreements. These agreements have been
the particular product of the space-resource States, and it is true that
their terms benefit such countries. With the voting control of the
General Assembly now in the hands of the LDCs, the with the augmented
COPUOSbeing more heavily populated with the LDCs, as well as equatorial
countries, the question has been raised whether such forums should be
employed in the future when space environment law is being formulated.
209
The alternative would be to look at the practices of the space-resource
States and to attempt to connect such practices with customary interna-
tional law. Just as the role of the UN will continue to be a substantial
one in the development of space-environment law, so, also will attention
be given to the importance of the practices of the space-resource States.
It will be necessary to follow these developments with care. Suitable
attention to the issue followed by relevant research efforts will help
clarify the policy options.
Attention has been called on several occasions to the importance of
the concepts of "Common Heritage of Mankind" and "Province of Mankind"
to evolving space-environment law. A clarification of the meaning of
these terms--both in law and in practice--is one of the most critical
issues requiring further assessment. The meaning given to them will have
a critically important impact on the use of space-environment resources,
including demands for the sharing of such resources. Such meaning will
influence man's activities in the space environment, and will constitute
a possible modification, if truly accepted, in the res communis principle.
This principle allows the first to arrive to use without appropriating
in the exclusive sense of exercising sovereignty. The "Mankind"
principles place greater emphasis on sharing, the formation of governing
regimes, the protection of the environment generally, and the special
claims and interests of the LDCs. Hence, any sensible national policy
must take into account, if not be based on, the meaning of and world
support given to such concepts. Of special importance will be the need
to determine if the "Mankind" principles are thought to apply to both the
energy resource, the orbital position resource, and the radio spectrum resource.
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Both short range and longer range, it will be necessary to reassess
the meaning of the terms of the 1967 Principles Treaty and its general
viability. In addition to those legal problems that have already been
mentioned, it will be necessary to establish more clearly than at present
the respective rights of juridical persons, other than States and interna-
tional intergovernmental organizations, to make use of and engage in
activities in the space environment. They, as well as States and such
organizations, may feel compelled to capture and transmit solar energy
from geostationary orbital level to Earth. Either as private business
entities operating wholly within a given nation-State, and thus subject
to its domestic laws, or as private business consortia operating from
several nation-States, and thus subject to a multiplicity of national laws,
they may have certain legal rights in the space environment. Although it
might be assumed that their financial resources were inadequate to carry
out SPS operations, the legal question still remains as to their rights
under the Principles Treaty. Or, they might act in a supportive role
for a governmentally organized and owned SPS. The domestic legal ramifi-
cations of such a relationship are worthy of inquiry.
A further inquiry based on the Principles Treaty is also in order.
Article 4, paragraph 2, limits the requirement of exclusively peaceful
uses to the Moon and other celestial bodies. There are several interpre-
tations as to whether the language of the Article can be so severely
limited as to exclude the peaceful uses requirement from outer space, per se.
Without endeavoring to resolve this issue at this time it should be
mentioned that this is a subject worthy of further inquiry. It has
particular relevance to general security considerations relating to the
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safety of a SPS against the detrimental or hostile conduct of non-national
forces. If human beings are ultimately to depend on "wholesale" solar
energy for their needs, it would not be advisable to allow a figurative
umbilical cord to be affixed to the SPS.
The question is not as to the existence of such a cord. Rather the
question is what can be done to protect both the SPS and its capability
to deliver energy to Earth. If it might be anticipated that intentional
harms might be directed toward a SPS, it might be advisable to establish
either a national or international police force in the space environment
to offer whatever protection it might be able to muster. In the fairly
recent past attention has been given to the possibility that the Soviet
Union has in operational use a space object able to interfere with other
space objects, if not in fact able to neutralize their use. Recently,
the United States has found itself under increasing pressure to field an
anti-satellite capability of its own in response to Soviet activities in
this area. The United States has a goal of maintaining its right of
passage through and operations in space without interference.
The respective security needs of nations relating to the effective
use and operation of a SPS require a political-legal assessment of the
seeming capabilities of such space objects. Inquiry might now be directed
toward a clarification of the legal right of a State to engage in anti-
satellite activities under the terms of the Principles Treaty, whether
the terms of the agreement should be reconsidered in order to prevent
such uses if in fact they are not permitted, and, might even consider
the possibility of reviving the notion that there should be complete
disarmament of the space environment. An approach in which all States
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would be consulted should be balanced against the possibility of a
bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in
which they would engage not to place any armamentsof any kind into the
space environment. An assessmentof the better forum in which to deal
with the security issue would be timely.
If national conduct is to be influenced by the international law
established in the 1967 Principles Treaty, the 1972 Liability Convention,
and the 1973 ITU Convention and Final Protocol, it would appear to be
wise to extend national acceptance of such agreements. It is a surprising
fact that only 35 States are parties to all of these agreements.3 An
assessment of the fact that only one African State is on the list or
only three South American countries have accepted these commitmentswould
be highly instructive. Such a study should contain policy recommendations
as to meansand strategies employable in enlarging the clientele for
these agreements. A wholly separate, but associated issue, relates
particularly to the legal force of the Principles Treaty with respect to
non-parties. At the present there are 75 States parties tu Lh_s agreement
including all of the space-resource States. Have they by this Treaty
and by their practices developed a body of international law--customary
as well as formal--that establishes principles, standards, and rules for
all countries--signatory or not? Clarification of this situation might
ease the decisional process in the United States as it plans for the use
of a SPS.
Much of what has been identified above relates to further national
and international assessments of both long-range and short-range problems.
3See Appendix E and F.
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It is also suggested that international short-range inquiries should be
maderespecting the possibility that microwaves can, in fact, produce
harms. At the world level this could be undertaken by the WHOin
collaboration with both public and private international bodies. At home
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in cooperation with
manyother interested governmental and private groups could be encouraged
to focus on the subject. At the international level the ITU should be
encouraged to continue its assessment of the accuracy of microwave beams.
National bodies should work independently and consult with the ITU. As
the ITU readies for the 1979 WARCand the 1982 regional conference all
involved United States governmental bodies should be studying the
positions to be advanced. In such planning it would be expected that
suitable consultations would be carried on with other States having
interests commonto those of the United States. Suitable preparations
will also have to be madefor the proposed UN Conference on Space Law
and Applications.
The policy positions of the United States, if they are to be soundly
based, require research appraisals of the kind set forth in this White
Paper. Suchpolicy positions require a high degree of coordination at
homebetweenagencies and levels of government and experts in the areas
of science, technology, law and politics. An intelligent blend of facts
and values can and ought to be the ingredients of our decisional process.
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APPENDIX A
MULTILATERAL
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967;
Ratification advised by the Senate o] the United States o] America
April 25, 1967;
Ratified by the President o] the United States o] America May 24,
1967;
Ratifwation o] the United States o] America deposited at flashing.
ton, London, and Moscow October 10, 1967;
Proclaimed by the President o] the United States o] America Octo-
ber 10, 1967;
Entered into torce October 10, 1967.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNTIED STATE8 OF fi_EPHCA
A PROCLAMATION
WHxar_s the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States ih the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, was signed at Washington, London, and
Moscow on January 27, 1967 in behalf-of the United States of America,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and was signed at one or more of
the three capitals in behalf of a number of other States;
WmeREAs the text of the Treaty, in the English, Russian, French,
Spanish, and Chinese languages, as certified by the Department of
State of the United States of America, is word for word as follows :
TIAS 6347 (2410)
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TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES
IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE,
INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES
The States Parties to this Treaty,
Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind
as a result of man's entry into outer space,
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress
of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should
be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the
degree of their economic or scientific development,
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in
the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that such co-operation will contrbbute to the
development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of
friendly relations between States and peoples,
Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled "Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space", which was adopted unanimously
by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963,
TIAS 6347
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Recalling resolution 1884 (XVII1), calling upon States to
refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction
or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was
adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on
17 October 19_3,
Taking account of United Nations General Assembly
resolution 110 (If) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda
designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the
aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space,
Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, will further the Purposes and
Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, l']
Have agreed on the following:
Article I
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit
and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree
of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of
all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
T89_3;59 Stat. 1031.
TIAS 6347
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discrimination of any kind. on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law, and there shall be free access
to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States
shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such
investigation.
Article II
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.
Article III
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including
the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security and promoting international
co-operation and understanding.
Article IV
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to.place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on
celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.
II-O01 I+oL lB. pt. 3I 0 " II -
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The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The
establishment of military bases, installations end fortifications,
the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military
maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or
facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other
celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Article V
States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys
of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible
assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing
on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When
astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly
returned to the State of registry of their space venlcie.
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial
bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible
assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other
States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-Ceneral of the United
Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, _nich could constitute a
danger to the life or health of astronauts.
TIAS 6347
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Article VI
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are
carried on by goverr_nenCal agencies or by non-governmental entities,
and for assurln 8 that natlona| activities are carried out in
conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty,
The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require
a_thorization and cmltinuing supervision by the appropriate State
Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space,
Including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international
organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall
be borne both by the international organization and by the States
Parties to the Treaty p_rtlcipating in such organization.
Article VII
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory
or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or
juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the
Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and
ocher celestial bodies.
TIAS 6347
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Article Vlll
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object
launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and
control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in
outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched
into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a
celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by
their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their
return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond
the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they
are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall,
upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.
Acticle IX
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be
guideo by the pLJ-_ivlc cf =c-9_=rnrlnn and mutual assistance and
shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties
to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them
so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes
in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of
extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate
measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has
TIAS 6347
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reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it
or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with
activities of ot_er States Parties in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before
proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party
to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially
harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or
experiment.
Article X
In order to promote international co-operition in the
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty.
the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of
equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be
afforded.an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects
launched by those States.
The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the
conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by
agreement between the States concerned.
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Article XI
In order to promote Internatlonal co-operatlon in the peaceful
exploratlon and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty
conducting activities in outer space, Including the moon and other
celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the
Ualted Nations as well as the public and the international scientific
comnn_nlty, to the greatest extent feasible and practlcable, of the
nature, conduct, locations and results of such acclvltles. On
receiving r_he said information, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations should be prepared to disseminate It immediately and
effectively.
Article XII
All stations, InsCallatlons, equlpment and space vehicles on
the moon and other celesclsl bodies shall be open to representatives
of ocher States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.
Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a
projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be herd
and that maxlnn_ precautions my be taken to assure safety and to
avoid interference vith normal operations in the facility to be
visited.
Article XIll
The provisions of thls Treaty shall apply to the activities of
States Parties co the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and ocher celestial bodies, whether such
TIAS 6B47
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activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or
Jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried
on within the framework of international inter-governmental
organizations.
Any practical questions arising in connection with activities
carried on by International inter-governmental organizations in the
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the
Treaty either with the appropriate international organization or
with one or more States members of that international organization,
which are Parties to this Treaty.
Article XIV
I. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature.
Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into
force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede
to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory
States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession
shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republlcs, which are hereby
designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of
instruments of ratification by five Governments including the
Governments designated as Depositary Coverr_nents under this Treaty.
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&. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession
are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty,
it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the
date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession
to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
Article XV
Any State Party to the Xreaty may propose amendments to this
Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to
the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a
majority of the States faruie_ _v _h_ Tr_y and thereafter for each
remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.
Article XVI
Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal
from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written
notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall
take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.
TIAS 6347
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Article XVII
This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish
and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the
archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of
this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to
the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
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BOGOTA DECLARATION
FIRST MEETING OF EQUATORIAL COUNTRIES*
The undersigned representatives of the States traversed by the
Equator met in Bogot6, Republic of Colombia, from November 29
through December 3rd, 1976 with the purpose of studying the geostationary
orbit that corresponds to their national terrestrial, sea, and insular
territory and considered as a natural resource. After an exchange of
information and having studied in detail the different technical, legal,
and political aspects implied in the exercise of national sovereignty
of States adjacent to said orbit, have reached the following conclusions:
I. The Geostationary Orbit as a Natural Resource
The geostationary orbit is a circular orbit on the Equatorial
plane in which the period of sideral revolution of the satellite is
equal to the period of sideral rotation of the Earth and the satellite
moves in the same direction of the Earth's rotation. When a sateliite
describes this particular orbit, it is said to be geostationary; such a
satellite appears to be stationary in the sky, when viewed from the
earth, and is fixed on the zenith of a given point of the Equator, whose
longitude is by definition that of the satellite.
This orbit is located at an approximate distance of 35,871 Kmts.
over the Earth's Equator.
Equatorial countries declare that the geostationary synchronous
orbit is a physical fact linked to the reality of our planet because
*The expression "Equatorial Countries" throughout the text means
those states of the world traversed by the Equator.
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its existence depends exclusively on its relation to gravitational
phenomena generated by the earth, and that is why it must not be
considered part of the outer space. Therefore, the segments of geosta-
tionary synchronous orbit are part of the territory over which
Equatorial states exercise their national sovereignty. The geostationary
orbit is a scarce natural resource, whose importance and value increase
rapidly together with the development of space technology and with the
growing need for communication; therefore, the Equatorial countries
meeting in Bogot6 have decided to proclaim and defend on behalf of their
peoples, the existence of their sovereignty over this natural resource.
The geostationary orbit represents a unique facility that it alone can
offer for telecommunication services and other uses which require
geostationary satellites.
The frequencies and orbit of geostationary satellites are limited
natural resources, fully accepted as such by current standards of the
International Telecommunications Union. Technological advancement has
caused a continuous increase in the number of satellites that use this
orbit, which could result in a saturation in the near future.
The solutions proposed by the International Telecommunications
Union and the relevant documents that attempt to achieve a better use
of the geostationary orbit that shall prevent its imminent saturation,
are at present impracticable and unfair and would considerably increase
the exploitation costs of this resource especially for developing
countries that do not have equal technological and financial resources
as compared to industrialized countries who enjoy an apparent monopoly
in the exploitation and use of its geostationary synchronous orbit. In
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spite of the principle established by Article 33, sub-paragraph 2 of the
International Telecommunications Convention, of 1973, that in the use of
frequency bands for space radiocommunications, the members shall take
into account that the frequencies and the orbit for geostationary
satellites are limited natural resources that must be used efficiently
and economically to allow the equitable access to this orbit and to its
frequencies, we can see that both the geostationary orbit and the
frequencies have been used in a way that does not allow the equitable
process of the developing countries that do not have the technical and
financial means that the great powers have. Therefore, it is imperative
for the equatorial countries to exercise their sovereignty over the
corresponding segments of the geostationary orbit.
2. Sovereignty of Equatorial States over the Correspondin 9 Segments
of the Geostationary Orbit
In qualifying this orbit as a natural resource, equatorial states
reaffirm "the right of the peoples and of nations to permanent sovereignty
over their wealth and natural resources that must be exercised in the
interest of their national development and of the welfare of the people
of the nation concerned," as it is set forth in Resolution 2692 (XXV)
of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "permanent sovereignty
over the natural resources of developing countries and expansion of
internal accumulation sources for economic developments."
Furthermore, the charter on economic rights and duties of states
solemnly adopted by the United Nations General Assembly through
Resolution 3281 (XXIX), once more confirms the existence of a sovereign
right of nations over their natural resources, in Article 2 sub-paragraph I,
which reads:
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"All states have and freely exercise full and permanent sovereignty,
including possession, use and disposal of all their wealth, natural
resources and economic activities."
Consequently, the above mentioned provisions lead the equatorial
states to affirm that the synchronous geostationary orbit, being a
natural resource, is under the sovereignty of the equatorial states.
3. Legal status of the Geostationary Orbit
Bearing in mind the existence of sovereign rights over segments of
the geostationary orbit, the equatorial countries consider that the
applicable legal considerations in this area must take into account the
following:
a) The sovereign rights put forward by the equatorial countries
are directed towards rendering tangible benefits to their
respective people and for the universal community, which is
completely different from the present reality when the orbit
is used to the greater benefit of the most developed countries.
b) The segments of the orbit corresponding to the open sea are
beyond the national jurisdiction of states and will be considered
as common heritage of mankind. Consequently, the competent
international agencies should regulate its use and exploitation
for the benefit of mankind.
c) The equatorial states do not object to the free orbital transit
of satellites approved and authorized by the International
Telecommunications Convention, when these satellites pass through
their outer space in their gravitational flight outside their
geostationary orbit.
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d) The devices to be placed permanently on the segment of a
geostationary orbit of an equatorial state shall require
previous and expressed authorization on the part of the
concerned state, and the operation of the device should conform
with the national law of that territorial country over which
it is placed. It must be understood that the said authoriza-
tion is different from the coordination requested in cases of
interference among satellite systems, which are specified in
the regulations for radiocommunications. The said authoriza-
tion refers in very clear terms to the countries' right to allow
the operation of fixed radiocommunications stations within
their territory.
e) Equatorial states do not condone the existing satellites or
the position they occupy on their segments of the Geostationary
Orbit nor does the existence of said satellites confer any
rights of placement of satellites or use of the segh_ent unless
expressly authorized by the state exercising sovereignty over
this segment.
4. Treaty of 1967
The Treaty of 1967 on "The Principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies," signed on January 27 of 1967, cannot be
considered as a final answer to the problem of the exploration and use
of outer space, even less when the international community is questioning
all the terms of international law which were elaborated when the
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developing countries could not count on adequate scientific advice and
were thus not able to observe and evaluate the omissions, contradictions
and consequences of the proposals which were prepared with great ability
by the industrialized powers for their own benefit.
There is no valid or satisfactory definition of outer space which
may be advanced to support the argument that the geostationary orbit is
included in the outer space. The legal affairs sub-commissioned which
is dependent on the United Hations Commission on the Use of Outer Space
for Peaceful Purposes, has been working for a long time on a definition
of outer space, however, to date, there has been no agreement in this
respect.
Therefore, it is imperative to elaborate a juridical definition of
outer space, without which the implementation of the Treaty of 1967 is
only a way to give recognition to the presence of the states that are
already using the geostationary orbit. Under the name of a so-called
non-national appropriation, what was actually developed was technological
partition of the orbit, which is simply a national appropriation, and
this must be denounced by the equatorial countries. The experiences
observed up to the present and the developments foreseeable for the
coming years bring to light the obvious omissions of the Treaty of 1967
which force the equatorial states to claim the exclusion of the
geostationary orbit.
The lack of definition of outer space in the Treaty of 1967, which
has already been referred to, implies that article II should not apply
to geostationary orbit and therefore does not affect the right of the
equatorial states that have already ratified the Treaty.
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5. Diplomatic and Political Action
While article 2 of the aforementioned Treaty does not establish an
express exception regarding the synchronous geostationary orbit, as an
integral element of the territory of equatorial states, the countries
that have not ratified the Treaty should refrain from undertaking any
procedure that allows the enforcement of provisions whose juridical
omission has already been denounced.
The representatives of the equatorial countries attending the
meeting in Bogot6, wish to clearly state their position regarding the
declarations of Colombia and Ecuador in the United Nations, which affirm
that they consider the geostationary orbit to be an integral part of
their sovereign territory; this declaration is a historical background
for the defense of the sovereign rights of the equatorial countries.
These countries will endeavor to make similar declarations in international
agencies dealing with the same subject and to align their international
policy in accordance with the principles elaborated in this document.
Signed in Bogot_ 3rd December 1976 by the Heads of Delegations.
Geraldo Nabcimento Silva
Observateur du BRESIL
Sara Ordofiez de Lodofio
Colombia
Tchitche Linguissi
Congo
Jos_ Ayala Lasso
Ecuador
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Soehardjono
Indonesia
Petersan John Kinya
Kenya
Khalid Younis Kinene
Uganda
Wabali Bakitambisa
Zaire
APPENDIX C
MULTILATERAL
Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects
Done at ff'ashington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972;
Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America
October 6, 1972;
Ratified by the President of the United States of America May 18,
1973;
Ratification of the United States of America deposited at _Va_h.
infton, London, and Moscow October 9, 1973;
Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America
November 21, 1973;
Entered into force with respect to the United States of America
October 9, 1975.
BT THE PRESIDENT OF THE _.JNITED STATES OF .AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
CONSIDERING THAT:
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on
March 29, 1972 in behalf of the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the depositary governments, and was
signed at one or more of the three capitals in behalf of a number of
other States, a certified copy of which Convention is hereto annexed;
The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of
October 6, 1972, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein,
gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the Convention;
The President of the United States of America ratified the Conven-
tion on May 18, 1973, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the
Senate;
The United States of America deposited its instrument of ratification
on October 9, 1973, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2
of Article X.XIV of the Convention;and
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article XXIV of the
Convention, the Convention entered into force for the United Sta .tes
of America on October 9, 1973;
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Now, TaERErOXtZ, be it known that I, Richard Nixon, President
of the United States of America, proclaim and make public the said
Convention to the end that it shall be observed and fulfilled with
good faith on and after October 9, 1973 by the United States of
America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all
other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
IN TESTIMONYWriESt-Or, I have signed this proclamation and caused
the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DoNE at the city of Washington this twenty-first day of November
in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred
[SEAL] seventy-three and of the Independence of the United
States of America the one hundred ninety-eighth.
RICHARD NIXON
By the President:
H_NBT A. KlSSINOER
Secretary of State
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CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS
The States Parties to this Convention,
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in furthering
the e.xploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, [1]
Taking into consideration that, notwithstanding the
precautionary measures to be taken by States and international
Intergovernmental organizations involved in the launching of space
objects, damage may on occasion be caused by such objects,
Recognizing the need to elaborate effective international
rules and procedures concerning llability for damage caused by
space objects and to ensure, in particular, the prnmpt payment
under the terms of this Convention of a full and equitable measure
of compensation to VlCt_s of much damage,
Believing that the establishamnt of such rules and procedures
will contribute to the strengthening of international cooperation
in the field of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes,
Have agreed on the following:
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ARTICLE I
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) The term "damage" means loss of life, personal injury or
other impairment of healthl or loss of or damage to property of
States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of inter-
national intergovernmental organizations;
(b) The term "launching" includes attempted launching;
(c) The term "launching State" means:
(i) A State which launches or procures the launc_ing of
a space object;
(ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space
object iS launched;
(d) The term "space object" includes component parts of a
space object as well as its launch %ehicle and parts thereof.
ARTICLE II
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation
for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or
to aircraft in flight.
ARTICLE III
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere ths/% on the
surface of the earth to • space object of one launching State or to
persons or property on board such • space object by a specs object
of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the
damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible.
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ARTICLE IV
1. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on
the surface of the earth to a space object of one launching State
or to persons or property on board such a space object by a space
object of another launching State, and of damage thereby being
caused to a third State or to its natural or Juridical persons,
the first two States shall be jointly and severally liable to
the third State, to the extent indicated by the following:
{a) If the damage has been caused to the third State
on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight, their
liability to the third State shall be absolute;
(b) If the damage has been caused to a space object of
the third State or to persons or property on board that
space object elsewhere then on the surface of the earth,
their liability to the third State shall be based on the
fault of either of the first two States or on the fault of
persons for whcD either is responsible.
2. In all cases of joint and several liability referred to
in paragraph I of this article, the burden of compensation for the
damage shall be apportioned between the first two States in
accordance with the extent to which they were at fault; _f the
extent of the fault of each of these States cannot be established,
the burden of compensation shall be apportioned equally between
them. Such apportionment shell be without prejudice to the right of
the third State to seek the entire ¢umpensation due under th/m
Convention from any or all of the launching States which era Jointly
and severally liable.
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ARTICLE V
I. Whenever two or more States jointly launch a space
object, they shall be jointly and severally liable for any damage
caused.
2. A launching State which has paid compensation for damage
shall have the right to present s claim for indemnification to
other participants iA the joint launching. The participants in a
joint launching May conclude agreements regarding the apportioning
among themselvesjof the financial obligation in respect of which
they are Jointly and severally liable. Such agreements shall be
without prejudice to the right of a Stats sustaining damage to
seek the entire compensation due under this Convention from any
or all of the launching States which are Jointly and severally
liable.
3. A State from whose territory or facility s space object
is launched shall be regarded as a participant in a joint
launching.
ARTICLE VI
I. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article,
exoneration from absolute liability shall be granted tc the extent
that s launching State establishes that the damage has resulted
either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an act
or omlssion done with intent to cause damage on the part of a
claimant State or of natural or Juridical persons it represents.
2. No exoneration whatever shall be granted in cases where
the damage has resulted from activities conducted by a launching
State which are not in conformity with international law including,
TIAS 7762.
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in particular, the Charter of the United Nations rItlj and the Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Noon and Other Celestial
Bodies.
ARTICLE VII
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to damage
caused by a space object of a launching State to:
(a) Nationals of that launching State;
(b) Foreign nationals during such time as they are
participating in the operation of that space object from the time
of its launching or at any stage thereafter until its descent, or
during such time as they are in the immediate vicinity of s planned
launchi'ng or recovery area as the result of an invitation by that
launching State.
ARTICLE VIII
I. A State which suffers damage, or whose natural or
juridical persons suffer damage, may present to a launching State
a claim for compensation for such damage.
2. If the State of nationality has not presented a claim,
another State may, in respect of damage sustained in its territory
by any natural or juridical person, present a claim to a launching
State.
3. If neither the State of nationality nor the State in
whose territory the damage was sustained has presented a claim or
notified its intention of presenting a claim, another State may,
in respect of damage sustained by its permanent residents, present
a claim to • launching State.
a T8 89S; 59 Btat 108L
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ARTICLE ZX
A claim for compensation for damage shall be presented to a
launching State through diplomatic channels. If a State does not
maintain diplomatic relations with the launching State concerned,
it may request another State to present its claim to that launching
State or otherwise represent its interests under this Convention.
It may also present its claim through the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, provided the claimant State and the launchinq State
are both Members of the United Nations.
ARTICLE X
I. A claim for compensation for damage may be presented to
• launching State not later than one year following the date of
the occurrence of the damage or the identification of the launching
State which is liable.
2. If, however, a State does not know of the occurrence of
the damage or has not been able to identify the launching State
which is liable, it may present a claim within one year following
the date on which it learned of the aforementioned facts_ however,
this period shall in no event exceed one year following the date
on which the State could reasonably be expected to have learned
of the facts through the exerciae of due diligence.
3. The time-limlts specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
article shall apply even if the full extent of the damage may not
be known. In this event, however, the claimant State shall be
entitled to revise the claim and submit additional documentation
after the expiration of such time-limits until one year after the
full extent of the damage is known.
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ARTICLE XI
I. Presentation of a claim to a launching State for
compensation for damage under this Convention.shall not require
the prior exhaustion of any local remedies which may be available
to a claimant State or to natural or juridical persons it represents.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a State, or
_atural or _uridical persons it might represent, from pursuing a
claim in the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a
launching State. A State shall not, however, be entitled to present
a claim under this Convention in respect of the same damage for
which a claim is being pursued in the courts or administrative
tribunals or agencies of a launching State or under another inter-
national agreement which is binding on the States concerned.
ARTICLE XII
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to
pay for damage under this Convention shall be determined in accor-
dance with international law and the principles of justice and
equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the
damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or
international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented
to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not
occurred.
ARTICLE XIII
Unless the claimant State and the State from which compensation
is due under this Convention agree on another form of compensation,
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the compensation shall be paid in the currency of the claimant
3tare or, if that State so requests, in the currency of the
State from which compensation is. due.
ARTICLE XIV
If no settlement of a claim is arrived at through diplomatic
negotiations as provided for in article IX, within one year from
the date on which the claimant State notifies the launching State
that it has submitted the documentation of its claim, the parties
concerned shall establish a Claims Commission at the request of
either party.
ARTICLE XV
i. The Claims Connuission shall be composed of three members:
one appointed by the claimant State, one appointed by the launching
State and the third member, the Chairman, to be chosen by both
parties jointly. Each party shall make its appointment within two
months of the request for the establishment of the Claims Commission.
2. If no agreement is reached on the choice of the Chairman
within four months of the request for the establishment of the
Co_ission, either party may request the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to appoint the Chairman within a further period of
two months.
ARTICLE XVZ
I. If one of the parties does not make its appointment
within the stipulated period, the Chairman shall, at the request
of the other party, constitute a single-member Claims Con_uission.
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2. Any vacancy which may arise in the Commission for
whatever reason shall be filled by the same procedure adopted for
the original appointment.
3. The Commission shall determine its own procedure.
4. The Commission shall determine the place or places where
it shall sit and all other administrative matters.
5. Except in the case of decisions and swards by a single-
member Co_ission, all decisions and awards of the Com_uission shall
be by majority vote.
ARTICLE XVII
No increase in the m_mbership of the Claims Co_ission shall
take place by reason of two oz more claimant States or launching
States being joined in any one proceeding before the Ccm=_ission.
The claimant States so joined shall collectively appoint one
member of the Co_aiasion in the same manner and subject to the
same conditions as would be the case for s single claimant State.
When two or more launching States are •o Joined, they shall
collectively appoint one member of the Commission in the same way.
Zf the claimant States or the launching States do not make the
appointment within the stipulated period, the Chairman shall
constitute a single-member Co_nisaion.
ARTICLE XVIlI
The Claims Commission shall decide the merits of the claim for
compensation and determine the amount of oempenaation payable, if
any.
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ARTICLE XIX
I. The Claims Commission shall act in accordance with the
provisions of article XII.
2. The decision of the Cc_nnission shall be final and binding
if the parties have so agreed; otherwise the C_ission shall render
a final and recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider
in good faith. The Commission shallstate the reasons for its
decision or award.
3. The Cor_ission shall give its decision or award as
promptly as possible and no later than one year from the date of
its establishment, unless an extension of this period is found
necessary by the Cc_mission.
4. The Corm_ission shall make its decision or award public.
It shall deliver a certified copy of its decision or award to each
of the parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
ARTICLE XX
The expenses in regard to the Claims Commission shall be
borne equally by the parties, unless otherwise decided by the
Commission.
ARTICLE XXI
If the damage caused by a space object presents a large-scale
danger to human life or seriously interferes with the living
conditions of the population or the functioning of vital centers,
the States Parties, and in particular the launching State, shall
examine the possibility of rendering appropriate and rapid
assistance to the State which has suffered the damage, when it
so requests. However, nothing in this article shall affect the
rights or obligations of the States Parties under this Convention.
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ARTICLE XXII
1. Zn this Convention, with the exception of articles XXIV
to XXVII, references to States shall be deemed to apply to any
international intergovernmental organization which conducts space
activities if the organization declares its acceptance of the
rights and obligations provided for in this Convention and if a
majority of the States members of the organization are States
Parties to this Convention and to the Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
2. States members of any such organization which are States
Parties to this Convention shall take all appropriate steps to
ensure that the organization makes a declaration in accordance with
the preceding paragraph.
3. If an international intergovernmental organization is
liable for damage by virtue of the provisions of this Convention,
that organization and those of its members which are States Parties
to this Convention shall be jointly and severally liable; provided,
however, that:
(a) Any claim for compensation in respect of such damage
shall be first presented to the organization;
(b} Only where the organization has not paid, within a
period of six months, any sum agreed or determined to be due
as compensation for such damage, may the claimant State invoke
the liability of the members which ere States Parties to this
Convention for the payment of that stun.
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4. Any claim, pursuant to the provisions of this Convention,
for compensation in respect of damage caused to an organization
which has made a declaratxon in accordance wxth paragraph 1 of this
article shall be presented by a State member of the organization
which i8 a State Party to this Convention.
ARTICLE XXlII
I. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect other
international agreements in force in so far as relations between
the States Parties to such agreements are concerned.
2. No provision of this Convention shall prevent States
from concluding international agreements reaffirming, supplementing
or extending its provisions.
ARTICLE XXIV
I. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature.
Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into
force in accardance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to
it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instrt_entl of
accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United
States of America, the United Ki_gd_ of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are
hereby designated the Depositary Govarnmente.
3. Thi8 Convention shall enter into force on the depoait of
the fifth instrument of ratification.
TIA8 Tt62
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4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession
are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention,
it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the
date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession
to this Convention, the date of its entry into force and other
notices.
6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
ARTICLE XXV
Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments
to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each
State Party to the Convention accepting the amenclments upon their
acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention
and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Convention on
the date of acceptance by it.
ARTICLE XXVI
Ten Fears after the entry into force of this Convention, the
question of the review of this Convention shall be included in the
provisional agenda of the United Nations General Assembly in order
to consider, in the light of past application of the Convention,
whether it requires revision. Bogeyer, at any time after the
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2404 U.S. Treatie_ and Other International A _'eem_ts [24 UST
Convention has been in fores for five years, and at the request of
one third of the States Parties to the Convention, and with the
concurrence of the majority of the States Parties, a conference of
the States Parties shall be convened to review this Convention.
ARTICLE XXVIZ
Any State Party to this Convention may give notice of it!
withdrawal from the Convention one year after its entry into force
by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such
withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt
of this notification.
ARTICLE XXVIII
This Convention, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish
and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the
archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of
this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Govery_ents
to the Governments of the signatory and accedinq States.
TIAR 7762.
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M_hNUI_ U
COMPARISON CHART OF SIGNATORY NATIONS FOR THREE TREATIES*
1967 OST - Treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967.
18 UST 2410; TIAS 6347; 610 UNTS 205.
1972 LIABILITY - Convention on the international liability for damage caused by
space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972.
24 UST 2389; TIAS 7762.
1973 ITU - International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols.
Done at Malaga-Torremolinos, October 25, 1973. TIAS 8572.
* As of January i, 1978.
NATION 1967 OST 1972 LIABILITY 1973 ITU
Afghanistan ...... YES
Albania ...... YES
Angola ...... YES
Argentina YES --- YES
Australia YES YES YES
Austria YES --- YES
Bahamas, The YES --- YES
Bahrain ...... YES
Bangladesh ...... YES
Barbados YES --- YES
Belgium YES YES ---
Benin --- YES ---
Botswana --- YES ---
Brazil YES YES YES
Bulgaria YES YES YES
Burma YES --- YES
Burundi ...... YES
Byelorussian Soviet Soc. Rep. YES --- YES
Canada YES YES YES
C_peVerde ...... YES
Central African Empire ...... YES
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NATION
Chile
China, People' s Republic
China, Republic
Colcrabia
Comoros
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
E1 Salvador
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gambia, The
German Democratic Republic
Germany, Federal Republic
Ghana
Greece
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Hungary
Iceland
1967 OST
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
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1972 LIABILI_
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
mm--
YES
YES
1973 ITU
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NATION 1967 OST
India ---
Indonesia ---
Iran ---
Iraq YES
Ireland YES
Israel YES
Italy YES
Jamaica YES
Japan YES
Jordan ---
Kenya ---
Korea, Democratic People's Republic YES
Korea, Republic YES
Kuwait YES
Laos YES
Lebanon YES
Lesotho ---
Liberia ---
Libya YES
Liechtenstein ---
Luxembourg ---
Madagascar YES
Malawi ---
Malaysia ---
Maldives ---
Mali YES
Malta ---
Mauritania ---
Mauritius YES
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1972 LIABILITY
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
1973 ITU
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NATION
Mexico
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Netherlands, The
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Rwanda
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
1967 OST
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
270
1972 LIABILITY
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
1973 ITU
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NATION 1967OST 1972 LIABILITY 19.73 ITU
Somalia ...... YES
South Africa YES --- YES
Spain YES --- YES
Sri Lanka --- YES ---
Surinam ...... YES
Swaziland ...... YES
Sweden YES YES YES
Switzerland YES YES YES
Syrian Arab Republic YES --- YES
Tanzania ...... YES
Thailand YES --- YES
Togo --- YES YES
Tonga YES --- YES
Trinidad and Tobago ...... YES
Tunisia YES YES YES
Turkey YES ......
Uganda YES ......
Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic YES YES YES
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics YES YES YES
United Arab Emirates ...... YES
United Kingdom YES YES YES
United States YES YES YES
Upper Volta YES .....
Uruguay YES YES ---
Vatican City ...... YES
Venezuela YES ......
Viet Nam, Socialist Republic ...... YES
Yugoslavia --- YES YES
Zaire ...... YES
Zambia YES YES ---
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Australia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ecuador
Fiji
Finland
France
German Democratic Republic
Germany, Federal Republic
Greece
Hungary
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Kuwait
Laos
Mali
Mexico
Mongolia
New Zealand
Pakistan
Poland
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Sweden
Switzerland
Tunisia
Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States
APPENDIX E
LIST OF NATIONS WHICH ARE SIGNATORY TO ALL THREE TREATIES
(1967 Principles, 1972 Liability, 1973 ITU)
SOURCE: TREATIES IN FORCE, 1978, Department of State Publication 8934,
Pp. 362-3, 367-8.
TOTAL: 35
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NATIONSBY AREAWHICHARESIGNATORYTOTHREETREATIES
WESTERN EUROPE
(1967 Principles, 1972 Liability, 1973 ITU)
EASTERN EUROPE
DENMARK
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC
IRELAND
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UNITED KINGDOM
BULGARIA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
POLAND
UKRANIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR)
MEDITERRANEAN
ASIA AND PACIFIC
CYPRUS
GREECE
AUSTRALIA
FIJI
LAOS
MONGOLIA
NEW ZEALAND
PAKISTAN
SINGAPORE
AFRICA
MALI
SOUTH AMERICA
MIDDLE EAST
BRAZIL
ECUADOR
IRAQ
ISRAEL
KUWA IT
SAUDI ARABIA
TUNISIA
NORTH AMERICA
CANADA
MEXICO
UNITED STATES
TOTAL: 35
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APPENDIX G
EQUATORIAL NATIONS AND FOUR TREATIES
(1967 Principles, 1971 WARC, 1972 Liability, and 1973 ITU)
NATION
BRAZIL
COLOMBIA
CONGO
ECUADOR
GABON
INDONESIA
KENYA
PERU
SOMALIA
UGANDA
ZAIRE
1967 PRINCIPLES
YES
n--D
YES
YES
NOT A PARTY
NOT A PARTY
NOT A PARTY
1971 WARC 1972 LIABILITY 1973 ITU
YES YES YES
...... YES
YES YES
YES
YES
YES
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